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The Spaniards were unable to exterminate the Indian race by those un-
paralleled atrocities which brand them with indelible shame, nor did 
they succeed even in wholly depriving it of its rights; but the Americans 
of the United States have accomplished this twofold purpose with singu-
lar felicity, tranquilly, legally, philanthropically, without shedding blood, 
and without violating a single great principle of morality in the eyes of 
the world. It is impossible to destroy men with more respect for the laws 
of humanity.1 
INTRODUCTION 
One of the most critical deprivations that the American Indians 
suffered at the hands of the United States was the loss of their lands. 
Within two centuries of the first European settlements in North Amer-
ica, the newcomers held title to almost every acre of the continent. At 
the root of most land titles in America today sits a federal patent. 
Government title, in turn, flows from "[t]he great case of johnson v. 
M[')Intosh,',2 which held that the United States has the exclusive right 
to extinguish Indians' interests in their lands, either by purchase or 
just war. M'Intosh was consistent with a long and uninterrupted line of 
statutes, regulations, and proclamations that barred private purchases 
ofland from the Indians. 
Most discussion of M'Intosh, and, more generally, of the larger 
process of expropriating North America from the Indians, has focused 
on normative questions about the relative evil or benevolence of the 
invading Europeans. De Tocqueville, contrasting Spanish "atrocities" 
with American legality and philanthropy, expressed the benevolent 
view that, unsurprisingly, was quite common in early America. E. de 
Vattel, a prominent eighteenth-century scholar of international law, 
noted with favor the American practice of buying lands even where, 
strictly speaking, the law did not require it: 
[W] e can not but admire the moderation of the English Puritans who 
were the first to settle in New England. Although they bore with them a 
charter from their sovereign, they bought from the savages the lands 
they wished to occupy. Their praiseworthy example was followed by 
1 1 ALExiS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 355 (Phillips Bradley ed. & 
Henry Reeve trans., Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1945) (1835). 
2 Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 279 (1954) (citing johnson v. 
M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823) ). In the M'Intosh opinion itself, Chief justice 
Marshall adverted to the "magnitude of the interest in [this] litigation." M'Intosh, 21 
U.S. (8 Wheat) at 604. William Mcintosh spelled and signed his last name with a "c" 
instead of an apostrophe, yet the Supreme Court used an apostrophe. 
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William Penn and the colony of Quakers that he conducted into Penn-
I . s syvama. 
Other commentators, while also maintaining that Europeans ex-
propriated with the best of intentions, at least tried to come to terms 
with the undeniably detrimental effect on Indians. "No government 
ever entertained more enlightened and benevolent intentions toward 
a weaker people than did that of the United States toward the Indian, 
but never in history, probably, has a more striking divergence between 
intention and performance been witnessed. "4 
Despite this failure to translate intent into effective action, leading 
scholars of this century have concurred with this sympathetic view. 
Felix Cohen, the founder of American Indian law as a distinct and 
scholarly field of study, noted that America paid for almost every 
square foot of the nation. He thus argued that "[w]e are probably the 
one great nation in the world that has consistently sought to deal with 
an aboriginal population on fair and equitable terms. We have not 
always succeeded in this effort but our deviations have not been typi-
cal. "5 Francis Paul Prucha, a leading historian of relations between 
the United States and the Indians, has argued that treaties and stat-
utes evidence a sincere desire to protect Indian rights.6 Another his-
torian, Don Russell, after debunking the myth that Indian massacres 
played a significant role in expropriating the continent by exterminat-
ing its aboriginal inhabitants, argued that the United States behaved 
with at least relative humanity. "Much of world history tells of the 
movements of peoples that infringe on other peoples. Rarely have the 
infringed upon been treated ·with more consideration and humane-
ness than was the American Indian. "7 
The opposite view, that European laws and practices amounted to 
a patently immoral land-grab, dates back at least to the years immedi-
3 3 E. DE VATIEL, LE DROIT DES GENS, OU PRINCIPES DE LA LOI NATURELLE, 
APPUQuEs A LA CONDUITE ET AUX AFFAIRES DES NATIONS ET DES SOUVERAINS [LAW OF 
NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW APPUED TO THE CONDUCT AND TO THE 
AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND OF SOVEREIGNS} 85-86 (Charles G. Fenwick trans., Oceana 
Publications, Inc. 1964) (1758). 
4 Mn.O Mn.TON QUAIFE, CHICAGO AND THE OLD NORTIIWEST, 1673-1835, at 179 
(1913). 
5 Felix S. Cohen, Original Indian Title, 32 MINN. L. REV. 28, 34 (1947). 
6 See FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN POUCY IN THE FORMATIVE YEARS: 
THE INDIAN TRADE & INTERCOURSE ACTS, 1790-1834, at 248 (1962) ("For [the Indian 
policy of the United States] we must tum to the treaties made with the Indians, which 
uniformly guaranteed Indian rights •••. "). 
7 Don Russell, H(IUJ Many Indians Were Killed?, AM. W.,July 1973, at 42, 63. 
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ately following the decision in M'Intosh. Although Justice Joseph Story 
signed on to Chief justice Marshall's unanimous opinion in the case, 
in a speech given five years later he argued that the case violated both 
"natural law and moral right. "8 A later monograph labeled the opin-
ion as "imperialism" and cast the result as facially immoral: 
[A]bove all, [M1ntosh] involved a flat question of right and wrong. It 
was a decision which seems to have altogether ignored property rights 
which had solemnly vested . . . . We are then to inquire whether or not 
the conscience of the world will today respond affirmatively to the 
proposition that discovery and conquest alone give a title as against own-
ers and occupants of property ... whether, in a word, that which is mor-
ally wrong can be legally and politically right. 9 
A growing number of scholars, reexamining the historical record 
from the Indian perspective, have cast M'Intosh and the larger process 
of expropriating Indian lands in even darker terms. A particularly 
bleak account of European treatment of the Indians observes that 
those "reaching for illicit power customarily assume attitudes of great 
moral rectitude to divert attention from the abandonment of their 
own moral standards of behavior .... All conquest aristocracies have 
followed such paths. It would be incredible if ours had not. "10 An-
other scholar, Vrne Deloria, avers that "Indians have not accepted the 
mythology of the American past which interprets American history as 
a sanitized merging of diverse peoples to form a homogeneous union. 
The ... abuses of the past and present [are] too vivid, and the mem-
ory of freedom [is] too lasting. "11 
Mter a thorough study of the intellectual antecedents to the opin-
ion, a recent work classifies M'Intosh as part of a 
discourse of conquest, which denies fundamental human rights and self-
determination to indigenous tribal peoples .... [This discourse asserts] 
the West's lawful power to impose its vision of truth on non-Western 
peoples through a racist, colonizing rule oflaw . 
. . . [T]he United States acquired a continent "in perfect good faith" 
that its wars and acts of genocide directed against Indian people ac-
corded with the rule oflaw. 
8 R. KENT NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT jUSTICE jOSEPH STORY: STATESMAN OF THE 
OLD REPUBUC 213 {1985). 
9 GEORGE BRYAN, THE IMPERIAUSM OF jOHN MARSHALL: A STuDY IN EXPEDIENCY i-
ii (1924). 
10 FRANCIS jENNINGS, THE INVASION OF AMERICA: INDIANS, COLONIALISM, AND THE 
CANTOFCONQUESTix (1975). 
11 
VINE DELORIA, BEHIND THE TRAIL OF BROKEN TREATIES: AN INDIAN 
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 2 (1974). 
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••• [T]he West's archaic, medievally derived legal discourse respect-
ing the American Indian is ultimately genocidal in both its practice and 
its intent.12 
For both sides of this debate, law plays a central role. Those with a 
dark view of the process of expropriation argue that European settlers 
used (or perhaps more accurately, abused) laws either with specific 
intent to take land and exterminate the aboriginal population, or with 
deliberate indifference to these inevitable results of their policies. 
Observers who view European actions as relatively benevolent insist 
that legal rules softened the process of expropriation. 
This Article makes no attempt to resolve this long-running and 
well-known normative debate. Moreover, neither view is consistent 
with even the most basic facts in the legal and historical record. Mas-
sacres, and even battles, were quite rare in the process of expropriat-
ing Indian lands-a fact difficult to harmonize with a theory of inten-
tional genocide. On the other hand, it is hard to reconcile a 
benevolent view of the expropriation process with the end result-the 
knowing and intentional expropriation of a continent accompanied 
by the destruction of tribe after tribe. 
This Article presents a view more consistent with the somewhat 
schizophrenic legal and historical record. Drawing on law and eco-
nomics, it explains the process of expropriating Indian lands in terms 
of minimizing the costs, broadly defined (for example, value of lives, 
risks borne, and time spent on unproductive warfare), to the Euro-
pean colonizers. Simply put, customs and legal rules promulgated by 
colonial and later American courts and legislatures promoted not 
simply expropriation (right or Wr-ong), but ejfzcient expropriation. The 
thesis of this Article is that colonists established rules to minimize the 
costs associated with dispossessing the natives. If it had been cheaper 
to be more brutal, then Europeans would have been more brutal. 
Such brutality, however, was not cheap at all. 
Likewise, if it had been cheaper to show more humanity, the 
Europeans would have exhibited more, such as extending Indians full 
rights to sell (or keep) their land. Such a legal rule, however, would 
have been far from cheap. johnson v. M'lntosh was an essential part of 
the regime of efficient expropriation because it ensured that Europe-
ans did not bid against each other to acquire Indian lands, thus keep-
12 
ROBERT A. WILLIAMS JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: 
THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST 325-26 (1990) (citation omitted). 
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ing prices low.13 The M'Intosh rule was neither the beginning nor the 
end of the means by which Europeans obtained American soil at 
minimal cost. Part II of this Article places the rule of M'Intosh in 
broader context. It explains why wars of conquest were unappealing 
and rare, and how disease and the destruction of the Indians' stocks 
of wild game played a much larger role in efficient expropriation.14 It 
then explains how legal rules channeled settlement to maximize the 
effect of these "natural allies" and shows how the Europeans' greater 
ability to maintain a united front yielded a set of tools for efficient ex-
propriation, from M'Intosh to powerful advantages in negotiation.15 
Despite some disagreements, this Article's law and economics in-
terpretation of American-Indian relations owes a significant intellec-
tual debt to recent articles by Terry Anderson and Fred McChesney/6 
and by Douglas Allen.17 Anderson and McChesney convincingly dem-
onstrate that the United States took few acres by direct force, arguing 
that the price paid for Indian lands depended on what each side ex-
pected to happen in the event of conflict. This Article questions An-
derson and McChesney's dichotomy between taking lands by raid 
(force) and by trade, suggesting instead that there was a continuum of 
techniques between these two poles. The United States mixed and 
matched techniques from both extremes in order to minimize the 
cost of Indian lands. Allen argues that giving away land, or at least 
subsidizing settlement, under the Homestead Acts and their precur-
sors, was a least-cost way of dealing with hostile Indians-settlers 
formed a rough, ready, and cheap border militia.18 This Article builds 
on Allen's work by demonstrating the key role settlers played in weak-
ening Indian resistance by spreading disease and thinning game. 
In addition to supplementing these earlier works, this Article ex-
amines other legal rules that enabled the cheap expropriation of In-
dian lands. These factors include government coordination of set-
13 See discussion infra Part II.A (contrasting the efficiency interpretation of M'Intosh 
with other explanations). 
14 See discussion infra Part II.D (examining the role played by the Europeans' 
"natural allies" in permitting them to efficiently expropriate Indian land). 
15 See discussion infra Part IT.E (discussing how the Europeans' legal rules encour-
aged private actions that helped expropriate Indian land). 
16 Terry L. Anderson & Fred S. McChesney, Raid or Trade? An Economic Model of 
Indian-White Relations, 37 J.L. & ECON. 39 (1994). 
17 Douglas W. Allen, Homesteading & Property Rights; or, "How the West Was ReaUy 
Won, "34J.L. & ECON. 1 (1991). 
18 See id. at 2 (describing the benefits of the Homestead Act and rejecting argu-
ments that the Act was a mistake). 
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tiers' movements, legal rules that overcame a natural inertia in the 
westward expansion (characterized by the desire to let others go first 
and bear the costs of first settlement), the federal government's gen-
eral reluctance to distribute land through large land companies, and 
perhaps most importantly, the competition-stifling rule of johnson v. 
M'Intosh. 
Before tracing out this theory of efficient expropriation, however, 
Part I presents a brief history of "[t]he great case of johnson v. 
M'Intosh."19 There are two reasons for this digression. First, as a lead-
ing Supreme Court case, the background to M'Intosh is of interest in 
and of itself. Part I presents material from a variety of sources that 
neither historians nor legal scholars have examined. The record is 
full of surprises, from the fact that the (victorious) defendants' pur-
chases may well have been illegal, to the likelihood that the case was 
£ . d 20 eigne . 
The second reason for presenting the history of M'Intosh is that it 
provides a nucleus of historical facts (for example, that disease had 
decimated the Indian sellers of the lands in question), background 
legal rules (including the long history of legislative strictures on pur-
chasing land from Indians), and archetypal characters (such as specu-
lating land companies of the early republic) that helps explain the 
process of efficient expropriation. The legal rule of M'Intosh is but 
one piece in the large puzzle of efficient expropriation oflndian land; 
characters from every stage of the case's history provide insights into 
the other pieces and how they all fit together. 
I. THE HISTORY OF jOHNSON V. M'INTOSH 
A Land Title and Alienability in Early America 
Generally, European colonists employed European real property 
law to define their rights in American lands. Two complications, 
however, created the need for additional rules. First, competing 
European sovereigns had to establish rules to deal with conflicting 
claims amongst themselves to American lands. Second, the European 
colonizers had to decide what rights, if any, Indians had to their own 
lands. 
19 For a more detailed history of the case, see Eric Kades, The Great Feigned Case of 
Johnson v. M'Intosh, 19 L. & HisT. REv. (forthcoming 2001). 
20 See discussion infra Part I.C (providing historical background for the M'lntosh 
litigation). · 
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The simultaneous British, French, Dutch, Spanish, and even Swed-
ish explorations and colonization of North America inevitably led to 
land disputes. 
[A]s they were all in pursuit of nearly the same object, it was necessary, 
in order to avoid conflicting settlements, and consequent war with each 
other, to establish a principle, which all should acknowledge as the law 
by which the right of acquisition, which they all asserted, should be regu-
lated as between themselves. This principle was, that discovery gave title 
to the government by whose subjects, or by whose authority, it was made, 
against all other European governments, which title might be consum-
db . 21 mate y possession. 
As with many rules of international law, competing nations often 
disregarded this discovery rule when it did not suit their purposes, yet 
the rule did serve to avoid at least some conflicts. 
It is important to note that, strictly speaking, this discovery rule 
applied only among European nations ("regulated as between them-
selves"). Some commentators have used the term "discovery rule" or 
"discovery doctrine" to describe the rules that the various European 
sovereigns established for defining Indian land rights,22 such as the 
M'Intosh rule that the sovereign alone could purchase land from the 
natives. Milner Ball cogently explains why this is inconsistent with 
Marshall's approach: 
The theory [of MTntosh] sets out two different relationships: one among 
European claimants to the New World, the other between each of the 
European claimants and the Indian inhabitants. As among the Europe-
ans, the doctrine of discovery obtained. As between European and In-
dian nations, each relationship was to be separately regulated.23 
21 Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 573 (1823). 
22 See Nell Jessup Newton, At the Whim of the Sovereign: Aboriginal Title Reconsidered, 
31 HAsTINGS LJ. 1215, 1222-24 (1980) ("[T]he doctrine of discovery permitted the 
sovereign alone to extinguish Indian title .... "). The statement can be corrected by 
adding the italicized language: "the doctrine of discovery permitted the sovereign 
alone to establish the rules that would govern how to extinguish Indian title." 
23 MilnerS. Ball, Constitution, Court, Indian Tribes, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES.J. 3, 24; 
see also M.F. LINDLEY, THEACQUISmON AND GoVERNMENT OF BACKWARD TERRITORY IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAw 29 (Negro Universities Press 1969) (1926) (noting that European 
nations claimed that discovery rights provided dominion over Indian territory and pri-
ority of discovery determined which nation had ownership); Howard R. Berman, The 
Concept of Aboriginal Rights in tlze Early Legal History of the United States, 27 BUFF. L. REv. 
637, 644-45 (1978) (defining the doctrine of discovery as the "organizing principle 
through which the European nations articulated claims against each other");J. Young-
blood Henderson, Unraveling the Riddle of Aboriginal Title, 5 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 75, 90 
(1977) ("Discovery ... was a distributional preference by which the Europeans agreed 
to divide up entitlements to acquire triballands.");John Hurley, Aboriginal Rights, the 
HeinOnline -- 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1075 1999-2000
2000] EXPROPRIATION OF AMERICAN INDIAN LANDS 1075 
Thus, the discovery doctrine did not apply, at least directly, to Euro-
pean-Indian relations. 
Confusion about this two-level doctrine-(!) the discovery rule 
regulating inter-European disputes, and (2) rules regulating Euro-
pean-Indian disputes-may be due in part to the following dense pas-
sage in Chiefjustice Marshall's opinion: 
The exclusion of all other Europeans, necessarily gave to the nation 
making the discovery the sole right of acquiring the soil from the natives, 
and establishing settlements upon it. It was a right with which no Euro-
peans could interfere. It was a right which all asserted for themselves, 
and to the assertion of which, by others, all assented.24 
Describing the "sole right of acquiring the soil" as a necessary re-
sult of the discovery rule is misleading. Marshall meant that a discov-
ering nation could exclude other nations under the first level, the in-
ter-European discovery rule. The discovery rule did not dictate which 
rule each sovereign chose at the second level when defining rights vis-
a-vis the Indians. Thus, the quoted passage did not mean that each 
sovereign had to bar its own citizens from making private purchases of 
land from the Indians. This was merely the particular second-level 
rule Marshall found that America and its predecessors adopted. In-
deed, contrary to the American rule explicated in M'Intosh, it appears 
that France at times permitted its colonists to purchase lands directly 
from the Indians.25 
Marshall's very next sentence makes clear the distinction between 
the discovery rule as level one, and whatever rules each nation de-
cided to establish as level two: "Those relations which were to exist 
Constitution and the Marshall Court, 17 REvuE JURIDIQUE THEMIS 403, 418 (1982-1983) 
(discussing the significance of M'Intosh and the principle of discovery). Berman per-
ceptively notes the one linkage between the discovery doctrine and relations with the 
tribes: "With the single exception of the right of alienability of land, the original, in-
deed aboriginal, sovereignty of the Indian nations is unimpaired by, and not included 
in, the concept of discovery." Berman, supra, at 650. 
24 M'lntos"h, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 573. 
25 
"[A]t Cahokia [in French-governed Illinois, prior to 1763] there were several 
cases of direct purchase by individuals from the Indians, [although] the practice was 
not [common], for the representatives of the government granted land freely, without 
formality, and without reservations •... " CLARENCE WALWORTII ALVORD, nm 
lu.INOIS COUNTRY, 1673-1818, at 206 (Univ. of Ill. Press 1987) (1920). William 
Murray, the principal field agent of the land companies that bought the tracts at issue 
in M'lntoslz, consulted French records, older Indian leaders, and French inhabitants 
before negotiating with the tribes. His research showed that "the lands held for the 
use of garrisons, or held by the inh.ahitants, originated from cessions on grants obtained 
for a valuable consideration from the native Indians." Introduction to AN ACCOUNT OF 
'IHE PROCEEDINGS OF 1HE IILINOIS AND OUABACHE LAND COMPANIES 5 (Philadelphia, 
William Duane 1803) [hereinafterACCOUNTOFPROCEEDINGS] (emphasis added). 
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between the discoverer and the natives, were to be regulated by them-
selves [(level two)]. The rights thus acquired being exclusive, no 
other power could interpose between them [(level one, the discovery 
rule)]."26 
From the beginning, English government in the New World re-
fused to recognize the Indians as true tide holders. Even during the 
first years of colonization, when they were no military match for the 
local tribes and indeed depended on their charity to survive, Virginia's 
earliest setders began to articulate a theoretical basis to deny Indian 
tide and thus expropriate tribal lands. 
"Some affirm, and it is likely to be true, that these savages have no par-
ticular propriety in any part of parcel of that country, but only a general 
residency there, as wild beasts in the forest; for they range and wander 
up and down the country without any law or government, being led only 
by their own lusts and sensuality. There is not meum and tuum [mine and 
thine] amongst them. So that if the whole land should be taken from 
them, there is not a man that can complain of any particular wrong done 
unto him."27 
In the eyes of the Puritans, hunter-gatherers were not really occu-
pants of their lands. "God had intended his land to be cultivated and 
not to be left in the condition of 'that unmanned wild Countrey, 
which they [the savages] range rather than inhabite.'"28 James 
Monroe, as President, more than once voiced the same theme. 
"[T]he hunter or savage state requires a greater extent of territory to 
sustain it, than is compatible with the progress and just claims of civi-
lized life, and must yield to it."29 "[T]he earth was given to mankind 
to support the greatest number of which it is capable, and no tribe or 
people have a right to withhold from the wants of others more than is 
necessary for their own support and comfort . ..so 
Common settlers, unsurprisingly, agreed with these sentiments, 
and invoked egalitarian, leveling arguments to explain why the land-
rich Indians should be compelled to share the wealth. For example, 
squatters on Chickasaw land successfully protested eviction that would 
25 M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 573. 
27 WILUAMS, supra note 12, at 2ll (quoting Robert Gray, a popular Puritan 
preacher). 
28 JENNINGS, supra note 10, at 80 (quoting 4 SAMuEL PuRCHAS, HAKLUYIUS 
POSTHUMUS ORPURCHAS HIS Pn.GRIMES 1814 (London, 1625)). 
29 
PRUCHA, supra note 6, at 227 (quoting Letter from President James Monroe to 
Andrew Jackson (Oct. 5, 1817)). 
so 2 A COMPILATION OF 1HE MEssAGES AND PAPERS OF 1HE PRESIDENTS, 1789-1897, 
at 16 Uames D. Richardson ed., 1896). 
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"bring many women and children to a state of starvation mearly to 
gratify a heathan nation Who have no better right to this land than we 
have ourselves and they have by estemation nearly 100000 acres of 
land to each man Of their nation. ,sJ 
A funny thing happened on the way to acquiring Indian lands. In 
spite of these oft-repeated justifications for simply taking Indian lands, 
colonists very early on began purchasing tracts instead of simply grab-
bing them (or trying to). This soon became official policy. The New 
England Company instructed its colonists in 1629 that "[i]f any of the 
Savages pretend Right of Inheritance to all or any Part of the land in 
our Patent ... purchase their claim in order to avoid the least Scruple 
of Intrusion. "32 When the Crown began to exercise more direct over-
sight of the colonies in the 1660s, it reiterated this principle. There 
\vas one instance in which outright expropriation was permissible: 
just" wars, that is, defensive wars.33 Conquest in New England, how-
ever, remained very much the exception. The bottom line is that 
contrary to the common belief that the Indians were ruthlessly deprived 
of their land, almost every part of [Massachusetts] that came to be inhab-
ited by the whites was purchased from the Indians, except the areas that 
were either acquired by conquest or, like Salem and Boston, never 
claimed by the Indians, because of depopulation by epidemics. 54 
The pattern of European land acquisition in New England-pur-
chases punctuated by rare conquests-repeated itself across the rest of 
the continent. The United States paid over $800 million for Indian 
lands.35 According to Congress, the United States exercised the right 
of conquest only once, and then half,.heartedly.36 
51 Petition lo the President and Congress by Intruders on Chickasaw Lands (Sept. 5, 1810), 
reprinted in 6 THE TERRITORIAL PAPERS OF THE UNITED STATES 106, 107 (Clarence Ed-
win Carter ed., 1938) [hereinafterTERRITORIALPAPERS]. 
52 JOELN. ENO, 'I'HEPuRrrANSANDTHEINDIANLANDS 1 (1906), 
55 YASUHIDE KAWASHIMA, PuRITAN JUSTICE AND THE INDIAN: WmTE MAN'S LAW IN 
MASSACHUSETIS, 1630-1763, at 50 (1986). 
s.~ ld. at 51. See infra Part II.D.1 for a discussion of the important role epidemics 
played in breaking down Indian resistance to European colonization. 
55 See Cohen, supra note 5, at 45-46 (implying that Indian land purchases were fair 
to the extent that substantial federal funds were appropriated for purchases). 
56 The Commissioner of Indian Affairs in 1872 stated that: 
Except only in the case of the Indians in Minnesota, after the outbreak of 
1862, the United States Government has never extinguished an Indian title as 
by right of conquest; and in this latter case the Government provided the In-
dians another reservation, besides giving them the proceeds of the sales of the 
lands vacated by them in Minnesota. · 
ld. at 37 n.20 (quoting Report of the Commissioner oflndian Affairs for 1872). 
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While Europeans recognized some Indian interest in land, they 
never "granted" the tribes all the sticks in the common-law bundle of 
property rights; in particular, colonists consistently narrowed or en-
tirely denied the Indians' power to sell land. First, while Indians for-
mally had the power to refuse to sell,37 in reality this was not an op-
tion.38 Second, European sovereigns asserted the right to sell Indian 
land to their citizens before purchasing from the Indians. Such a pur-
chaser took title "subject only to the Indian right of occupancy,>P9 but 
otherwise had a full fee interest. Combined with the exclusive right to 
purchase Indian lands (or conquer the tribe), discussed in the follow-
ing subsection, this created a novel and peculiar "bifurcated title." Ul-
timate title resided with the European sovereign or its grantee, while 
the Indian occupants retained "Indian title" until they sold, or were 
otherwise relieved of their lands. 
The facts of M'Intosh, discussed in Part I.C.1, present a conun-
drum that can arise under this bifurcated title regime: if the Indians 
sold to Ywhile the Crown or the United States sold to X, who owned 
the land, X or Y? Given the superiority that colonizers assigned to 
their title, it comes as no surprise that X had title as against Y. The 
colonies, the British government, and the United States achieved this 
result by the same rule. They barred anyone but themselves from 
purchasing lands from the lndians.40 While most of the property rules 
discussed thus far involve European-Indian relations, this stricture was 
a regulation made by colonists, directed at only colonists. That said, 
this Article argues, in Part II.B, that the rule profoundly harmed the 
Indians. 
Cohen cites the Report as observing, however, that "[i]t is not to be denied that 
wrong was often done in fact to tribes in the negotiation of treaties of cession. The 
Indians were not infrequently overborne or deceived." /d. Part II infra discusses how 
the United States was able to coerce and deceive the Indians, and why such an ap-
proach was more attractive than conquest. 
87 See President Thomas Jefferson, Speech to Tribes (Apr. 22, 1808), quoted in 
Dwight L. Smith, Indian Land Cessions in the Old Northwest, 1795-1809, at 213-14 
(1949) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University (Bloomington)) (on file 
with author and the University of Pennsylvania Law Review) ("[I]n all these 
things .•. you have been free to do as you please, your lands are your own ... to keep 
or sell as you please ..• you are always free to say 'no,' and it will never disturb our 
friendship for you."). 
88 See infra Part II.B (describing how U.S. policy made the Indians' option to sell 
practically useless). 
89 Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 573, 574 (1823). 
40 The French apparently did not adopt such a rule and recognized private pur-
chases of Indian lands. See supra note 25 and accompanying text (discussing France's 
policy toward its settlers regarding land purchases). 
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The universal and repeated enactment o£ laws barring purchases 
of land by private citizens from the Indians attests to the importance 
that Britain, its colonies, and later the United States attached to this 
rule. In colonial New England, "[i] t is a reasonable generalization to 
say that land purchases from Indians were a governmental monop-
oly. "41 Massachusetts apparently adopted the first such official law in 
163442 and repeatedly enacted similar measures.43 As late as 1760, 
Massachusetts publicized the law and empowered local officials to en-
force it at colonial expense.44 No later than 1672, Connecticut's Gen-
eral Court enacted a similar measure.45 Almost every colony adopted 
such measures as soon as they began purchasing significant amounts 
of Indian land.46 Successive British and American governments 
41 James Warren Springer, American Indians and tire Law of Real Property in Colonial 
New England, 30 AM. J. LEGAL HlsT. 25, 35-36 (I986) (collecting cites to colonial stat-
utes barring private purchases oflndian lands). 
42 See I RECORDS OF THE GoVERNOR & COMPANY OF THE MAssACHUSE'ITS BAY IN 
NEW ENGLAND ll2 (photo. reprint I968) (Nathaniel B. Shurtleff ed., Boston, William 
White I853) (reprinting a law that prohibited purchasing land from the Indians with-
out the permission of the court). 
-13 See KAWASHIMA, supra note 33, at 53 (explaining that later versions included 
harsh penalties for mere attempts to buy land directly from Indians, including fines 
equal to double the value of the land or imprisonment for six months). 
44 See 4 THE Acrs AND RESOLVES, PuBUC AND PRIVATE, OF THE PROVINCE OF THE 
MAssACHUSETIS BAY: TO WffiCH ARE PREFIXED THE CHARTERS OF THE PROVINCE 369 
(Boston, Wright & Potter Printing Co. I890) [hereinafter Acrs AND RESOLVES] (re-
printing a 1760 law that authorized and empowered named state agents to prosecute 
any .fsersons who purchased land from the Indians). 
5 SeeTHE EARLIEsT LAWS OFTHENEWHAVEN AND CONNECTICUT COLONIES, 1639-
I673, at ll2 (John D. Cushing ed., I977) (reprinting a 1672 Colony of Connecticut law 
prohibiting the purchase ofland from the Indians). 
46 See id.; 1 THE EARLIEsT PRINTED LAWS OF THE PROVINCE OF GEORGIA, I755-1770, 
at 17-18 (John D. Cushing ed., 1978) (reprinting a 1758 Act prohibiting Georgia citi-
zens from purchasing lands from and trading with the Indians without license); 4Acrs 
AND RESOLVES, supra note 44, at 369 (reprinting a 1760 Act giving certain Massachu-
setts officials the right to prosecute all persons who have purchased, or purchase in the 
future, lands from the Indians); 3 KENT's COMMENTARIES *396 (I873) (describing a 
similar I644 Maryland measure); Acrs AND LAws OF NEW HAMPsmRE, I680-1726, at 
162 (John D. Cushing ed., I978) (reprinting "An Act to Prevent and Make Void Clan-
destine and Illegal Purchases of Land from the Indians," passed in 17I9); KENT's 
COMMENTARIES, supra, at *394-95 {describing a similar 1682 New Jersey statute); 
KENT's COMMENTARIES, supra, at *385 {describing New York's measures at preventing 
illegal Indian land acquisition); I THE EARLIEsT PRINTED LAWS OF NORTii CAROUNA, 
1669-1751, at 38 (John D. Cushing ed., 1978) (reprinting a 1715 law prohibiting the 
purchase of land from the Indians); 4 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA FROM 
1682 TO I801, at 154-56 (James T. Mitchell & Henry Flanders eds., n.p., Clarence M. 
Busch 1897) (reprinting "A Supplementary Act to an Act Against Buying Land of the 
Natives," passed in 1729); THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF SOUTii CAROUNA 526 (Thomas 
Cooper ed., I836) (reprinting a 1739 statute making land conveyances from the Indi-
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d d . "1 47 a opte s1m1 ar measures. 
The longstanding rule against private purchases is important for 
two reasons. First, it makes the holding of M'Intosh (reaffirming the 
rule against private purchases from the Indians) seem predictable; 
moreover, it lays the foundation for the novel argument that custom 
forms the central ground for Chiefjustice Marshall's opinion.48 Sec-
ond, the rule makes perfect sense as a tool of efficient expropriation 
of Indian lands. Universal enactment and strict enforcement of the 
M'Intosh rule support the least-cost expropriation thesis presented in 
Part 11.49 
ans to private persons void); 10 THE STATUTES AT LARGE: BEING A COLLECIION OF ALL 
1liE LAws OF VIRGINIA 97 (William Waller Hening ed., Richmond 1822) (1619) [here-
inafter STATUTES AT LARGE OF VIRGINIA] (reprinting law on purchasing lands from 
"natives"). 
47 See Act of Mar. 3, 1799, ch. 46, § 12, 1 Stat. 743, 746 (invalidating any sale ofland 
by the Indians unless executed under treaty); Act of May 19, 1796, ch. 30, § 12, 1 Stat. 
469,472 (same); Act of Mar. 1, 1793,ch.19, § 8, 1 Stat. 329, 330 (same); Act of July 22, 
1790, ch. 33, § 4, 1 Stat. 137, 138 (same); 24 JOURNALS OF 1liE CONTINENTAL 
CONGRESS 264 (1783) (same); 25 id. at 602 (same); RobertN. Clinton, The Proclamation 
of 1763: Colonial Prelude to Two Centuries of Federal-State Conflict over the Management of 
Indian Affairs, 69 B.U. L. REv. 329, 356-57 (1989) (explaining that the Proclamation of 
1763 barred private purchase of Indian lands). These statutes illustrate the United 
States's repeated barring of private purchases of Indian lands. Congress worded the 
later statutes quite broadly, criminalizing the act of negotiating ("treating") with the 
Indians for land, "directly or indirectly." 1 Stat. at 472; 1 Stat. at 330. 
48 See infra Part I.C.4 (describing the custom-based rationale behind the M'Intosh 
decision). 
49 The long and uninterrupted pedigree of the rule against private purchases raises 
a difficult question. Why did land speculators (such as the plaintiffs in M'Intosh) make 
purchases in the face of a seemingly clear legal refusal to recognize title rooted in In-
dian deeds? Many speculators, including those whose purchases from the Indians 
eventually precipitated the M'Intosh case, felt emboldened to engage in such transac-
tions based in part on the Camden-Yorke Opinion. The Camden-Yorke Opinion was a 
peculiar legal opinion letter originally written by British Attorney General Charles 
Pratt (who later became Lord Camden) and Solicitor General Charles Yorke that af:. 
firmed the right of individuals to buy land from rajahs in British India. A slightly al-
tered version, not limited to India (it is not clear if the original authors, or others, 
made the alterations), found its way to America no later than 1773. See Jack M. Sosin, 
The Yorke-Camden opinion and American Land Speculators, 85 PA. MAG. HlsT. & 
BIOGRAPHY 38, 42-43 (1961) (describing historians' conflicting views on how this opin-
ion came into the hands of American colonists). 
As the later actions of many of the speculators indicate, they may have planned 
from day- one to obtain ex post legislative action to except them from the laws that 
would void their titles. The incredible size of their claims, often in the millions of 
acres, provided a ready source of consideration with which to bribe legislators. Finally, 
anticipation of political change may have motivated the marked increase in private 
purchases from the Indians in the 1770s. The storm clouds of the impending Ameri-
can Revolution apparently led some speculators to believe that the British rule against 
purchases from Indians might be trumped by other considerations. "Should a revolu-
tion occur, Henderson [head of the Transylvania Company and Daniel Boone's spon-
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B. The Purchases of the fllinois and the Wabash Land Companies 
The plaintiffs in M'Intosh claimed lands under Indian deeds ob-
tained before the Revolutionary War by two closely related land ven-
tures, the Illinois Land Company and the Wabash Land Company. 
The Illinois Company arose out of the Indian trading and troop provi-
sioning activities of a group of prominent Philadelphia merchants led 
by David Franks and the Gratz brothers, Bernard and Michael. Their 
partner and agent in Illinois, William Murray, successfully convinced 
the merchants to branch out from trade into land speculation.50 
Murray arrived at the British fort in Kaskaskia (on the Mississippi 
River, in southern Illinois) injune 1773.51 Despite warnings from lo-
cal British officials of the strictures against private purchases from the 
Indians, Murray promptly began negotiations with the Illinois tribes. 
Murray dealt with the shells that remained of the once great Illi-
nois tribes. Their population had fallen from around 10,500 in 1680 
to 2500 in 1736 and to 500 in 1800, as they fell victim to European 
diseases and Indian enemies on all sides.52 Unable to prevent neigh-
boring tribes from encroaching on their extensive land, on July 5, 
1773, the Kaskaskia, Peoria, and Cahokia tribes53 deeded two large 
sor] reasoned, actual possession ••• would constitute a strength not otherwise attain-
able." OTISK. RICE, FRONTIERKEN'ruCKY73 (1993). 
50 See Anna Edith Marks, William Murray, Trader & Land SpeculatM in the minois 
Country, in 26 TRANSACTIONS OF THE IU.INOIS STATE HISTORICAL SOCIE1Y 188, 190..91 
(1919) (describing Murray's interaction with the merchants). 
51 Although the fort survives and is part of an lllinois state park, the Mississippi 
River finally inundated the adjacent town ofKaskaskia in 1899. See john W. Weymouth 
& William I. Woods, Combined Magnetic & Chemical Suroeys of Forts Kaskaskia & de Char-
tres No. 1, miTUJis, 18 HIST. ARCHEOLOGY 20, 29 (1984) (describing how the Mississippi 
River changed course and destroyed the town of Kaskaskia). 
52 See Emily J. Blasingham, The Depopulation of the IUinois Indians, 3 ETHNOHIST. 361, 
372 (1956) (describing settlement patterns and population estimates of!llinois Indians 
based on historical records). See generaUy 15 HANDBOOK OF NORm AMERICAN INDIANS 
596-97, 674, 678-79 (William C. Sturtevant ed., 1978) (discussing reasons for the de-
cline of the Illinois Indian population). Blasingham indicates that the Illinois Indian 
population may have been significantly higher before the 1660s, when reliable records 
first became available. See Blasingham, supra, at 361-62. Blasingham attributes this 
precipitous drop in population to warfare with other Indians, European endemic dis-
eases, the introduction of Christianity and thus monogamy, alcoholism, and the splin-
tering of the tribes. See id. at 373. More recent scholarship, discussed infra Part II.D.1, 
pinpoints disease as perhaps the most important factor in decimating Indian popula-
tions. Smallpox appeared as early as 1701, and successive epidemics struck again in 
1733,1751,1756, and 1762. SeeBiasingham, supra, at383-84. 
53 Less than 100 years earlier, the Illinois Confederation consisted of as many as 
twelve distinct tribes, but the severe population decline led to a series of mergers and 
extinctions that left only these three. See 15 HANDBOOK OF NoRm AMERICAN INDIANS, 
supra note 52, at 594, 673. 
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tracts ofland to Murray and the other twenty-one members of the Illi-
·c 54 nots ompany. 
Murray and his Philadelphia partners worried about obtaining of-
ficial recognition for the Illinois Company's deed. Unable to find po-
litical support in their own state for their purchase, the Pennsylvani-
ans of the Illinois Company turned to Lord Dunmore, Governor of 
Virginia. Absent direct royal administration, Virginia claimed, and 
was recognized to have, jurisdiction over Illinois by virtue of its colo-
nial charter. Murray visited Dunmore in April177 4. An aspiring land 
speculator himself, the governor apparently agreed to throw his 
weight behind the Illinois Land Company's claim in return for the 
opportunity to participate in subsequent transactions. Murray was al-
ready talking of a second scheme by May. 55 
To satisfy the desires of the governor, Murray created the Wabash Land 
Company, of which Lord Dunmore and several men from Maryland, 
Philadelphia, and London became members .... 
His reward promised, Lord Dunmore wrote to Lord Dartmouth [Brit-
ish Secretary of State] a most cordial recommendation of the lllinois 
Land Company .... 
. . . In a later letter Dunmore denied that he had any connection with 
the lllinois Land Company, but he kept discreetly silent about the Wa-
56 bash Land Company. 
Instead of negotiating a second purchase himself, Murray re-
cruited a prominent local Frenchman, Louis Viviat, as a partner and 
an agent. Viviat treated with Piankashaw tribal leaders at Vincennes 
(Port St. Vincent) and Vermillion, in present-day Indiana. The Pi-
ankashaws were one of six tribes classified as Miami Indians. Like the 
Illinois tribes, the Miami suffered precipitous population declines af-
ter contact with Europeans; their numbers fell from 7500 in 1682 to 
just over 2000 in 1736.57 
54 See Map of Land Claims in johnson v. M'Intosh, supra p. I 067 (showing the land 
purchased by the Illinois Company). Murray promptly recorded the deed at the Kas-
kaskia records office. See MEMORIAL OF 1HE UNITED ILUNOIS AND WABASH LAND 
COMPANIES TO 1HE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF 1HE UNITED STATES i-
ii, 11-15 (Baltimore, Robinson 1816) [hereinafter 1816 MEMORIAL] (providing 
Murray's own account of the events and transactions of 1773). 
55 See Marks, supra note 50, at 202 (describing a May 16th letter by Murray that dis-
cussed his new plan). 
56 ALVORD, supra note 25, at 302, 303 n.35. 
57 See 15 HANDBOOK OF NORTH AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 52, at 596-97, 688. 
Population figures for the Piankashaw tribe alone are apparently unavailable. 
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Viviat reached terms and executed a deed on behalf of the twenty 
members of the Wabash Company,58 with the Piankashaw representa-
tives on October 18, 1775.59 This deed also conveyed two large tracts, 
both along the Wabash River. The first (northern) tract straddled the 
Wabash between the Cat River and Point Coupee. The second 
(southern) tract ran from the Ohio River up to the White River.60 
Viviat apparently did not make efforts to include all the tribes with 
colorable claims to the lands purchased. In particular, the Weas may 
have had claims in the southern tract.61 In addition, there is evidence 
that the Piankashaw negotiators did not have the support of their own 
tribe in making the grant.62 These facts are at odds with the case 
stated in M'lntosh, which represented both purchases as being made 
from united, consenting tribes with exclusive Indian title.63 
In order to cure any defects in their title, the Illinois and Wabash 
Companies did what so many other land speculators did in the early 
republic: they lobbied the legislature. Lobbying in the early republic 
was no prettier than lobbying today. In the Continental Congress, 
land claims formed "the most complicated and embarrassing Subject 
.... Infinite pains are taken by a certain sett of men vulgarly called 
Land robbers [jobbers], or Land-Sharks to have it in their power to 
engross the best lands. "64 
In the early years of the American Revolution, the Companies 
took two important steps to obtain legislative confirmation of their ti-
tles. First, they attracted influential, well-connected investors to bol-
ster their lobbying efforts. James Wilson, who later became one of the 
primary architects of the Constitution and a Supreme Court Justice, 
58 Wabash Company investors included Virginia Governor Lord Dunsmore and 
Maryland Governor Thomas Johnson-predecessor in interest to the M'IntoslL plain-
tiffs, Joshua Johnson (his son) and Thomas Graham (his grandson). SeeJohnson v. 
M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 555, 561 (1823). 
59 See 1816 MEMORIAL, supra note 54, at 16-24 (providing a copy of the deed). 
60 See Map of Land Claims in Johnson v. M'Intosfl, supra p. 1067. 
61 See 1816 MEMORIAL, supra note 54, at 23-24 (mentioning only Piankashaw chiefs 
as siwatories to the deed). 
See RICHARD WHITE, THE MIDDLE GROUND: INDIANS, EMPIRES, AND REPUBUCS IN 
nm GREAT LAKES REGION, 1650-1815, at 372 (1991) ("Their dalliance with Clark arose 
at least partially from their need of support for a land sale they had earlier made to the 
Wabash Company without the consent of the other Piankashaws or of the Weas."). 
63 This illustrates the dangers of relying on facts, especially stipulated facts, in cases 
that appear to be feigned or collusive. See infra Part I.C.1, which argues that the par-
ties wanted the case to be heard in the Supreme Court despite the lack of any con tro-
ve~ over their separate claims. 
PAUL WAllACE GATES, HISTORY OF PuBUC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 64 (1968) 
(quoting statement of Rep. David Howell ofR.I.) (citation omitted). 
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was the central figure in the United Company's efforts by 1779.65 
Other prominent investors were Robert Morris, financier of the 
American Revolution,66 and Dr. Thomas Walker, Thomas Jefferson's 
guardian and "a dominant figure among Virginia's land speculators in 
the later 1700s. "67 Second, the members of the Illinois Company and 
the Wabash Company merged on March 13, 1779 in order to pool 
their resources. 68 Wilson became chairman of the newly founded 
company on August 20, 1779. 
The shareholders made tentative plans for their first settlements 
in Illinois. 59 They proposed to establish their first town at the conflu-
ence of the Wabash and Ohio rivers, in the second (southern) tract of 
the Wabash Company's deed. The rather detailed plans included, in-
ter alia, the widths of streets and alleys (seventy feet and fifteen feet, 
respectively); taxation based on acreage and improvements; large 
chunks of free land and subsidies for the first five hundred settlers; 
and the allocation of surveying costs between the Companies and the 
settlers. The Companies reserved many town lots for themselves, pre-
sumably with the hope that values would appreciate rapidly, thus 
permitting quick resale at a higher price.70 
Murray had begun lobbying even before the Companies united. 
While the British government had clearly rejected the land claims, the 
happenstance of the American Revolution created a new opportunity 
for vindicating the tides through the (newly sovereign) State of Vir-
ginia, whose colonial charter encompassed Illinois and the rest of the 
Old Northwest-basically those lands north of the Ohio River and east 
of the Mississippi. Thus, Murray presented a memorial outlining the 
65 Wilson was an inveterate land speculator, investing in at least two other large 
schemes: the (in)famous Yazoo lands and the Indiana Company. See GEORGE E. 
LEWIS, THE INDIANA COMPANY, 1763-1798, at 253 (1941) (describing Wilson as a "great 
speculator"); C. PETER MAGRATII, YAZOO: LAW AND POLITICS IN rnE NEW REPUBUC 5 
(1966) (noting that James Wilson was one of the prominent bankers of the Yazoo 
companies); M. SAKOLSKI, THE GREAT AMERICAN LAND BUBBLE 135 (1932) (noting 
thatJames Wilson was a "large subscriber" to the Yazoo deal). 
Morris bought a share of the United Company for 8000 pounds on October 2, 
1779. See Minutes of the United Illinois & Wabash Land Companies 46 (1778-1782) 
(on reserve in the collection of the Historical Soc'y ofPa., Phila., call no. HSPL (PH:) 
Am. 4096) [hereinafter Minutes of the United Companies]. 
67 
'!ROMAS PERKINS ABERNETHY, WESTERN LANDS AND rnE AMERICAN REvOLUTION 
60 (1937). 
68 See Minutes of the United Companies, supra note 66, at 19 (resolving that the 
Co~anies unite). 
See id. at 23-25 (proposing the location where the town might be laid out). 
7
° For this plan to make financial sense, members must have believed that property 
values would increase at a faster rate than other investments of comparable risk. 
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Companies' land claims to the Virginia legislature in December 
1778.71 
Virginia, however, refused to recognize the Companies' Indian 
deeds. Indeed, the activities of the Illinois and Wabash Companies 
led Virginia's legislature, in May 1779, to restate the ancient rule 
against direct purchases from the Indians.72 Virginia's reasoning 
could not have come as a surprise. "It was stated that no person had 
ever had the right to purchase lands ·within the limits of Virginia from 
the natives, except those persons authorized to make such purchases 
for the use and benefit of the colony and later the state.'m 
The fluid political situation, however, soon gave the United Com-
panies a new body to lobby: the American Continental Congress and 
its successors. Between 1781 and 1796, Wilson drafted no fewer than 
five memorials to the national legislature pleading the United Com-
panies' case.74 Their most frequent refrain was to offer large portions 
of the Companies' tracts (varying from one quarter to three quarters) 
to the United States in exchange for recognition of the Companies' 
title in the remainder. In trying to sell Congress on such a compro-
mise, the United Companies repeatedly emphasized that, by relying 
on their deeds, the nation could avoid paying the Illinois and Pianka-
shaw Indians anything for lands already sold. "[A] transfer of [the 
Company's title] to the United States may be rendered effectual, to 
preclude the necessity of a second purchase, and to bar all future claims 
of the Indians to the lands in question.''75 Just in case Congress missed 
the point, the Companies later reiterated it, with more emotion: 
71 SeeMenunialofWiUiamMurray (Dec. 26, 1778}, in 1 CALENDAROFVIRGINIASTATE 
PAPERS AND OTHER MANUSCRIPTS, 1652-1781, at 314 (Wm. P. Palmer ed., Richmond 
1875) ("Since ••• the Public affairs of America have prevented the Company from set-
tling and improving the said Lands •.. the said Company think it necessary ••. to no-
tify the Governor, Council & Legislature of that State, of their Purchase •••• "). 
72 See ALVORD, supra note 25, at 341 (noting that "it was declared that the right of 
preemption of all land within the limits of Virginia belonged to the commonwealth 
alone") (citing STATUTES AT LARGE OF VIRGINIA, supra note 46, at 97). 
78 LEWIS, supra note 65, at 220. Virginia's 1779 statute barring private land pur-
chases from the Indians replaced a similar provision that appears to have lapsed prior 
to the United Companies' purchases. For the legal implications of this lapsed statute 
in the M'Intosh case, see infra Part I.C.2. 
74 See Minutes of the United Companies, supra note 66, at 82-84 (1781}, 98-104 
(1782}, 105 (1790). The Company granted him an extra share for the first of these 
memorials; no payment is recorded for the later ones. 
75 MEMORIAL OF THE !WNOIS AND OUBASH LAND COMPANIES 29 (Phila. 1796) 
[hereinafter 1796 MEMORIAL]; see also MEMORIAL OF THE lWNOIS AND WABASH LAND 
COMPANY 5 (Phila. 1797) [hereinafter 1797 MEMORIAL] (pushing the idea that the 
United States could gain title to valuable land without paying any additional money). 
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[W]e are persuaded that the government of the United States, would not 
reject a valid title, to the great injury of many of their good citizens; and, 
at a greater price, recur to the Indians for a new purchase, sinking in 
their pockets (viz. the Indians) the large sums that have been paid and 
expended by the first bona fi.de purchasers, who remain true and faithful 
citizens of the United States.76 
Congress never found compromise attractive. From the very first 
memorial in 1781, Congress rejected the Companies' claims based on 
the ancient, omnipresent rules against private purchases of land from 
the Indians: "the said purchase had been made, without the license of 
the then government, or other public authority, contrary to the com-
mon and known usage, in such case established. "77 The Companies 
did win over a House committee in 1788, which reasoned that the na-
tion could step into the Companies' shoes, noting, "[h]owever im-
proper it may be in general to countenance private purchases from 
the Indians ... the United States will be ultimately benefited by an 
exemption from the expense of purchasing the same Lands."78 
Winning over a single House committee was as close as the United 
Illinois and Wabash Companies would ever get to success. A Senate 
committee found that the value of strictly enforcing the rule against 
private purchases of Indian lands outweighed the benefits of waiving 
the rule in this particular case. The Senate Committee rejected the 
Companies' petition on the predictable grounds that "deeds obtained 
by private persons from the Indians, without any antecedent authority 
or subsequent confirmation from the government, could not vest in 
the grantees ... a title to the lands."79 
The Companies submitted memorials to Congress in 1802 and 
1803 containing little, if any, new material; Congress again summarily 
refused to recognize the claims.80 In 1804, the Companies also took a 
stab at administrative relief in the territories by petitioning the com-
missioners adjudicating the morass of land claims at Vincennes.81 
76 ACCOUNT OF PROCEEDINGS, supra note 25, at 69; see also 1797 MEMORIAL, supra 
note 75, at 5-6. 
77 /d. at 57. 
78 Repmt of Committee: The United Land Companies oftlte Illinois and Wabash (June 27, 
1788), reprinted in 1 TERRITORIAL PAPERS, supra note 31, at 115-16 (1934). 
79 ACCOUNT OF PROCEEDINGS, supra note 25, at 52. 
80 See MEMORIAL OF THE ILUNOIS AND OUABACHE LAND COMPANIES, TO THE 
HONOURABLE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES (n.p. 1802) [hereinafter 1802 
MEMORIAL] (providing the text of the United Companies' petition). 
81 See, e.g., MEMORIAL OF THE II.J..INOIS AND WABASH LAND COMPANIES TO THE 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (1810) [hereinafter 1810 MEMORIAL], reprinted in 
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: DOCUMENTS, LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE, OF THE 
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Clear directions from Washington, however, barred recognition of the 
Companies' deeds for the same old reason: the United States would 
never validate treaties made between the Indians and private per-
sons.82 In 1805, the Secretary of the Treasury summed up the consen-
sus view of the Companies' claims: "[the Companies] have not the 
shadow of a title to support their claim ... I speak with perfect confi-
dence on that point, because I have read all the Memorials of the 
Companies and never heard of a more frivolous claim. ,ss Two years 
later the Secretary made it clear that the United States would have "no 
hesitation" removing claimants under the Companies' deeds.84 
The Companies were dormant until 1810, when they submitted a 
fresh memorial to Congress. Congress rejected the Memorial of 1810 
on the same grounds that the British had rejected the Companies' 
claims before the Revolution. The Companies' attempt to purchase 
land directly from the Indians contradicted the then-governing Proc-
lamation of 1763, and the universal rule introduced "at a pretty early 
day ... regulating the intercourse with Indian tribes, which requires 
the concomitant assent or subsequent sanction of the Government to 
a conveyance oflands by Indians, in order to render it valid.',ss Ques-
tioning whether the earlier purchases allowed the United States to buy 
the same Indian land more cheaply, the Committee found that even 
so, "to recognize such unauthorized proceedings of individuals with 
the Indians ... would encroach upon the great system of policy so 
wisely introduced to regulate intercourse with the Indian tribes.',ss 
The Companies resubmitted the 1810 Memorial with trivial additions 
in 1816, but Congress never even bothered to respond.87 The Com-
CONGRESS OF 1HE UNITED STATES, 2 PUBUC LANDs 108, 109 (D.C., Gales & Seaton, 
1834) [hereinafter AMERICAN STATE PAPERS] (indicating that the purpose of the peti-
tion was to investigate land claims in Vincennes). 82 See 7 TERRITORIAL PAPERS, supra note 31, at 205-08, 311-12 (1939) (providing 
letters that indicate the lack of importance associated with private transactions). See 
generaUy 1 MEssAGES AND LETIERS OF WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON 102 (Logan Esarey 
ed., 1922) (indicating the power of the government in approving land grants). 
83 Letter from the Secretary of the Treasury to John Badollet, Register of Deeds at 
Vincennes (Oct. 23, 1805}, reprinted in 7 TERRITORIAL PAPERS, supra note 31, at 312 
(1939). 
84 Letter from the Secretary of the Treasury to Michael Jones, Register of Deeds at 
Kaskaskia (Mar. 28, 1807}, reprinted in 7 TERRITORIAL PAPERS, supra note 31, at 445 
(1939) (noting that "there will be no hesitation in removing persons" whose claims 
arise "under the Wabash and Illinois Companies"). 
85 Report of the Committee on Public Lands Uan. 10, 1811}, reprinted in AMERICAN 
STATE PAPERS, supra note 81, 2 PUBUC LANDS 253, 253. Congress cited the long list of 
the colonial statutes against private land purchases discussed in Part I.A. 
86 Report of the Committee on Public Lands, supra note 85, at 253. 
87 See 1816 MEMORIAL, supra note 54. 
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panies' next stop would be federal court. 
Meanwhile, the United States was busily buying up Indian lands 
closer and closer to the United Companies' claims. In 1803, William 
Henry Harrison obtained all the lands described in the Illinois Com-
pany's deed, and more, in a huge 8.9 million acre cession from the Il-
linois tribes.88 The cession specifically notes the tribes were "reduced 
to a very small number ... unable to occupy the extensive tract of 
country which of right belongs to them.',s9 Neighboring Indians dis-
puted the title of such a "decimated and impotent tribe" to so vast a 
territory, and "there was considerable doubt as to their rightful claim 
to all the land they had ceded."90 A recent account labeled the 1803 
treaty with the Illinois tribes as "(t]he most notorious" of Harrison's 
88 See Act of Aug. 13, 1803, 7 Stat. 78, 78-79 (describing the terms of the treaty); 
PAYSONJACKSON'I'REAT, THENATIONALLANDSYs'rEM,1785-1820, at404 (1910) (giving 
acreage of the tract). For maps of this and the other cessions cited, see BUREAU OF 
AMERICAN ETiiNOLOGY, EIGHTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT, at PL CXXIV-XCCVI (1900), 
reprinted in INDIAN LAND CEsSIONS IN THE UNITED STATES (Charles C. Royce ed., 1971). 
According to the Eighteenth Annual Report, only the Kaskaskia tribe signed this treaty. 
See id. at 664. However, the official version published in Statutes at Large indicates 
that, while the Illinois tribes had consolidated under the name Kaskaskia, leaders of all 
the other Illinois tribes except the Peorias signed the treaty. See Act of Aug. 13, 1803, 7 
Stat. 78, 79 (listing as signatories "Ocksinga a Mitchigamian" of the Sioux and "Kee-tin-
sa a Cahokian" of the Iriquois). The United States obtained a cession from the Peoria 
and a reaffirmation of the earlier cession from the other Illinois tribes in September 
1818. See Act of Sept. 25, 1818, 7 Stat. 181, 182 (providing that to effectuate the ces-
sion by the Peoria and to reaffirm the cessions by the other tribes, the Peoria, Kas-
kaskia, Mitchigamia, Cahokia, and Tamarois "do hereby relinquish, cede, and confirm, 
to the United States, all the land included within the following boundaries"). The 
Kickapoo tribe also had colorable claim to some of the lands ceded by the Illinois 
tribes, and hence the United States purchased their interest in July 1819. See Act of 
July 30, 1819, 7 Stat. 200, 200 (noting that the Kickapoo Tribe ceded "[a]ll their land 
the southeast side of the Wabash River"). 
In their 1810 Memorial to Congress, the United Companies correctly cited this 
treaty, along with other major cessions overlapping the Wabash Company deeds dis-
cussed infra, as intersecting with their claims. See 1810 MEMORIAL, supra note 81, at 
109. Felix Cohen asserted that the Treaty of Greenville, 7 Stat. 49 (1795), as amended, 
Act of June 7, 1803, 7 Stat. 74, ceded the lands at issue in M'lntosh, but this appears 
doubtful. The primary lands involved in that treaty were far to the east, and while it 
did include a relatively small tract around Vincennes, Indiana, this tract appears to lie 
between the two tracts described in the Wabash Company's deed. See Cohen, supra 
note 5, at 47 n.43. C(JTTipare BUREAU OF AMERICAN ETiiNOLOGY, supra, at CCXXVI, with 
MaE ofLand Claims in]olmsonv. M'lntosh, suprap. 1067. 
89 Act of Aug. 13, 1803, 7 Stat. 78, 78 (Article I of treaty). 
90 REGINALD HORSMAN, EXPANSION AND AMERICAN INDIAN POUCY, 1783-1812, at 
146 (1992); see also TREAT, supra note 88, at 169 (discussing the fact that "a consider-
able cession had been secured from the Kaskaskias in 1803-but other tribes disputed 
the regions"). 
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dealings ·with tribes that had only tenuous claims to lands ceded.91 
Harrison dealt with "the remnants of the Kaskaskias under Ducoigne, 
a band that numbered, according to the United States, only 30 men, 
women, and children in 1796 but that ceded [all of] southern Illinois 
[and much of central Illinois] to the United States.to92 
In part because he had to deal ·with so many disjointed tribes, 
Harrison acquired the lands described in the Wabash Company's 
deed through a series of cessions. The United States apparently ac-
cepted the weakness of the Piankashaw's claim to all the lands sold to 
the Wabash Company. In the fall of 1809, the United States acquired 
2.8 million acres that included the first (northern) parcel in the 
Companies' deed from five other tribes, without paying the Pianka-
shaws a cent93 The Piankashaws were among the tribes ceding lands 
included in the Wabash Company's second (southern) parcel.94 The 
United States began surveying these lands, a necessary prerequisite to 
91 WHITE, supra note 62, at 474 n.6. 
92 ld. 
93 Harrison initially signed a treaty with the Miamis (including Eel Rivers), Dela-
wares, and Pottawatamies on September 30, 1809. See Act of Sept. 30, 1809, 7 Stat. 113, 
113 (noting the formation of a treaty "between the United States of America, and the 
tribes oflndians called the Delawares, Putawatimies, Miamies and Eel River Miamies"). 
This treaty required the United States to obtain the approval of the Weas and the 
Kickapoos. See id. at 114-15 (noting that the treaty will have no effect unless the tribes 
agree to it). Harrison obtained these tribes' approvals by the end of the year. See Act 
of Dec. 9, 1809, 7 Stat. 117, 117 (noting that the Kickapoos agreed to the ninth article 
of the treaty of September 30, 1809); Act of Oct. 26, 1809, 7 Stat. 116, 116 (noting the 
Weas' consent to the treaty of September 30, 1809). 
9
• The Delaware tribe was the first to sell its rights to lands included in the second 
(southern) Wabash Company tract, on August 18, 1804. See Act of Aug. 18, 1804, 7 
Stat. 81, 81-82. This tract consisted of 1.9 million acres. See TREAT, supra note 88, at 
404. Articles four and five of the treaty denied that the Piankashaws or the Miamis had 
any right to the lands ceded. See Act of Aug. 18, 1804, 7 Stat. 81, 82 (noting that the 
Delawares had "exhibited to the above-named commissioner of the United States suffi-
cient proof of their right to all the country which lies between the Ohio and White 
river"). The United States nonetheless subsequently purchased whatever interests 
these tribes might have had. See Act of Aug. 21, 1805, 7 Stat. 91, 91 (noting that the 
Miamis "cede and relinquish to the United States forever, all that tract of country 
which lies to the south of a line to be drawn from the north east comer of the tract 
ceded by the treaty of Fort Wayne"); Act of Aug. 27, 1804, 7 Stat. 83, 83 ("The Pianke-
shaw tribe relinquishes, and cedes to the United States for ever, all that tract of country 
which lies between the Ohio and Wabash rivers"). The Piankashaws, alone, ceded the 
portion of the second (southern) Wabash Company west of the Wabash River on De-
cember 30, 1805. See Act of Dec. 30, 1805, 7 Stat. 100, 100-01 (noting the terms of the 
treaty between the United States and the Piankashaw tribe). This tract consisted of 2.1 
million acres. See TREAT, supra note 88, at 404 (listing the acres of numerous Indian 
land cessions). Harrison negotiated both treaties. · 
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sale, almost immediately after finalizing the treaties.95 Land offices 
were opened in Vincennes, Indiana and Kaskaskia, Illinois in 1804.96 
C. The Litigation of Johnson v. M'Intosh 
1. Prelude 
In their first decade, officials at the Kaskaskia office devoted them-
selves almost exclusively to sorting out the tangle of preexisting 
French, British, and early American claims over southern Illinois 
lands.97 New business picked up when surveyors finished their work in 
the district and Congress passed a "pre-emption" act giving occupiers 
and improvers (squatters) the right to purchase their claims at the 
statutory minimum price of two dollars an acre.98 Like most preemp-
tion acts, Congress limited individual claims to a single quarter section 
(160 acres).99 Preemptioners purchased about 110,000 acres from 
1814-1815.100 President Madison finally proclaimed open-market land 
sales by auction on May 16, 1816, and business boomed.101 
95 See Joseph W. Ernst, With Compass and Chain: Federal Land Surveyors in the 
Old Northwest, 1785-1816, at 251 (1958) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia 
University) (detailing a map of the Federal Surveys in Illinois, 1804-1815). 
96 See MALCOLM]. ROHRBOUGH, THE LAND OFFICE BUSINESS 28-29 (1968) (provid-
ing a map ofland districts and offices). 
97 See Act of Feb. 12, 1812, 2 Stat. 677, 677-78 (reexamining existing claims and 
permitting new claims in Kaskaskia district); Act of May 1, 1810, 2 Stat. 607, 607 (con-
firming claims approved by Kaskaskia commissioners made through 1809); Act of Mar. 
3, 1807, 2 Stat. 446, 446-47 (confirming claims to land in Vincennes district); see also 
SOLONJ. BUCK, ILLINOIS IN 1818, at 53 (1917) (discussing the fact that the land office 
had to deal with preexisting claims). 
98 Act of Feb. 5, 1813, 2 Stat. 797, 797. "[E]very such person ... shall be entitled to 
a preference in becoming the purchaser from the United States of such tract ofland at 
private sale, at the same price .... " I d. Congress twice extended the time period for 
preemptive claims in the Kaskaskia district. See Act of Apr. 27, 1816, 3 Stat. 307, 307 
(noting a "further provision for settling claims to land in the territory of Illinois"); Act 
of Feb. 27, 1815, 3 Stat. 218, 218 (extending Illinois land claims "upon the river Missis-
sippi"). 
99 See Act of Feb. 5, 1813, 2 Stat. 797, 797 (noting that "no more than one quarter 
section ofland shall be sold to any one individual"). 
100 This number is based on receipts for land sales in 1814 ($53,000) and 1815 
($207,000), combined with the fact that all preemptioners, by statute, paid two dollars 
an acre. See Arthur H. Cole, Cyclical and Sectional Variations in the Sale of Public Lands, 
1816-1860, in THE PuBllC LANDS: STuDIES IN 1HE HISTORY OF 1HE PU1mC DOMAIN 
229, 234 (V em on Carstensen ed., 1968) (providing a table of the receipts from public 
land sales). 
101 See 1 CIS Index to Pres. Exec. Orders & Proc. 98 (1986) (announcing the ex-
ecutive order for a public land sale at Kaskaskia). Receipts went from $207,000 in 
1816, to $572,000 in 1817, and to $1,491,000 in 1818. See Cole, supra note 100, at234. 
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This legal chronology raises questions about the purchases by the 
defendant, William Mcintosh, in]ohnson v. M'Intosh.102 He obtained 
the lands at issue in the case (fifty-three tracts amounting to nearly 
12,000 acres) on April24, 1815/03 before the first public sale. The law 
limited preemption claims to 160 acres, and it is extremely doubtful 
that Mcintosh had claims dating from British or French rule to over 
11,000 acres scattered all over southern Illinois. How, then, did Mcin-
tosh manage to get patents from the federal government to all this 
land, at the statutory minimum price, before the government auc-
tioned it to the public? 
There are two possibilities, both consistent with what litde is 
known of Mcintosh. First, he may have engaged in a massive fraud, 
claiming preemptive or colonial rights to acreage 100 times the per 
person limit. More likely, and consonant with a large body of evi-
dence, is that Mcintosh obtained these lands from preemptioners and 
colonial claimants in return for the legal services he rendered to help 
establish their claims. Mcintosh served as the voice of French claim-
ants in southern Indiana and Illinois as early as 1803,104 and William 
102 William Mcintosh served as treasurer of the Indiana Territory circa 1804, and 
like many other frontier officials, ':jumped in at the very beginning of [his] residence 
in the new territories to acquire [land] claims." GATES, supra note 64, at 92; see also 
Letter from Michael Jones, Register of Land Office at Kaskaskia, to Albert Gallatin, 
Secretary of the Treasury (May 18, 1804), reprinted in 7 'TERRITORIAL PAPERS, supra note 
31, at 194 (1939) (noting that William Mcintosh owned "vast quantities of real prop-
erty"). 
103 See District Court Records of johnson v. M'Intosh, microformed on National Ar-
chives Microfilm Publications (Supreme Court Case Files), Film M-214 (1792-1831), 
Roll 56, Frame 410 [hereinafter District Court Records of M'Intosh] {describing Mcin-
tosh's acquisitions). The district court records ofMcintosh's purchases match exactly 
the patents issued to him as recorded in a database of all the United States patents is-
sued for land in Illinois. See State of Illinois Public Domain Land Tract Sales Arcliive (last 
modified Jan. 18, 2000) <http:/ /www.sos.state.il.us/depts/archives/data_lan.html> 
(containing transaction data for public domain land sales in Illinois). The Supreme 
Court dates the purchases three years later, in 1818, when the federal government is-
sued patents. See Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 560 (1823). Such de-
lays between purchase and issuance of patent were common. See ROHRBOUGH, supra 
note 96, at 175 (noting that "the delay in the issue of patents had become severe 
enough to necessitate a circular to the land offices on the reasons for the delay"). The 
Supreme Court's acreage count, 11,560 acres, based on the parties' stipulated facts,· 
appears to be off; the land records indicate Mcintosh purchased 11,982.81 acres (44 
quarter sections, one half section, six sections, a fractional section (521.21 acres) and a 
fractional half section (260.6 acres)). According to the Illinois Public Domain Land 
Tract Sales Archive database, Mcintosh paid the statutory minimum of two dollars per 
acre for all these parcels. See State of Illinois Public Domain Land Tract Sales Archive, supra. 
104 See Letter from William Mcintosh to the President ijefferson] (Dec. 15, 1807), 
reprinted in 7 TERRITORIAL PAPERS, supra note 31, at 503 (1939) (addressing Jefferson 
"on behalf of the french Inhabitants ofVincennes"); Letter from William Mcintosh to 
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Henry Harrison, Governor of the territories, identified Mcintosh as 
one of "the principal councellors of the Kaskaskias Speculators. "105 
The historical record of the plaintiffs in M'Intosh is thinner and 
much less colorful. Thomas Johnson, an original investor in the Wa-
bash Company, and later a Supreme Court Justice, died on or about 
November 1, 1819, and the plaintiffs, his son Joshua and grandson 
Thomas Graham, were the primary beneficiaries in his will. Perhaps 
more importantly for the commencement of the M'Intosh litigation, 
the will made Robert Goodloe Harper executor of the estate.105 
Harper apparently determined that Johnson owned shares and de-
cided to go to court in a final stab at giving a happy ending to the long 
and sad story of the United Illinois and Wabash Land Companies. 
Looking for a federal patent holder to sue, as a test of the validity 
of their claim under the Wabash Company's Indian deed, Johnson 
and Graham, probably led by Harper, appeared to target Mcintosh. 
As one of the largest landholders in the Illinois and Indiana territo-
ries, Mcintosh was a natural adversary, but he does not appear to have 
been a real one. Mapping the United Companies' claims alongside 
Mcintosh's purchases, as enumerated in the district court records, 
shows that the litigants' land claims did not overlap.107 Hence there 
was no real "case or controversy," and M'Intosh, like another leading 
early Supreme Court land case, Fletcher v. Peck, appears to have been a 
h 108 sam. 
the President [Jefferson] (Mar. 30, 1808}, reprinted in 7 TERRITORIAL PAPERS, supra 
note 31, at 537 (1939); Memorial to Congress by Inhabitants of Knox County (Nov. 8, 
1808), reprinted in 7 TERRITORIAL PAPERS, supra note 31, 612-13 (1939) (including a 
signature for Israel Rowland "by [William] Mcintosh his agent"); Petition to Congress 
by Inhabitants ofKnox, St. Clair, and Randolph Counties (Oct. 22, 1803}, reprinted in 7 
TERRITORIAL PAPERS, supra note 31, at 125, 128 (1939) (including William Mcintosh 
among the petitioners). 
105 Letter from Governor Harrison to the Secretary of the Treasury Albert Gallatin 
(Au~!;. 29, 1809}, reprinted in 7 TERRITORIAL PAPERS, supra note 31, at 669 (1939). 
6 See Letter from Roger Taney to Robert Goodloe Harper (Dec. 4, 1819}, in 
Harper Papers, Legal Correspondence, 1797-1824 (on reserve in the MarylandHist. 
Soc'y Collection, Baltimore, Md., MS 1884, ace. no. 55,644) (describing the details of 
the execution ofMr.Johnson's will). 
107 See Map of Land Claims in]olmson v. M1ntosh., supra p. 1067. For a detailed de-
scri~tion of the sources used to derive this map, see Kades, supra note 19 app. 
08 See MAGRATII, supra note 65, at 54-55 (showing that Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 
Cranch) 87 (1810}, resolving the Yazoo land case, was feigned}; see also 1 CHARLES 
WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HisTORY 147 (1926) (arguing that 
Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3Dall.) 171 (1796}, was feigned). The Supreme Court 
has repeatedly ruled that federal courts have no jurisdiction in feigned cases since 
there is no "case or controversy." See, e.g., Moore v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of 
Educ., 402 U.S. 47, 48 (1971) (dismissing for lack of jurisdiction because of the ab-
sence of a "case or controversy"); Lord v. Veazie, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 250, 255 (1850) 
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Mcintosh did not contest a single fact alleged in the complaint, 
jurisdictional or othenvise. Perhaps he participated in framing the 
complaint, which became the stipulated facts of the case. Neither the 
district court nor the Supreme Court questioned any of these facts.109 
Everyone involved, it seems, wanted a decision on the legal question 
of the validity of private purchases from the Indians. 
The plaintiffs' case thus commenced in the United States District 
Court for Illinois in December 1820,110 in Vandalia, Illinois. The par-
ties apparently agreed to a bench trial, and the judge gave them leave 
"to make a stated and agreed case of facts for the consideration of the 
Court. "m Without providing any substantive opinion, the court ren-
dered judgment for the defendant.112 As yet another piece of evidence 
that both sides wanted a final ans·wer to the question presented in the 
case, Mcintosh waived his right to force the plaintiffs to post an appeal 
bond.113 
The plaintiffs filed a writ of error "by consent" in the Supreme 
Court on February 5, 1822, one more indication that Mcintosh 
wanted the case heard at the highest level despite his victory in district 
court.114 Unsurprisingly, Robert Goodloe Harper, along '\vith Daniel 
Webster, served as counsel for the plaintiffs. Argument spanned four 
days, and only nine days later the Court affirmed the district court's 
judgment for the defendant.115 
2. Supreme Court Arguments and Holding 
The bulk of Webster and Harper's reported argument for the 
plaintiffs focused on narrow statutory issues. They claimed (1) that 
banning the purchase of lands from a foreign sovereign was a legisla-
tive act beyond the power of the Crown acting '\vithout consent of Par-
liament, and thus that the Proclamation of 1763 was void; and (2) that 
("[T]here must be an actual controversy, and adverse interests."). This case law, of 
course, is based on Article III of the Constitution. See U.S. CoNST. art. m, § 2, cl. 1 
(limitingjudicial power to cases and controversies). 
109 See Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 543-71 (1823). 
110 See District Court Records of M'Intosh., supra note 103, Frame 422. 
111 I d. Frame 347. 
112 See M'Intosh., 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 604. 
m See District Court Records of M'Intosh., supra note 103, Frames 420-21. 
114 See Supreme Court February Term 1821 (docket sheets), micro formed on National 
Archives Microfilm Publications, Series 216, Roll 1, Frame 408. The Supreme Court 
received the district court records almost a year before the plaintiff finally filed the writ 
of error. See id. 
115 The case was argued February 15 and 17-19, 1823; judgment was entered on 
February 28, 1823. Seeid. 
HeinOnline -- 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1094 1999-2000
1094 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 148: 1065 
colonial Virginia's 1662 statute banning such purchases had lapsed 
(or been repealed), and that its reenactment in 1779, after the United 
Companies' purchases, could not divest the Companies of vested 
. h 116 ng ts ex post. 
Chief Justice Marshall, in a brief detour toward the end of the 
Court's unanimous opinion, summarily rejected both contentions. 
Simply disagreeing with the plaintiffs' first point, he declared that the 
Crown retained exclusive power to deal with "vacant lands," including 
Indian lands, as it pleased.117 Much more peculiar was Marshall's re-
sponse to the supposedly lapsed and tardily reenacted Virginia statute 
banning private purchases. The only evidence that the statute of 1662 
had been repealed, it seems, was a "marginal note opposite to the title 
of the law, forbidding purchases from the Indians, in the revisals of 
the Virginia statutes, stating that law [the 1662 statute] to be re-
pealed. "118 Marshall did not argue that a marginal note beside a title 
was insufficient evidence that the legislature had repealed the statute; 
indeed, he explicitly refused to recognize that the 1779 law could 
"countervail the testimony furnished by the marginal note."119 He in-
stead found that the 1779 law could "safely be considered as an une-
quivocal affirmance, on the part of Virginia, of the broad principle 
which had always been maintained, that the exclusive right to pur-
chase from the Indians resided in the government. "120 
This discussion will return momentarily to what Marshall meant by 
"broad principle ... always ... maintained." There is a more immedi-
ate question: why did Marshall not limit his opinion to these two 
points? If either the Proclamation of 1763 or the Virginia colonial 
statute of 1662 (or the "broad principle" behind it) were good law at 
the time of the United Companies' purchases, then those purchases 
were clearly illegal. A contemporary New York case rejected an Indian 
deed precisely on such narrow grounds. 121 The main difference be-
116 See supra note 46 (citing, inter alia, a Virginia statute of 1662 barring private 
purchases oflndian lands). 
m See Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 595-96 (1823) ("[A]JI vacant 
lands are vested in the crown, as representing the nation; and the exclusive power to 
grant them is admitted to reside in the crown, as a branch of the royal prerogative."). 
Marshall distinguished the plaintiffs' primary supporting case, CampbeU v. Hall, 1 
Cowp. 204, 98 Eng. Rep. 1045 (1774), as involving royal imposition of a tax. Parlia-
ment, not the Crown, had the exclusive power to tax. See M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 
at597. 
118 M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 585. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
121 See GoodeJI v. Jackson, 20 Johns. 693, 722-34 (N.Y. 1823) (refusing to recognize 
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tween this approach and the broader rule Marshall enunciated is that 
a more limited ruling would leave loopholes for future litigation-for 
example, what if a colony had a lapsed statute and some speculators 
made purchases before the Proclamation of 1763? Marshall thought 
the stakes were important enough to ·warrant a universal rule barring 
private purchases from the Indians. 
Scholars have justly complained about the "tumbling logic" of 
Marshall's opinion/22 and its "conflicting and confusing potpourri of 
arguments."123 Yet there is an underlying structure to the opinion, 
and the arguments from Marshall's "conflicting and confusing pot-
pourri" can still be distilled and assessed, each in turn. It has already 
become evident, for example, that the Proclamation of 1763 and the 
colonial statutes were too narrow to support a more general holding. 
Most other arguments in Marshall's opinion can be ignored as mere 
dicta unnecessary to decide the case. 
In order to find the true holding, the inquiry must start with the 
question Marshall proposed to answer. Here, at least, in its very first 
paragraph, the opinion is crystal clear: "the question is, whether [the 
United Companies'] title can be recognised in the Courts of the 
United States?"124 The key clause is the last one, "in the Courts of the 
United States." Marshall used this phrase in the first paragraph of the 
opinion and repeated it in the very last paragraph. 125 It at first seems 
superfluous; what courts, other than the courts of the United States, 
could possibly be relevant to the dispute? 
The answer is Indian courts. Marshall laid out the two tiers gov-
erning rights in American lands: the discovery rule that regulated in-
ter-European claims, and "[t]hose relations which were to exist be-
tw·een the discoverer and the natives."126 The Indians' rights to their 
lands, defined in the second tier, "were, in no instance, entirely disre-
garded; but were, necessarily, to a considerable extent, impaired. "127 
The discovery rule itself, Marshall noted, prevented the Indians from 
selling to other sovereigns. Under colonial practice, however, the In-
an Indian grant based on an exhaustive analysis of the New York Constitution of 1777, 
article 37, and a long line of colonial and state statutes forbidding land transactions 
with Indians). 
122 Henderson, supra note 23, at 87. 
123 David E. Wilkins, Johnson v. M'Intosh Revisited: Through the Eyes ~?[Mitchel v. 
United States, 19 AM. INDIANL. REV. 159, 161H>7 (1994). 
124 M'lntosh., 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 572. 
125 See id. at 604-05 ("[P]laintiffs do not exhibit a title which can be sustained in the 
Courts of the United States ••.• "). 
126 I d. at 573. 
127 I d. at 574. 
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dians were not stripped of all rights; they retained what Marshall la-
beled the "Indian title of occupancy," which could be extinguished 
only "by purchase or by conquest "128 
The plaintiffs, then, via their predecessor (a member of the Wa-
bash Company and then the United Companies), purchased this In-
dian title of occupancy. Since they purchased Indian title, Marshall 
directed them to an Indian forum for a remedy. 
[The plaintiffs hold] under [the Indians], by a title dependent on their 
laws. The grant derives its efficacy from their will; and, if [the lllinois 
and Piankashaw tribes] choose to resume it, and make a different dispo-
sition of their land, the Courts of the United States cannot interpose for 
the protection of the title. The person who purchases lands from the 
Indians, within their territory, incorporates himself with them, so far as 
respects the property purchased; holds their title under their protection, 
and subject to their laws.129 
Included in the Indians' title of occupancy was the power to sell 
lands to the discovering sovereign that a tribe had previously conveyed 
to someone else. Thus, as Milner Ball puts it, "[t]he plaintiffs' claim 
to the land was defeated principally because the Indians themselves 
had extinguished plaintiffs' interest [by the later sale to the United 
States]."130 
Marshall, then, created a rather strange two-tiered land tenure sys-
tem: Indian title of occupancy applied before American purchase or 
conquest, and the common law of the several states applied after. The 
courts of the United States had no jurisdiction over claims based on 
Indian title of occupancy. The dual land tenure system explains why 
the plaintiffs lost the case: they purchased the Indian title of occu-
pancy, which the Indians could and did extinguish under the law of 
the United States, by reselling to the United States. 
3. Marshall's Version oflndian Title 
What is less clear in M'Intosh is the precise contours of the Indian 
title of occupancy. The most important question for the Indians, 
given that they could sell full title only to the United States, was 
whether they could refuse to sell. Marshall's black letter rule, that the 
128 Id. at 587. 
129 Id. at 593. Marshall knew full well, of course, that there was no Indian court to 
hear the plaintiffs' grievance. In the very next sentence, he observed, "[i]f they annul 
the ~t, we know of no tribunal which can revise and set aside the proceeding." I d. 
Ball, supra note 23, at 26; see also Henderson, supra note 23, at 93-96 (discussing 
tribal title and tribal tenurial systems, and their treatment in M'Intosh). 
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United States could divest the Indians of title only via purchase or 
conquest, was consistent with earlier doctrine, discussed in Part I.A 
The word "conquest" was subsequently limited to "defensive wars" or 
those fought for some other 'just cause."131 In addition to purchase 
and just conquest, later cases held that the Indians could lose their ti-
tle of occupancy by abandonment.132 Outside of these elaborations, 
the Supreme Court has never altered the rules established in M'Intosh. 
Formally, then, describing Indian title as amounting to "only a 
tenancy at sufferance"133 is misleading, since under M'Intosh the Indi-
ans could remain on their land and refuse to sell, as long as they re-
mained peaceful. Marshall specifically deemed them "rightful occu-
pants," the antithesis of tenants at sufferance, whom the law 
distinguishes from trespassers only by the legality of their original en-
try. The opinion casts Indians as term-of-year tenants with full rights 
to renew, rather than as tenants at sufferance subject to immediate 
eviction. As a matter of realpolitik, however, the sufferance label may 
have been accurate.184 
As peculiar as Indian title seems in and of itself, even stranger is its 
131 Worcesterv. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 545 (1832). 
152 Abandonment explains Marsh v. Brooks, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 513 (1852), in which 
the Court ruled that the holder under a federal patent could adversely possess against 
the Indians, despite the failure of the government to extinguish Indian title. See id. at 
521-24. Without appealing to abandonment as the basis for extinguishing title, this 
case would be inconsistent with M'lntosh, empowering a private citizen to do by occu-
pation what she could not do by purchase. The Court formally declared that aban-
donment can extinguish Indian title in Williams v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 434, 437-38 
(1917) ("[W]hen [the Indians' right of occupancy] was abandoned all legal right or 
interest which both tribe and its members had in the territory came to an end."). 
Arguably, Chief Justice Marshall alluded to abandonment in M'lntoslz. Mter de-
scribing Indian migrations caused by settlers thinning the game population, he noted 
that "[t] he soil, to which the crown originally claimed title, being no longer occupied by its 
ancient inhabitants, was parceled out according to the will of the sovereign power." 
M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 591 (emphasis added). The practical importance of 
game-thinning in expropriating Indian lands is examined infra Part II.D.2. 
133 Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and 
lntetJetation inFederallndianLaw, 107 HARV. L. REv. 381, 386 (1993). 
Later Supreme Court decisions have made Indian title more like tenancy at suf-
ferance. In Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 285 (1955), the Court 
held that tribes had no Fifth Amendment constitutional right to compensation for a tak-
ing of their title of occupancy. Payment is made at the pleasure of the government. 
This case seems to contradict M'Intosh, since it permits extinguishment of Indian title 
without purchase, just conquest, or abandonment. At bottom, however, it merely 
shows that M'lntosh was not decided on constitutional grounds. It also makes sense 
within Marshall's system of dual land tenure systems: there are no remedies in "the 
Courts of the United StateS' for rights based on Indian tenure, whether held by the plain-
tiffs in M'Intosh or the Indians in Tee-Hit-Ton. 
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coexistence with European title in Marshall's dual land tenure con-
struct. Real property was still the centerpiece of the common law in 
1823, and few common law doctrines were as deeply established as the 
principle that all titles were rooted in a unique sovereign, be it the 
Crown, a state, or the federal government. Marshall himself appar-
ently found it most odd that, under this system of dual land tenure, 
European sovereigns could convey titles before they had extinguished 
Indian title. He devoted almost half of his opinion135 to laying out the 
historical record that "our whole country [has] been granted by the 
crown while in the occupation of the Indians."136 Why did Marshall 
devote so much time to summarizing long historical practice? Why 
did he emphasize that grants of European title before extinguishment 
of Indian title were "understood by all," "exercised uniformly," and 
extended "universal recognition" as legitimate?137 
4. Legal Basis for the M1ntosh Rule: Custom 
The answer is tied to the basis for the holding in M1ntosh:. cus-
tom. Phrases like "understood by all," "exercised uniformly," and 
"universal recognition" appeal to long-established practice, not to any 
specific constitutional, statutory, or common law rule. "Common 
practices, sanctioned by general usage, that cover ... similar situations 
are what. .. (in accordance with long usage) [is meant] by cus-
toms."138 
Basing customary law on a general, long-term statutory usage is 
admittedly unusual; it ordinarily arises via long private practice, inde-
pendent of formal rule creation by a public entity. While most cus-
tomary legal rules may have arisen from entirely unofficial acts, draw-
ing on old statutes for customary law is (perhaps surprisingly) quite 
185 See M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 574-88 (discussing the history of American 
land ownership). 
136 /d. at 579. One scholar has argued that this extended discussion was no more 
than tracing the chain of the United States's title, complaining that the "Court spent 
an extravagant amount of time in establishing the principle that the ultimate title to 
land within the United States was held by the federal government as the successor-in-
interest to the discovery by England." Henderson, supra note 23, at 90. Marshall fo-
cused, however, on the filet that various grants were made while the Indians occupied 
the lands, rather than on the legitimacy of each transfer. He adverts to grants made 
"notwithstanding the occupancy of the natives," or "while in the occupation of the In-
dians," no less than nine times in the course of discussing the history of the dual land 
tenure regime in America. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 577-88. 
1
s
7 M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 574, 588. 
158 Richard A. Epstein, The Path to The T J. Hooper: Tile Theory and History of Gus· 
tom in tlteLawofTurt, 21]. LEGAL STUD. 1, 6 (1992). 
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consistent with the rationale behind English customary law. "The 
theory of English law was that, if there had been a usage from time 
immemorial ... , it might fairly be presumed that it arose under an 
act of Parliament or other public act of governing power, the best evi-
dence of which had perished. "139 
This theory-that custom evidenced ancient and lost legislative 
will-dovetails well with Marshall's blithe response to the possibility 
that the relevant Virginia colonial statute barring private purchases 
had lapsed. He considered the later reenactment of a similar provi-
sion "as an unequivocal affirmance, on the part of Virginia, of the 
broad principle which had always been maintained, that the exclusive 
right to purchase from the Indians resided in the government. "140 
Marshall seemed to say that the longstanding customary legislative 
practice of barring private purchases oflndian title was so strong that 
it overrode the "mere technicality" of a lapsed or repealed statute. 
This is a powerful form of customary law, which is usually seen as 
subordinate to statutory formalities.141 Marshall displayed a similarly 
strong deference to custom in response to the plaintiffs' argument 
that the enactment of the numerous statutes barring private pur-
chases142 showed that the background (common law) rule, absent such 
statutes, was that such purchases were valid. He enlisted the very exis-
tence of these statutes to make the case for a customary rule of law: 
"[T]he fact that such acts have been generally passed, is strong evi-
dence of the general opinion, that such purchases are opposed by the 
189 Graham v. Walker, 61 A. 98, 99 (Conn. 1905). The Supreme Court had long 
taken the same view. 
[C]ustom ••• is always presumed to have been adopted with the consent of 
those who may be affected by it. In England, and in the states of this Union 
which have no written constitution, it is the supreme law; always deemed to 
have had its origin in an act of a state legislature • • • . The court not only may, 
but are [sic] bound to notice and respect general customs and usage, as the 
law of the land, equally with the written law, and when clearly proved, they will 
control the general law; this necessarily follows from its presumed origin-an 
act of parliament or a legislative act. 
United Statesv. Arredondo, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 691, 714 (1832) (emphasis added). 
140 M'Intosh., 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.} at 585. 141 Marshall may have borrowed the idea of a customary basis for his opinion from 
the defendants, who argued that the "uniform understanding and practice of Euro-
pean nations" rendered the plaintiffs' deeds void. /d. at 567. The roots of using cus-
tom as a ground for deciding cases may go back to the Continental Congress's reply to 
the United Companies' first memorial to the federal government, which deemed pri-
vate purchases against "common and known usage." ACCOUNT OF PROCEEDINGS, supra 
note 25, at 57. 
H
2 See discussion supra Part I.A (explaining land, title, and alienability in early 
America). 
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soundest principles of wisdom and national policy."143 Universal, uni-
form, and longstanding legislation summed to a customary rule 
greater than its statutory parts. 
That said, Marshall did not even hint that Congress was powerless 
to reverse his opinion by statute and to permit private citizens to buy 
land directly from the Indians. That is, there is no evidence that 
M'Intosh created a constitutional rule. A reading of M'Intosh, as decided 
on customary grounds, is consistent with the general ability of parties 
to contract around customary laws. "[C]ustom is best understood as set-
ting out the 'right' default provisions, not as creating a body of man-
datory terms."144 
Also consistent with a customary law reading of M'Intosh is the fact 
that Marshall was not troubled that different rules might apply else-
where in the British Empire. In Britain, custom was usually local (ap-
plying only to a manor, village, parish, or similarly small group). On 
precisely such parochial grounds, Marshall dismissed the relevance of 
the Camden-Yorke opinion (approving private purchases of land in 
India) that was relied on so heavily by the original members of the 
United Companies. Without explaining why America should have a 
different rule, Marshall merely noted that the opinion referred to 
"'princes or governments,'" terms "usually applied to the East Indians, 
but not to those of North America. We speak of their sachems, their 
warriors, their chiefmen, their nations or tribes, not of their 'princes 
or governments. '"145 Marshall admitted that the Camden-Yorke opin-
ion stood for the proposition that "the king's subjects carry with them 
the common law, wherever they may form settlements. "146 While the 
common law generally permitted purchases of foreign lands, Mar-
shall's opinion implies that customary practice in America created an 
exception to this rule. He argued that the system of dual land tenure 
"adapted to the actual condition of the two people" was "indispensa-
ble to that system under which the country has been settled"-such an 
essential practice, Marshall said, "cannot be rejected by courts of jus-
tice."147 Not only was the custom of barring private purchases from 
the Indians immune to legislative lapse, it was wholly beyond the 
145 M'Jntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 604. 
144 Richard A. Epstein, International News Service v. Associated Press: Custom and 
Law as Sources of Property Rights in News, 78 VA. L. REv. 85, 87 n.6 (1992) [hereinafter 
Epstein, Custom and Law]. 145 M'Intosh., 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 600. 
1<16 /d. 
147 Id. at591-92. 
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power of common law courts to alter. 
Admittedly, early American courts rarely recognized custom as a 
basis for law. Until a modem resurgence, "'custom' had almost no 
authority in American law."148 In reviewing cases involving rights of 
public access to roads and waterways, however, Carol Rose found that 
while courts usually rejected it as the basis for legal rights, custom 
"provides powerful insights into the nature of 'inherently public 
property. "'149 Courts have often declined to invoke custom explicitly 
in their holdings, even when their reasoning in effect relies on it. In 
International News Service v. Associated Press,150 for instance, the Court 
discussed customary news industry practices at length to support its 
recognition of property rights in news. Richard Epstein has argued 
that "the easiest way to defend the result in [International News Service] 
is to recognize the force of custom in the creation of the property 
rights," even if the Court did not explicitly base its holding on industry 
custom.151 "[T]he INS decision and the cases following it reached re-
sults consistent with the custom of the news-gathering industry, al-
though they did not purport to derive their rules from custom. "152 
So, too, in M'Intosh, Marshall never invokes the word "custom," yet 
the passages from the opinion cited above show that custom is are-
current theme that underlies the holding of the case. Given the long 
and uninterrupted line of statutes in every colony, it was likely un-
thinkable to Marshall, the other justices, and mostAmericans that pri-
vate citizens could purchase land directly from the Indians. There ex-
148 Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public 
Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 717 (1986) (footnote omitted). A number of Ameri-
can courts in the 1800s did recognize customary practices in the whaling industry. See 
generaUy ROBERT C. ELUCKSON, ORDER WnHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SEm.E 
DISPUTES 191-206 (1991) (examining the practices of the New England whaling indus-
try in using custom to create rules establishing property rights). More recently, courts 
in a number of jurisdictions have accepted custom-based rights of the public to use 
otherwise private beaches. See, e.g., Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449, 460 
(Or. 1993) (finding no taking of property within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment 
based, in part, on the "common law of custom"); City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, 
Inc., 294 So. 2d 73, 78 (Fla. 1974) ("If the recreational use of the sandy area adjacent 
to mean high tide has been ancient, reasonable, without interruption and free from 
dispute, such use, as a matter of custom, should not be interfered with by the owner."); 
County of Hawaii v. Sotomura, 517 P.2d 57, 61 (Haw. 1973) (arguing that the long-
standing public use of beaches "ripened into a customary right" consistent with favor-
ing such use as a matter of public policy). 
149 7 Rose, supra note 148, at 22. 
1
!50 248 u.s. 215 (1918). 
151 Epstein, Custom and Law, supra note 144, at 106. 
152 Id. at 124. 
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ists abundant evidence that the customary norm behind the M'Intosh 
rule was deeply recognized in American society. 
In a leading antebellum treatise on constitutional law, Chancellor 
Kent described the basis for Marshall's opinion in words that support 
a customary reading: 
[The M'Intosh rule] is established by numerous compacts, treaties, laws, 
and ordinances, and founded on immemorial usage. The country has been 
colonized and settled, and is now held by that title. It is the law of the 
land, and no court of justice can permit the right to be disturbed by 
I . . b • h 153 specu at1ve reasonmgs on a stract ng ts. 
Further support for inferring custom as the basis of Marshall's 
holding comes by process of elimination: all other possibilities are ei-
ther explicitly contradicted by, or implicitly dissonant with, Marshall's 
opinion. The discussion above highlighted Marshall's rejection of 
both statutory and common law bases for the rule of M'Intosh. He 
flatly rejected both natural and intemationallaw,154 defending the rule 
against private purchases from Indians "[h]owever this restriction may 
be opposed to natural right, and to the usages of civilized nations."155 
From the discussion of the discovery rule, itself clearly a rule of inter-
national law, it was already clear that a different set of rules regulated 
relations between Europeans and Indians.156 He declared that domes-
tic law (of unspecified source) must decide property cases: 
As the right of society, to prescribe those rules by which property may be 
acquired and preserved is not, and cannot be drawn into question; as the 
title to lands, especially, is and must be, admitted, to depend entirely on 
the law of the nation in which they lie; it will be necessary, in pursuing 
this inquiry, to examine, not simply those principles of abstract justice, 
which the Creator of all things has impressed on the mind of his crea-
ture man, and which are admitted to regulate, in a great degree, the 
rights of civilized nations, whose perfect independence is acknowledged; 
but those principles also which our own government has adopted in the 
. I d . th I "' d . . 157 parucu ar case, an giVen us as e ru e .or our ec1s1on. 
153 KENT'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 46, at *381 (emphasis added). 
154 Marshall seemed to define international law, in large part, as a subspecies of 
natural law. He rejected relying entirely on "principles of abstract justice, which the 
Creator of all things has impressed on the mind of his creature man, and which are 
admitted to regulate, in a great degree, the rights of civilized nations." M'Intosh, 21 
U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 572. 
155 I d. at 591. 
156 See id. at 573 ("Those relations which were to exist between the discoverer and 
the natives, were to be regulated by themselves."). 
157 I d. at 572. 
HeinOnline -- 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1103 1999-2000
2000] EXPROPRIATION OF AMERICAN INDIAN LANDS 1103 
In extensive, apologetic dicta, Marshall offered "excuse, ifnotjus-
tification,"158 for refusing to extend intra-European civility, under the 
guise of natural or international law, to the Indians. While natural 
and international law usually required a conqueror to integrate mem-
bers of the defeated population into its own and extend them equal 
property rights, Marshall claimed that an agricultural and industrial 
society simply could not incorporate hunters like the Indians. He re-
fused to justify this less favorable treatment on the theory that "agri-
culturists, merchants, and manufacturers, have a right, on abstract 
principles, to expel hunters from the territory they possess, or to con-
tract their limits," deeming irrelevant such "speculative opin-
ions ... respecting the original justice of the [Europeans'] claim."159 
The reporter classified the case as "Constitutional Law" without 
elaboration, and the index heading entitled "Constitutional Law" 
makes no less than fifteen references to the case.160 While it is possible 
to imagine the M'Intosh plaintiffs invoking the Due Process Clause or 
the Takings Clause, they do not mention either, and neither does the 
Court. Marshall also did not cite the Constitution's grant of exclusive 
jurisdiction over Indian affairs to Congress. In fact, there is not a sin-
gle reference to the United States Constitution.161 Finally, as previ-
ously discussed, Marshall never suggested that Congress was powerless 
to reverse his opinion and to permit private citizens to purchase land 
directly from the Indians. Thus, it is difficult to argue that M'Intosh is 
. . al I th . 1 d 162 a constitution case, at east as e term 1s common y use . 
II. EFFICIENT EXPROPRIATION 
Part I traced the roots of M'Intosh in colonial land practices and 
the acts of speculators that contradicted established (customary) prac-
tice. It then analyzed how Chief Justice Marshall upheld the long-
standing bar against private purchases of land from the Indians. Part 
ISS fd. at 589. 
159 I d. at 588. 
160 I d. at 543, index at 31-32. 161 There are references to the (unwritten) British Constitution regarding the 
Crown's power to bar private land purchases in the Proclamation of 1763, but this dis-
cussion was irrelevant to the holding. See id. at 594-97 (outlining the scope of authority 
granted to the King of Great Britain in distributing parcels of land in colonial territo-
ries to his subjects). 162 Philip Frickey argues that M'lntosh was a "quasi-constitutional" decision, mean-
ing that while it did not bar legislation to the contrary, it established a "clear statement 
rule" requiring Congress to be explicit about any further erosion of Indian rights. 
Frickey, supra note 133, at 385. 
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II explains why colonial law uniformly and universally barred such 
purchases and why Marshall made this statutory custom the law of the 
land. 
The rule of M'Intosh was part and parcel of a larger process: effi-
cient (cheap) European expropriation of Indian lands. Just as many 
contract, tort, property, and other legal rules promote efficient behav-
ior/63 M'Intosh and a broad range of other colonial and early Ameri-
can laws created rewards and penalties that helped Europeans obtain 
Indian lands as inexpensively as possible. It is important to stress that 
the process minimized costs for European colonizers, not for the 
colonizers and Indians together. This is in contrast with most efficient 
legal rules that, ex ante at least, benefit all participants in a given activ-
ity. 
European agricultural colonization undoubtedly presented the 
possibility of enormous gains from trade. First, "a European immi-
grant required about two acres to provide for himself in the New 
World, while Indians required up to a thousand times more."164 
Moreover, Europeans had a wide variety of manufactured goods 
of great value to Indians in their traditional way of life, including 
guns, metal tools, cooking utensils, and warmer clothing. Thomas jef-
ferson drew the obvious conclusion from these basic economic facts: 
"[The Indians are] very poor, and they want necessaries with which we 
abound. We want lands with which they abound; and these natural 
wants seem to offer fair ground of mutual supply."165 
The only question was, which side would garner the lion's share of 
the gains from this trade? In a system of purely voluntary exchange, 
without any coercion on either side, the European farmers might be 
expected to buy off relatively small comers of Indian hunting grounds 
for relatively large amounts of trade goods. American land would still 
have been much cheaper for settlers than it was in heavily populated 
Europe. The land-rich Indians, while preserving their way of life, 
would have been glad to part with a modicum of their territory for 
novel and useful manufactures. This would have been the "market" 
(based on voluntary exchanges and thus arguably fair) division of the 
gains from trade between land-rich and manufacturing-rich societies. 
165 For efficiency explanations of a broad range of legal rules, see generally 
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (5th ed. 1998). 
164 Anderson & McChesney, supra note 16, at 43 (citing STANLEYLEBERGOIT, THE 
AMERICANS: ANECONOMICRECORD 15-16 (1984)). 
165 17 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 374-75 (Albert Ellery Bergh ed., 1907) 
[hereinafter WRITINGS OF jEFFERSON]. 
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This, of course, is not what happened. Instead, the United States 
obtained virtually every acre of Indian land at astoundingly low prices. 
This Article explains how the United States captured virtually all the 
gains from trade with the Indians. 
Mter briefly discussing why customary practices are often effi-
cient/66 the Article explains how the M'Intosh rule facilitated low-cost 
acquisition of Indian lands by stifling bidding by Americans for Indian 
land and making the United States a monopsonistic buyer.167 The de-
cision, like the earlier colonial statutes, solved a collective action prob-
lem and left the Indians facing a single buyer assured of no competi-
tion.168 
The United States, however, was not formally a monopsonist. If 
one tribe laid sole claim to a piece of land, then the advantage of be-
ing the only possible buyer was offset by the fact that there was only 
one seller. The parties are then trapped in what is called a bilateral 
monopoly, and the outcome of such bargaining games, where neither 
side can obtain competing offers, is uncertain. 
Still the United States had many techniques for ensuring its vic-
tory in these bargaining games. On one extreme, an examination of 
the history of European-Indian negotiations reveals the willingness of 
the Europeans to use threats, and, rarely, force, to obtain land at bar-
gain prices. While fighting '\vas atypical due to its expense, it did set a 
ceiling on what the United States had to pay.169 The United States, 
however, did not have to resort to violence or even threats to lower 
the price oflndian lands. Its most powerful alternative '\vas breathtak-
ingly simple: settlement on the frontier. Settlers killed relatively few 
Indians in raids, massacres, skirmishes and the like. They killed many 
more by spreading endemic diseases like smallpox.170 Perhaps even 
more importantly, by clearing forests for agriculture, introducing 
European animals, and hunting at prodigious rates, they thinned the 
game animals on which the Indians depended for food, clothing, and 
other necessities.171 The colonies, and later the United States, passed 
166 See discussion infra Part II.A.1 (explaining the evolution of efficient customary 
rules). 
167 A monopsonist, the converse of a monopolist, is the sole buyer in a market, in-
stead of the sole seller. See BLACK'S LAW DIGI10NARY 1023 (7th ed. 1999). 
163 See discussion infra Part II.B (exploring European-Indian relations). 169 See discussion infra Part II.C (explaining the rarity of fighting). 
170 See discussion infra Part II.D.1 (explaining how depopulation by disease altered 
the terms of trade between Europeans and Indians). 
171 See discussion infra Part II.D.2 (explaining how game-thinning altered the terms 
of trade between Europeans and Indians). 
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a wide variety of laws to facilitate this process by encouraging and pro-
tecting settlers, and even squatters.172 On the other hand, settlers who 
precipitated hostilities made land acquisition more expensive, espe-
cially in terms of European lives; in response, the government at-
tempted, with limited success, to reign in these rogue frontiersmen.173 
This Part concludes by recharacterizing the process of efficient 
expropriation as an implicit exercise of the power of eminent do-
main.174 European immigrants had, under European valuations, a 
higher-valued use of the continent-intensive agriculture-but paid 
the Indians the European-calculated value of the land for its old use: 
hunting and light agriculture. 
A. Custom and the Efficiency Interpretation oJM'Intosh 
1. Evolution of Efficient Customary Rules 
Before examining in detail how M'Intosh and other legal rules fa-
cilitated efficient expropriation oflndians lands, it is worth pausing to 
consider how efficient customary rules arise in the first place.175 The 
rough and ready definition of an efficient rule is one that enables and 
encourages parties to maximize their joint production ofwealth.176 
Richard Epstein posits that customary rules are usually efficient 
when they arise among parties with frequent interactions (so-called 
repeat players) and the stakes in any individual case are small.177 In 
such circumstances, participants in an activity realize that they will 
gain in their numerous future dealings if they adopt an efficient rule 
(by the very definition of efficiency); there is not enough at stake in 
any one case to outweigh the sum of these expected future benefits. 
172 See discussion infra Part II.E.1 (explaining efforts to attract and reward settlers 
through the creation oflegal rules). 178 See discussion infra Part II.E.2 (explaining the negative externalities of lawless 
settlers, speculators, and traders). 174 See discussion infra Part II.G (discussing the analogy between eminent domain 
and efficient conquest). 175 See George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 
J. LEGAL STUD. 65, 81 (1977) (positing that common law courts have a powerful ten-
dency to adopt efficient rules). For possible shortcomings in this model, see POSNER, 
supra note 163, at 614-15 (noting several objections to the theory that common law 
courts have incentives to choose efficient rules). 
176 See POSNER, supra note 163, at 12-17 (discussing different definitions of effi-
cie~W)S. E · 138 11 (d" · th d". • h" h ee pstem, supra note , at 1scussmg e con 1ttons m w IC customs 
emerge). 
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Epstein further argues that when the context of a tort case indicates 
that customary practice is likely efficient (repeat players in consensual 
dealings, where the payoff at each interaction is relatively small), the 
court should defer to "the practices formulated by those who have 
powerful incentives to get things right. "178 
Once custom is accepted as controlling, it is no longer necessary 
for judges to guess what set of rules best accommodate the communi-
ties they serve. "That information is generated by trial and error from 
below, and those practices that survive have good claim to being bene-
ficial (one could almost say efficient or wealth-maximizing) for the 
• J n179 commumty at arge. 
Robert Ellickson has provided powerful historical examples and 
contemporary empirical evidence that customary practices in rela-
tively close-knit groups are efficient, and that members of such groups 
generally rely on their customs even when formal legal rules provide 
seemingly more attractive rights and remedies. 180 
Unlike "conventional" custom, the rule of M'lntosh arose not from 
the everyday acts of European settlers, but instead from a long line of 
colonial statutes, regulations, and executive orders. This statutory 
source of custom explains why the rule against private purchases of 
Indian lands was likely efficient for European colonizers: it was 
rooted in democratic process. Assuming that democracy reflects the 
will of the governed, the fact that legislatures and executive officials 
from New Hampshire to Georgia adopted the same rule strongly sup-
ports the proposition that the rule reflected public desires. As the ac-
tivities of the United Companies show, there were strong incentives 
for individual citizens to acquire choice lands directly from the Indi-
ans. From a socie~ point of view, however, such seU:interested action 
would drive up the price oflndian land for all settlers. As discussed at 
length in Part II.B. I, the rule against such purchases might have 
harmed individual Europeans, but it helped minimize the total price 
paid for Indian lands. Settlers thus relied on legislation and regula-
178 /d. at 24. 
1
7D Epstein, Custom and Law, supra note 144, at 86. For a similar analysis, see Robert 
D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy, 23 Sw. U. L. REv. 443, 445 (1994) 
(noting that "[t]he subject of this lecture is .•• enacting custom") [hereinafter Cooter, 
Complex Ec011~], elaborated on in Robert D. Cooter, Structural Adjudication and tire 
New Law Merchant: A Mot:kl of Decentralized Law, 14 INTL REV. L. & ECON. 215, 216 
(1994) (noting that "[w]hen courts apply community standards, they find law, rather 
than making it"). 
180 See ElliCKSON, supra note 148, at 184-206 (giving examples of customary prac-
tices that have developed in whaling and cattle communities). 
HeinOnline -- 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1108 1999-2000
ll08 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 148: 1065 
tion to solve a classic collective action problem-one of the primary 
efficiency gains derived from a government with coercive power. 
Indians had no voice in the colonizers' governments, and thus it is 
not surprising that they were not a factor in the social calculus that re-
sulted in the rule against private purchases of Indian lands. Both 
courts adopting customary practices, and commentators praising 
them, have been careful to point out that customary rules work well 
only in small, close-knit communities, where the custom has no nega-
tive effect on outsiders.181 Instead of facilitating free trade that would 
have maximized the joint product of both societies, European settlers 
adopted rules that maximized their own utility, regardless of Indian 
welfare. 
2. Contrasting Efficiency with Other Explanations of M'Intosh 
While the monopsonistic M'Intosh rule imposed costs on the Indi-
ans, this effect and the intent behind it are not obvious. Thus, both 
sides of the polarized debate on American-Indian relations, discussed 
in the Introduction above, find support for their respective views in 
Chief Justice Marshall's opinion. As noted in the Introduction, nei-
ther side provides a story that squares with basic historical facts, and 
M'Intoshis a case in point182 
At one extreme, Marshall could have given the Indians a full loaf: 
European title, with an absolute right to alienate to anyone. Begin-
ning with Felix Cohen, scholars offering a benevolent interpretation 
of American Indian policy have described Marshall's opinion as a bril-
liant compromise between the political pressures to take Indian lands, 
and the immorality of outright expropriation. According to Cohen, 
Marshall "would accept neither horn of this dilemma .... [which] was 
neatly solved by Chief Justice Marshall's doctrine that the Federal 
181 SeeGhen v. Rich, 8 F. 159, 162 (D. Mass. 1881) (adopting, for example, whaling 
custom as law, in part, because "[i] ts application must necessarily be extremely limited, 
and can affect but a few persons"); Epstein, Custom and Law, supra note 144, at 126 
(noting that custom "works well in narrow domains"). Cooter says that a custom of 
cooperation among producers, resulting in a cartel, is clearly not entitled to judicial 
deference. 
[M] embers of a business cartel can benefit each other by keeping prices high. 
From the viewpoint of the cartel, discounting the price is "cheating." How-
ever, discounting benefits people outside the cartel more than it harms the 
members of it. Consequently, discounting is socially efficient, whereas the car-
tel is socially inefficient. 
Cooter, Complex Economy, supra note 179, at 450 (emphasis added). 
182 See supra text accompanying notes 1-12 (summarizing both sides of the debate). 
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Government and the Indians both had exclusive title to the same land 
at the same time. "183 More recent commentators, while casting later 
Supreme Court decisions in a negative light, continue to view M'Intosh 
as a defense oflndian rights in the face of political pressure.184 An un-
stated assumption of these commentators is that judges and legisla-
tures were willing to pay significantly more for Indian lands in order 
to salve the nation's conscience. 
At the other extreme, Marshall could have given the Indians no 
loaf by declaring them truly tenants at sufferance subject to ejection at 
the will of the United States. The fact that Marshall also rejected this 
extreme position presents difficulties for those who portray American 
Indian policy as intentionally genocidal. Robert Williams makes one 
of the most forceful recent statements of this viewpoint, arguing that 
the only reason Marshall left the Indians with any rights is that "[h]is 
judicial task was merely to fill in the details and rationalize the fictions 
by which Europeans legitimated the denial of the Indians' rights in 
their acquisition of the Indians' America."185 Williams fails to explain 
why Marshall, as a participant in grand theft of the continent, created 
a dual land tenure system vesting some rights in the Indians. 
Marshall's decision to give the Indians half a loaf (or perhaps 
more accurately a quarter or an eighth of a loaf) thus presents diffi-
culties for both the benevolent and the malevolent interpretation of 
the expropriation of America from the Indians. The remainder of 
this Part argues that M'Intosh is best explained as one element of a cal-
culated, rational, unemotional effort to obtain Indian lands at the 
least cost. This analysis rejects the kindness imputed to Marshall (and 
the rest of the Justices who joined his unanimous opinion) by the be-
nevolent school, and the truculence imputed by the malevolent 
school. The working assumption is that such a sweeping national pol-
icy to transfer wealth must be understood, at bottom, in terms of self-
ishness (economics), not benevolence or malevolence (morality or 
lack thereof) .186 
185 Cohen, supra note 5, at 48-49. 
184 See Wilkins, supra note 123, at 166-67 (stating that Marshall "cleverly reached a 
political/legal compromise" that protected Indians from outright expropriation); see 
also Henderson, supra note 23, at 105 (arguing that later Supreme Court cases under-
mined the nuanced and balanced approach of M'lntosh); Newton, supra note 22, at 
1223 (indicating that M'lntosh represents "a brilliant compromise" by providing Indi-
ans with rights in the face ofEuropean rapacity). 
185 
WILLIAMS, supra note 12, at 312. For similarly dark readings of events leading 
up to the M'lntosh decision, see id. at 185, 193-94, 196, 205, 207. 
185 Whether selfishness itself is good or evil is another classic normative debate; this 
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B. Governing European-Indian Relations: Presenting a United Front 
1. United Front in Land Purchases 
The international discovery rule, along with the national rule of 
M'Intosh,187 created a two-tiered system to avoid competition for Indian 
lands. The first tier, the discovery rule, not only minimized physical 
conflict between European sovereigns, as emphasized by Chief justice 
Marshall,188 but also ensured that once a nation had staked its claim, 
other nations would not meddle in affairs within the "discovered" re-
• 189 gton. 
Other scholars have noted in passing that the second tier, barring 
citizens of the discovering sovereign from making private purchases, 
created a monopsony, but have not emphasized the importance of 
this custom, enshrined in M'Intosh, to the process of efficient expro-
priation.190 It is undoubtedly true from an individual perspective that 
Article focuses on the positive implications of economic (selfish) behavior. 
187 Congress codified the rule against private purchases of Indian lands as part of 
the Trade and Intercourse Acts, discussed infra Part II.E.2. 188 See supra text accompanying notes 24-26 {discussing the discovery doctrine). 
189 While the discovery rule's attempt to minimize competition was efficient, at 
least from the European perspective, it had other effects that may or may not have 
minimized the cost of finding and expropriating aboriginal lands. The discovery rule 
does seem to encourage a wasteful race to establish rights. Expeditions across the 
oceans were costly propositions, yet countries may have incurred this and other ex-
penses in order to establish property rights; this is also a potential problem with pre-
emption (right to purchase based on settlement and improvements) and homestead-
ing (right to title, without any payment, based on settlement and improvements), 
discussed i#a Part II.E.l. For a vivid description of what seems an astoundingly waste-
ful race to establish rights among European nations, see THOMAS PAKENHAM, "!HE 
SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA, 1876-1912, at xxi-xxv (1991). An earlier attempt by the Pope 
may have avoided competition, and such a wasteful race to establish rights, by assign-
ing title before discovery. "The [papal] bull of Alexander VI in 1493 which divided the 
world between Spain and Portugal, for example, was principally designed to prevent an 
unseemly and dangerous scramble among Christian nations for the spoils of the newly 
discovered areas." Wilcomb E. Washburn, The Moral and Legal Justifications for Dispos-
sessing the Indians, in SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA: EssAYS IN COLONIAL HisTORY 
15, 15 Uames Morton Smith ed., W.W. Norton & Co. Inc. 1972) (1959). 
190 See Anderson & McChesney, supra note 16, at 56 (noting in passing that the 
M'Intosh rule "made the United States a monopsonistic purchaser"); see also Jennifer 
Roback, Exchange, Sovereignty, and Indian-Angla Relations, in PROPERlY RIGHTS AND 
INDIAN ECONOMIES 5, 18 (Terry L. Anderson ed., 1992) (discussing how state cessions 
to the federal government "facilitated the Continental Congress' continuance of the 
policy of monopolizing land purchases from the Indians"). Another scholar notes that 
the government's land monopsony was "bound up with issues of military security, di-
plomacy, and law enforcement." Springer, supra note 41, at 35. I will discuss what 
Springer meant by security, diplomacy, and law enforcement infra Part II.E, but con-
spicuously absent from this list of issues is the primary effect of monopsony: reducing 
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"the prohibition on private land sales probably prevented many mutu-
ally beneficial transactions from taking place. "191 From an American 
societal point of view, however, the rule of M'Intosh solved a collective 
action problem and permitted the nation to avoid expensive bidding 
wars for Indian lands. 
To illustrate, consider a simplified version of a private acquisition 
of Indian lands. Assume that there are two tracts for sale, and two po-
tential buyers. Both buyers face the following schedule of costs and 
revenues:
192 
• cost of two cents an acre to buy if they cooperate and do not 
bid against each other, but one dollar an acre if they bid 
against each other; and 
• revenue of three dollars an acre from reselling small lots to set-
tlers. 
If the players cooperate (stick to an agreement to bid low), they each 
agree to buy one tract. One assumes if they compete (either never 
agree to both bid low, or both defect from such an agreement), they 
likewise each obtain one tract. If one cooperates while the other 
competes, the defecting competitor obtains both tracts. Based on 
these numbers, the players' payoffs are determined by the interaction 
of their decisions to cooperate or compete. 
the Rrice a buyer pays. 
91 Roback, supra note 190, at 19. 
192 These costs and revenues are loosely based on historical data. See infra text ac-
companying note 490 (describing how Indians typically received about two cents an 
acre or Jess for land while the statutory minimum price charged for land was two dol-
lars an acre). 
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Player 2 
Cooperate Compete 
Cooperate 298,298 0,400 
Compete 400,0 200,200 
(payoffs in cents: Player 1, Player 2) 
Figure 1 
This presents the players with the classic prisoners' dilemma.193 
Without some mechanism to enforce an agreement to cooperate, 
both buyers are likely to defect and bid against each other for both 
tracts. While this competition may have been optimal considering the 
welfare of Indians as well as the Americans, this Article hypothesizes 
that American laws sought to maximize only American welfare. If so, 
this potential competition is disastrous for Americans, as the Indians 
receive a substantial share of the value of their lands. If American 
bidders cooperate, their net wealth increases by almost six dollars; any 
degree of competition reduces this surplus by two dollars-money 
that goes directly to the Indians. The United Companies, for in-
stance, faced no rivals for the lands they sought to purchase, but had 
they earned fat profits, more competitors would inevitably have begun 
bidding for Indian lands. 
M'Intosh provided a neat solution to this dilemma by establishing 
the United States as the sole purchasing entity. Not only did the hold-
ing solve the collective action problem, but it did so without imposing 
any administrative costs on the govemment.194 Any private party so 
rash as to violate the rule, like the United Companies, ended up with 
an unmarketable title, and a subsequent purchaser from the United 
193 See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 33-35 (1994) (ex-
plaining that the Prisoners' Dilemma focuses attention on collective action problems, 
where the parties do best if they cooperate, but at the same time they lack mechanisms 
to credibly and enforceably commit to cooperative behavior). 
194 This stands in stark contrast to the extremely high expense, amounting to im-
possibility, of regulating many other acts of those on the frontier. Such prohibitive 
costs often hindered the least-cost expropriation of Indian lands. See infra Part II.E.2 
(discussing how actions of some frontiersmen, such as squatting on Indian lands, had 
negative external effects that imposed costs on the rest of the nation). 
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States, like William Mcintosh, could file suit (or, as in M'Intosh, defend 
against suit) to clear title.195 
Marshall does not mention creating a monopsony; as discussed in 
Part II.A 1, judges often adopt customary practices as law without real-
izing their efficiency. At some level, however, the courts did realize 
the importance of M'Intosh. The trial court, and then the Supreme 
Court, decided a case that minimal investigation would have revealed 
·was feigned. Marshall's opinion for the unanimous Court chose the 
broadest rule possible, laying down a national standard, instead of re-
lying on colonial or British law that the opinion itself declared valid.196 
Although Congress could have legislatively reversed the decision, 
M'Intosh fostered collusion in the purchasing of Indian lands. There 
are no records of subsequent litigation attempting to reverse the case, 
and no records of subsequent private purchases from the Indians. 
The opinion's focus on incentives going forward, rather than on 
the fairness of events that had already transpired, is further evidence 
that the courts grasped the efficiency motivation for the custom 
against private purchases of Indian lands. Ironically, despite the det-
rimental effect of the case on Indian welfare, the real winners of 
M'Intosh were the Illinois and Piankashaw Indians. The losing plain-
tiffs found the claims they inherited worthless. The victorious defen-
dant, William Mcintosh, presumably paid the United States fair value 
for the lands and derived little further benefit from the case.197 The 
tribes, however, sold the lands twice: first in 1773 and in 1775 to the 
Illinois and Wabash Companies, then from 1803 to 1809 to the United 
States. The United Companies repeatedly beseeched Congress to 
avoid double payment to these double grantors, but the legislature, 
and then the Supreme Court, found this equitably sound argument 
• • 198 
unconvmcmg. 
As discussed above in Part I.C.3, Marshall told the plaintiffs that, 
under the dual land tenure system, they must seek a remedy from the 
195 The rule did impose negotiation and other transaction costs on the federal gov-
ernment, but as discussed infra Part II.B.2, the government appears to have had nego-
tiati~ advantages that were unavailable to any private party. 
1 See M'lntosli, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 598-600. 
197 The decision did remove a small blotch from Mcintosh's title, but given the 
number of people buying lands based on United States patents that overlapped with 
the United Companies' claims, their potential conflicting claim was not seen as much 
of a threat. The author could find no evidence that land intersecting the Companies' 
tracts sold at a discount compared to similar land elsewhere. 
198 See supra text accompanying notes 74-76 (discussing the United Companies' ar-
guments against paying the tribes twice for the same land). 
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Indians, under whom they held title. Marshall, however, virtually ad-
mitted that the Court would find no remedy since there was no Indian 
forum. If he had been concerned with equity, Marshall could have 
(1) ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, (2) directed the United States to 
refund Mcintosh's money, and (3) instructed the United States to 
pursue the Illinois and Piankashaw tribes for a remedy, perhaps taking 
some of their western reservation lands. The United States govern-
ment alone was capable of disgorging the Indians' unjust gains from 
selling the same lands twice. Instead, the holding of the case left the 
double grantors with double proceeds, apparently a necessary evil in 
reaffirming a custom that helped reduce the price Americans paid for 
Indian lands. 
M'Intosh, of course, was a fleeting and pyrrhic victory for two small 
tribes. Indians generally realized that America's monopsony worked 
to their detriment and tried to deny the existence of any such exclu-
sive right to purchase. 
Brothers: You have talked, also, a great deal about pre-emption, and 
your exclusive right to purchase Indian lands, as ceded to you by the 
King, at the treaty of peace. 
Brothers: We never made any agreement with the King, nor with any 
other nation, that we would give to either the exclusive right of purchas-
ing our lands; and we declare to you, that we consider ourselves free to 
make any bargain or cession of lands, whenever and to whomever we 
please. If the white people, as you say, made a treaty that none of them 
but the King should purchase of us, and that he has given that right to 
the United States, it is an affair which concerns you and him, and not us; 
we have never parted with such a power.199 
These protestations could have no effect as long as the British re-
spected their treaty with the United States (preventing international 
competition), and the United States in tum effectively refused to rec-
ognize Indian deeds obtained by its citizens (preventing intranational 
competition). All the willingness in the world to sell to the highest 
bidder is irrelevant if there is only one bidder. Indians selling land 
after M'Intosh suffered much the same way consumers would in the 
absence of antitrust laws. Just as a price-fixing agreement between 
manufacturers A and B can harm consumer C despite the fact that Cis 
not a party to the deal, the customary agreement among Americans 
not to bid against each other for Indian lands, embodied in M'Intosh, 
199 Answer to Speech by the Commissioners (Aug. 16th, 1793), reprinted in AMERICAN 
STATE PAPERS, supra note 81, 1 INDIAN AFFAIRS 356, 356 (1832). 
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reduced Indian welfare by lowering the price Indians received for 
their lands without requiring any consent from those harmed. 
Refusing to recognize Indian deeds also helped clarify land ti-
tles.200 It may have been expensive to mediate conflicts among Ameri-
cans running deep into the woods and obtaining potentially overlap-
ping deeds. Determining whether or not such deeds were 
fraudulently obtained might have been difficult as well.201 Divergences 
between the two cultures' understandings of land tenures may have 
contributed to such difficulties. For example, the European emphasis 
on absolute power to use and exclude forever was at odds with the In-
dians' frequent use of more limited usufructuary land rights). Yet 
governments could have solved these difficulties by simply placing the 
burden on private purchasers to prove that they obtained clearly-
demarcated lands in fair sales. To assure that the deeds obtained were 
not fraudulent, the government could have required, for instance, 
that all purchasers negotiate at federal posts, as Murray did in obtain-
ing the Illinois Company deed. Standard recording acts could have 
resolved competing claims. Standard rules on unclear land descrip-
tions could have addressed problematic land descriptions in Indian 
deeds. Alternatively, if the United States was not worried about paying 
market price for Indian lands, but rather only about clarity of titles, it 
could have appointed itself sole auctioneer of Indian lands. When-
ever the Indians decided to sell, agents of the United States would 
then have conducted the sale fairly, made sure there were not conflict-
ing grants, deducted a portion of the proceeds for its administrative 
expenses, and forwarded the remainder of the winning bids directly to 
the Indians. Thus, while a federal monopsony did enhance clarity of 
land titles, it did not seem to lie at the heart of the customary practice 
upheld in M'Intosh. 
The colonists did not stumble at random onto the efficient cus-
tom adopted in M'Intosh. Colonial policymakers realized the advan-
tages of preventing competition for Indian lands, and they did not 
stop at curbing individual land transactions: "From the earliest colo-
nial period, the English Crown adopted a policy of attempting to cen-
tralize and monopolize contact with the natives.',2°2 As Chief Justice 
Marshall noted later in another important Indian law case, "[t]he 
200 See Telephone Interview with Professor RobertEllickson, Yale Law School (Feb. 
4, 1998). 
201 See JENNINGS, supra note 10, at 130 (discussing "endless litigation over purchase 
of fraudulent titles" in colonies before they banned private purchases). 
202 Roback, supra note 190, at 11. 
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whole intercourse between the United States and [Indian nations], is, 
by our constitution and laws, vested in the government of the United 
States."203 
In addition to restraints on individuals, the historical record is re-
plete with arrangements designed to solve the collective action prob-
lem among colonies and later states-the "federalism" dimension of 
presenting a united front. The land monopsony seems to have been 
one of the central purposes of the United Colonies of New England, 
an early American confederation formed in 1643. "Six of the eight 
commissioners, two from each colony, had to authorize action, so op-
portunistic scrambling for Amerindian lands could be stalled by rival 
colonies . ..204 A century later, the British barred private purchases of 
lands in the Proclamation of 1763 in part to prevent competition in 
the acquisition of Indian lands. In proposing national control over 
Indian relations in the Articles of Confederation, Ben Franklin de-
clared that "[a]bove all else, rivalries between colonies in treating with 
the Indians had to be avoided."205 The Articles, however, left the 
States with complete control over the Indians ·within their borders. 
This excessive division of power was one of the reasons the nation 
adopted a new Constitution that clearly and unequivocally made the 
national government master of all dealings with the tribes.206 Execu-
tive officials brooked no violation of these governmental preroga-
tives.207 
203 Worcesterv. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515,561 (1832). 
204 lANK. STEELE, WARPATIIS: INVASIONSOFNORTHAMERICA95 (1994). 
205 FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN TREATIES: THE HisTORY OF A 
POUTICALANOMALY 38 (1994). 
206 Article IX of the Articles of Confederation gave the United States control only 
over Indians in the territories outside the established states. See ART. OF CONFED. of 
1781, art IX (granting the power to regulate "the trade and managing all affairs with 
the Indians, not members of any of the states, provided that the legislative right of any 
state within its own limits be not infringed or violated"). Note that even this arrange-
ment prevented competition among governments, since it vested exclusive power to 
deal with a given tribe in either one state or in the national government. The Indian 
Commerce Clause of the Constitution of 1789 removed even this limited division of 
power. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress the power to regulate com-
merce with Indian Tribes). 
Despite this provision and a series of congressional acts regulating trade and inter-
course with the Indians, some eastern states continued their colonial practice of deal-
ing directly with the Indians. The federal government did not intervene. "These state 
actions provided the fodder for the rash of eastern Indian land claims litigated in fed-
eral courts over the [1970s and 1980s]." Robert N. Clinton, The Proclamation of 1763: 
Colonial Prelude to Two Centuries of Federal.State Conflict over the Management of Indian Af 
fairs, 69 B.U.L. REv. 329,372-73 (1989). 
207 See, e.g., ROBERT V. REM!NI, ANDREW jACKSON AND THE COURSE OF THE 
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The importance of presenting a united front suggests a different 
interpretation of Cherokee Nation203 and Worcestef09 which, together with 
M'Intosh, comprise the "Marshall trilogy" on Indian law. Focusing on 
sympathetic dicta, many scholars have suggested that these cases em-
bodied a sympathetic and fair-minded approach to dealing with the 
Indians that later opinions overlooked.21° Frickey argues that, while 
Marshall's M'Intosh opinion may have recognized unsavory colonialism 
as to past events, when taken together with Cherokee Nation and Worces-
ter, Marshall attempted to soften colonialism with constitutional-style 
rules that limited the ability of the other branches to exploit the Indi-
ans. Frickey reads the Marshall trilogy as an implicit message to the 
other branches of government and the nation that they "should help 
those poor Indians. "211 
Whatever Marshall pontificated about in his extensive dicta, the 
holdings of the two cases clearly served the purpose of maintaining a 
united front in Indian relations. Cherokee Nation held that the Su-
preme Court did not have original jurisdiction over a lawsuit filed by 
Indians since Indian tribes were not the type of foreign "States" con-
templated in the Supreme Court's grant of original jurisdiction in the 
Constitution.212 By deeming Indian tribes "domestic dependent na-
tions,"213 Marshall ensured that neither foreign powers nor any of the 
several states would meddle in Indian affairs. In Worcester, the Court 
AMERICAN EMPIRE, 1767-1821, at 422 (Harper 8c Row 1977) (1817) (providing that 
upon becoming governor of the chaotic Florida Territory in 1821, jackson arrested all 
white men who treated with the Indians without proper authorization. One thing he 
would not abide was a 'meddlesome' white man undercutting his policy."). Plaintiff 
William Mcintosh withdrew a suggestion that private citizens contact Indians about the 
likelihood of hostilities, making it clear that he "did not intend to interfer[e] with the 
poceedings [sic] of the Governor," who had exclusive power over Indian affairs. Letter 
from James Johnson to Nathaniel Ewing Uune, 1810), reprinted in 8 TERRITORIAL 
PAPERS, supra note 31,at 29 (1939). 
208 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). 
209 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 515. 
210 See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text (noting that the American gov-
ernment paid for almost all of the land acquired from the Indians, even though the 
law did not require it). 
211 Frickey, supra note 133, at 424. 
212 See U.S. CoNsr. art. lll, § 2 ("The judicial power shall extend to all 
Cases ... between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens, or Sub-
jects."). 
218 Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17 ("[T]hose tribes which reside within the 
acknowledged boundaries of the United States ... may, more correctly, perhaps, be 
denominated domestic dependent nations. They occupy a territory to which we assert 
a title independent of their will, which must take effect in point of possession, when 
their right of possession ceases."). 
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held, under the clear language of the Constitution (reversing the Ar-
ticles of Confederation), that the State of Georgia had no power to 
deal directly with the tribes within its borders. By preserving a unitary 
entity to deal with the Indians, Marshall's opinions helped the United 
States continue to buy Indian land cheaply.214 
2. The Bargaining Game 
While M'Intosh limited the number of bidders for Indian lands to 
one legal entity, it would be rash to conclude that this created a mo-
nopsony. If a tribe had an exclusive claim to a piece of land, the value 
of being a single buyer was counterbalanced by the existence of a sin-
gle seller: the United States then could not pit competing sellers 
against each other. 
Dealings of this sort, with only one party on each side of a poten-
tial transaction, are called "bilateral monopolies" or "bargaining 
games." The basic schema is that the two parties are interested in 
making a deal, and there exists a range of prices acceptable to both. 
Marine salvage law contains a vivid example. Imagine that the good 
ship Rescuer comes across the storm-damaged Distress. The Distress is 
incapable of moving and carries a very valuable cargo, say, gold, worth 
$1,000,000. No other ships are likely to happen by (thus ensuring that 
this is indeed a bilateral monopoly). The expense to the Rescuerofas-
sisting the Distress, accounting for all costs and risks, is $10,000. Thus, 
the Rescuer would be happy to perform the rescue services for any 
higher amount. The Distress, facing a total loss, is better off paying 
anything up to $1,000,000. If the parties are roughly aware of these 
facts, there is much room for haggling, bluffing, and all the other fine 
points of negotiating. The bottom line is that both sides know the 
other side is better off agreeing to extreme terms than none at all. 215 
There is no exact "solution" to such bargaining games. Unlike 
"normal" markets where supply and demand, created by numerous 
214 PresidentJackson's infamous refusal to enforce Marshall's decision against the 
State of Georgia might appear to undermine the unifYing, nationalist holding. How-
ever, Jackson's refusal to protect the Indians against the depredations of the Georgia 
state government may only indicate that the nation approved of the State's policy, and 
in effect relied on Georgia, as an agent, to further national policy. Marshall's decision 
gave the federal government the power to prevent state actions that were inconsistent 
with the national interest; Jackson merely chose not to exercise this power against 
Georra· 
21 Bilateral monopolies are ubiquitous; other examples include workers and firms, 
when workers have firm-specific skills; neighboring property owners negotiating an 
easement; and relations among owners of a closely held corporation. 
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competing sellers and buyers, dictate a Pareto-optimal price, any out-
come between $10,000 and $1,000,000 is plausible for the example in 
the previous paragraph. The relative bargaining talents of the parties 
will ultimately determine the outcome. There may, however, be other 
factors such as time-pressure that affect the outcome. For instance, if 
the Distress were sinking and it were a matter of life and limb, the Res-
cuer would be likely to garner more favorable terms.216 
The next two Parts catalog a host of techniques the United States 
used in this bargaining game to minimize the price it paid for Indian 
lands. Parts II.B.2.a-.b discuss the techniques in decreasing order of 
acceptability under contract law and voluntary exchange, starting with 
bluffing, surely a legal practice, and ending with physical intimidation 
and threats, surely grounds for rescinding contracts at common law.217 
Part II.B.2.c discusses why the United States's superior unity and gov-
ernance translated into this catalog of bargaining advantages over the 
Indians. Finally, Part II.B.2.d argues that the strange mix of bargain-
ing techniques-some of which were consistent with voluntary ex-
change, while others not-fits the hypothesis of efficient conquest 
well. 
a. Bargaining "Tricks" Colorably Consistent with Contract Law 
A common negotiating technique is to pound a fist on the table 
and storm out of the room, declaring a (false) intention never to re-
turn, in the hope that the other side, realizing a bad deal is better 
than no deal, will cave in. This is undoubtedly a legally accepted prac-
tice in voluntary negotiations. The United States frequently employed 
such bluffs to gain an advantage in bargaining to purchase Indian 
lands. For example, in 1786 the United States implied it would attack 
the Shawnees if they refused to the proffered terms, despite the Secre-
tary of War's later admission that the nation was "utterly unable to 
maintain an Indian war with any dignity or prospect of success.',21s 
Perhaps the most potent ploy for gaining the upper hand in nego-
tiations with Indians was exploiting divisions, both among the several 
tribes and within each tribe. European colonial powers had long used 
216 See DAVID M. KREPS, A COURSE IN MICROECONOMIC THEORY 551 (1990) (dis-
cussing bargaining in a bilateral monopoly). 
217 REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS,§§ 174-76 (1987). 
218 PRUCHA, supra note 205, at 54 (quoting statement of Henry Knox, Secretary of 
War). I will discuss the use of threats below in Partii.B.2.b; here the focus is on bluff:. 
ing-making representations that the United States was capable of prosecuting a war 
when in fact it could not. 
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such divide and conquer techniques to forcibly take Indian lands. 
"[T]he [Spanish] conquistadors, efficient killing machines though 
they were, did not conquer Mexico and Peru unaided. Native allies 
were indispensable. In a sense, Spanish armed conquest was a judo 
trick by which Europeans, assisted by the pox and the plague, used the 
Indians' own strength to overthrow them."219 
The United States repeatedly exploited fissures among and within 
tribes to obtain land cheaply, usually without resorting to force. From 
the first days of the Republic, Congress counseled its Indian agents to 
"deal with each Indian tribe or nation as separately as possible"220 and 
"insisted that the tribes were to be kept separated so that negotiations 
would be easier."221 Desperate to prevent the Indians from uniting 
and refusing to sell lands, Secretary of War Knox successfully cleaved 
the powerful Iroquois from such an alliance "by remedying their 
complaints" about, inter alia, American land claims and encroaching 
settlers.222 
The United States preyed mainly on two sources of disunity 
among the Indians. First, the United States fanned the flames of 
longstanding animosities between various groups. For instance, Gen-
eral St. Clair purposefully negotiated separately with the Six Nations 
and the Great Lakes tribes because there was "a jealousy that subsisted 
between them, which [he] was not willing to lessen by appearing to 
consider them as one people"-St. Clair even thought, if need be, he 
could "set them at deadly variance."223 The United States at times paid 
little in hard cash for land, instead offering to protect weak tribes 
against strong enemy neighbors or co-tenants. This tactic helped re-
duce the amount William Henry Harrison agreed to pay to the Kas-
kaskias for the lands in southern Illinois that they had previously con-
veyed to the Illinois Company.224 
219 jENNINGS, supra note 10, at33. 
22
° Charles Judah Bayard, The Development of the Public Land Policy, 1783-1820, 
with Special Reference to Indiana 48 (1956) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Univer-
sity oflndiana (Bloomington)) (on file with author). 
221 /d. at 85-86. 
222 Robert F. Berkhofer, Banier to Settlement: British Indian Policy in the Old Northwest, 
1783-1794, in THE FRONTIER IN AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT 249, 270 (David M. Ellis ed., 
1969). 
22
' Letter from Governor St. Clair to the President (May 2, 1789), in 2 THE ST. 
C!..AIR PAPERS: THE LIFE AND PUBUC SERVICES OF ARTHUR ST. CLAIR 111, 113 (William 
Henrr Smith ed., 1882). 
22 See WRITINGS OF jEFFERSON, supra note 165, at 375 (noting that the Kaskaskias 
"are now but a few families, exposed to numerous enemies, and unable to defend 
themselves, and would cede lands in exchange for protection"). 
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Second, the United States manipulated the conflicting and un-
clear tribal claims in order to buy land cheaply. "Frontier authorities 
often found it expedient to bargain with one nation for lands claimed 
or actually occupied by another.',225 Even in cases in which all sides 
agreed that a number of tribes held land in effect as co-tenants, the 
United States was able to drive a wedge between the owners. William 
Henry Harrison was a master of this technique. 
Harrison played the divided villagers against each other, getting substan-
tial cessions. Because villages often contained members of several tribes 
and because different tribal groups shared common areas, one group 
rarely had exclusive claim to the land. If Harrison induced representa-
tives of one group to make a cession, then others had to follow or else 
risk getting no payments at all for the land .••. [C]hiefs signed from fear 
that if they refused2'2 chiefs of other villages would gladly make the ces-
sions in their stead. 6 
Harrison employed the same technique to obtain the Pianka-
shaws' interest in the lands they had previously conveyed to the Wa-
bash Company. 
The cession of 1804 in southwestern Indiana from the Delaware and Pi-
ankishaw was obtained by [divide and conquer]. Both tribes claimed the 
area but would not consider releasing their title. Delaware acquiescence 
was first obtained. The Piankishaw, realizing the tenuousness of their 
claim, and fearing the loss of additional annuities and goods that might 
otherwise accrue from a cession on their part gave consent less than a 
c .hi . 227 ~ortmg t ater m a separate treaty. 
There was no end to the theories that the British, and later the 
Americans, conjured up to place title in the hands of a tribe that was 
willing to sell, and sell cheaply. For instance, after the Proclamation 
of 1763 and Pontiac's Uprising: 
[T] he British partially resurrected the old doctrine of Iroquois owner-
ship of the lands along the Ohio River [based on conquest]. This 
225 JACKM. SOSIN, THE REvOLUTIONARY FRONTIER, 1763-1783, at 84 (1967). In a 
somewhat comical example of what must have been a specious claim, President jeffer-
son told William Henry Harrison that he had "heard there was still one Peoria man 
living, and that a compensation, making him easy for life, should be given him, and his 
conveyance of the country [referring to a large tract in central Illinois] by a regular 
deed be obtained." MOSES DAWSON, A HisTORICAL NARRATIVE OF THE CiviL & 
MILITARY SERVICES OF MAJOR-GENERAL WILLIAM H. HARRISON 112 (1824). 
226 WHITE, supra note 62, at 474, 496. The Kaskaskias' 1803 cession was a notorious 
example of such practice. See id. at 474 n.6 (noting that although the Kaskaskia tribe at 
the time numbered only 30 men, women, and children, they ceded southern Illinois to 
the United States). 
227 Smith, supra note 37, at 245. 
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opened up the possibility of the Iroquois, ceding away the land of their 
228 
"dependents," as they had before. 
Another argument held that "the French had reached Illinois 
country before the Illinois [tribes] themselves had ... and thus had 
prior claim to the land that had, by right of conquest, descended to 
the British king. "229 
Sometimes the United States did not even rely on preexisting divi-
sions or muddled claims; it merely isolated resistant tribes by making 
deals with their neighbors. During his negotiations with the southern 
tribes in the aftermath of the War of 1812, Andrew Jackson "decided 
to treat the Indians separately. By dividing the tribes he believed he 
could weaken their resistance to his demands. He began with the 
Cherokees because he anticipated 'much difficulty' with the Chicka-
saws . . . . An initial success with the Cherokees, therefore, would 
strengthen his negotiating stance with the Chickasaws.,230 
The "divide and conquer" strategy eroded the price Indians re-
ceived for their lands in two ways. First, by introducing competition 
among sellers, especially co-claiming tribes, the United States was able 
to convert a bilateral monopoly into something more akin to a mo-
nopsony.231 It might seem that tribes with co-tenancy interests who did 
not sell simply could have remained on the land. Given the United 
States's policy of making some payment to almost any tribe with even 
a colorable claim, the fact that one co-tenant received a payment 
would not seem to diminish the right of the other co-tenant to occupy 
the land.232 The United States, however, usually paid less to late-
228 WHilE, supra note 62, at 308. It is unclear whether or not the Indians recog-
nized title by conquest amongst themselves. See Johnson v. M'lntosh, 21 U.S. (8 
Wheat.} 543, 573 (1823) (noting that Algonquian Indians in Illinois and surrounding 
regions rejected Iroquois claim to title by conquest}; WHilE, supra note 62, at 150-55 
(describing Iroquois claims to Illinois land based on conquest}. Perhaps more telling 
is the fact that British officials did not believe in it. 
General Gage thought [the] myth oflroquois conquest had been useful enough in 
negotiations with the French, but he did not believe that the Iroquois could negotiate 
away Shawnee lands on the basis of such a conquest. "If we are to search for truth and 
examine her to the Bottom, I dont [sic] imagine we shall find that any conquered Na-
tion ever formaly [sic] ceded their Country to their Conquerors, or that the latter even 
required it." Id. at 352 (quoting correspondence of General Gage). The Shawnees 
disputed the right of the Iroquois to cede their land. See id. at 354 (describing the 
Shawnees' attempt to oppose the treaty by which the Iroquois had ceded their land to 
the British). 
229 WHilE, supra note 62, at 308. 
230 REMINI, supra note 207, at 328. 231 See supra note 167 (defining monopsonist). 232 
"[The tribes] are extremely watchful and jealous of each other lest some ad van-
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settling tribes. Moreover, as explained in Part II.D.2 below, once set-
tlers approached Indian lands, their activities reduced the stock of 
hunting prey dramatically and rendered the land of little value to the 
tribes. Accordingly, tribes were pressured into early sales of land to 
the United States. 
The United States employed a version of "divide and conquer" 
within tribes as well as among them. "If there was not unanimity 
within a tribe itself, assent would be obtained from those chiefs who 
were willing, thus giving the United States a wedge and also weaken-
ing the tribal resistance. ,233 General St. Clair failed to purchase any 
lands in Indiana or Illinois since he could not identify any leaders with 
sufficient certainty. His successor William Henry Harrison, however, 
"seldom troubled himself about either the justice of the claims of the 
contracting party or the representative character of the chiefs, if sig-
natures to a treaty could be obtained. "234 
Sowing division among the other side in negotiations is generally 
permissible under the common law of contracts. In labor talks, a firm 
bargaining with many employees may try and to lure some back in the 
hopes of undermining the strike. Symmetrically, a union striking 
against multiple employers may make a deal with one employer in the 
hopes that others will follow. Harrison's method of exploiting intra-
tribal division by striking deals with any member who would sign, 
while valid as a matter of contract law, may have violated principles of 
agency law: there appears no plausible basis for imputing to unem-
powered chiefs (agents) the authority to bind their tribes (principals). 
Bribery, a similar trick that exploited divergent incentives among 
tribe members, is also consistent with voluntary exchange. However, 
bribery is beyond the range of acceptable tactics under the common 
law of agency.235 Indian leaders time and again proved to be disloyal 
tage should be obtained in which they do not all participate." Letter from William 
Henry Harrison to Secretary of War Dearborn, Feb. 26, 1802, in DAWSON, supra note 
225, at 19. 
233 Smith, supra note 37, at 245-46. 
23i ALVORD, supra note 25, at 416. General St. Clair "had been ordered to purchase 
cessions from the Indians, but on his first visit he was unable to discover any nation 
with a clear title to the southern lands of Illinois." /d. William Henry Harrison, who 
negotiated all the major treaties discussed in this subsection, had no such compunc-
tion, "showing a readiness to enter into negotiations with any faction or isolated band 
oflndians who would consentto a relinquishment ofland titles." /d. 
235 Under the duty of loyalty as defined by the common law of agency, agents must 
"act solely for the benefit of the principal in all matters connected with the agency," 
and "an agent who makes a profit in connection with transactions conducted by him 
on behalf of the principal is under a duty to give such profit to the principal." 
REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY§§ 387-88 (1958). Thus an agent (such as a chief) 
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agents to their principals (tribe members), and the United States did 
not seem to show any aversion to taking advantage of this breach of 
duty. For example, President Jefferson advised Harrison to bribe 
chiefs in purchasing Illinois and Indiana lands, and Harrison did so 
effectively.236 The United States resorted to bribing virtually all the 
tribes from which it bought lands; "such methods of obtaining Indian 
agreement had become the rule rather than the exception.'.237 
b. Fraud, Overawing, and Threats 
In addition to bribery, the United States consciously engaged in 
"ruse, subterfuge, circumvention, and outright fraud to achieve 
through chicanery, under the cloak of voluntary cooperation, a con-
tinued stream of land cessions."238 The Indians were, of course, aware 
of such tricks. "The Americans were, the Shawnees argued, inevitably 
'deceitful in their dealings with ... the Indians.' Their promises of 
benevolence were their most potent weapons."239 Outright fraud, of 
course, cannot form the basis for enforceable contract rights under 
Anglo-American law. 
The United States also tried to overawe Indians in order to obtain 
their lands more cheaply. 
Almost from the day whites arrived in the New World ... [Europeans] 
shipped Indians back to Europe to impress them with the extent of white 
technology and population, then returned them "with the expectation 
that upon their return they would spread the gospel of European supe-
riority throughout their native villages." Whites frequently demonstrated 
representing a principal (such as a tribe) who takes a bribe has not acted solely for the 
principal's benefit and is obligated to remit the bribe to the principal. 
236 See WRITINGS OF JEFFERSON, supra note 165, at 376 (stating that "it would be easy 
to solicit and bring over by presents every individual of mature age"); Smith, supra note 
37, at 246 ("After receiving a special annuity in the preliminary negotiations for the 
Treaty of June 7, 1803, Litde Turtle, who had until then opposed any cession, became 
inclined to favor one."). 
237 HORSMAN, supra note 90, at 140; see also id. at 125 (finding that Cherokees were 
"'brought to reason' •.• by the bribery of one or two influential chiefs"); id. at 140 
(predicting that "moderate presents to some of the most influential Characters, will be 
deemed sufficient" to obtain an easement to build a road); REMINI, supra note 207, at 
329, 330 (documenting several occasions on which Jackson resorted to bribery in order 
to obtain land). Jackson emphasized the importance of covering up such transactions: 
"Secrecy is necessary, or the influence of the chiefs would be destroyed." !d. at 330. 
238 MICHAEL D. GREEN, THE POUTICS OF INDIAN REMOVAL: CREEK GOVERNMENT & 
SOCIE1YIN CRISIS 50 (1982). 
259 WmTE, supra note 62, at 459 (citation omitted). 
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their technology peacefully to impress Indians with the pointlessness of 
240 
war. 
While some techniques for impressing the tribes contained only 
the hint of a threat, more commonly, the United States and it prede-
cessors overawed the Indians with direct displays of military might. 
[While t]he posts were small, and the number of troops that could be 
squeezed from the civilian-minded and economy-conscious Congress was 
always inadequate, ... Indian agents ••• who carried on the relations be-
tween the government and the Indians always did it under the shadow of 
h th . d . f b "l" . 241 t e au onty an protection o a near y m1 1tary garnson. 
Furthermore, the United States recognized that "[a] display of 
force or demonstrations of potential military strength were effective 
persuaders at conferences and negotiations either bringing awe, re-
spect, fear, or a realization of futility to the Indians. n242 
While impressing a bargaining foe with economic might may be 
legally permissible (for example, in a merger proposition made by a 
large competitor to a smaller one), employing armed agents to sug-
gest that physical harm is the alternative to striking a deal makes a 
strong case for duress. The United States, hmvever, often went be-
yond mere displays of force and employed direct intimidation and 
overt threats when "negotiating" land cessions. Although it was only a 
bluff, the Shawnee in 1786 were "warned that the United States in-
tended to hold firm to its conditions and that refusal of the terms 
would mean war. 'The destruction of your women and children[,] or 
their future happiness ... depends on your present choice. Peace or 
• • ,,243 
war 1s m your power. 
In negotiating with the Choctaws atDoak's Stand in 1820,Jackson 
found the Indians generally opposed either to ceding or exchanging any 
land. The few Choctaws who favored a treaty were compelled to be si-
lent, and every chief threatened with death if he consented to sell or ex-
change an acre. . . . [Mter long and tough negotiations] Jackson re-
sorted to threats . • . • He warned them of the loss of American 
friendship; he promised to wage war against them and destroy the 
240 Anderson & McChesney, supra note 16, at 58-59 (quoting JAMES AxTELL, AFTER 
COLUMBUS: EssAYS INTI:IE ETHNOmsfORY OF COLONIAL NORTIIAMERICA 140 (1988) ). 
241 PRUCHA, supra note 6, at 62. 
242 Smith, supra note 37, at 246. 
243 PRUCHA, supra note 205, at 52 (quoting 2 THE OLDEN TIME 523-24 (Neville B. 
Craig ed., Kraus Reprint Co. 1976) (1848)). 
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Nation; finally he shouted his determination to remove them whether 
h l.k d. 244 t ey 1 e 1t or not. 
President Monroe agreed that "if the Indians did not voluntarily 
submit to the civilizing programs, compulsion would have to be re-
sorted to. "245 
Tribes wanted what any bargainer wants: a fair price. During 
Harrison's 1809 negotiations in Indiana, one tribe, the Miami, initially 
adamantly refused to sell any land, declaring that they must end "'the 
encroachments of the whites who were eternally purchasing their 
lands far less than the real value of them'" and vowed to sell only "'for the 
price that it sells among[]st yourselves [the Americans].',246 The Mi-
ami were simply trying to obtain a portion of the gains from trade ·with 
the Americans. Harrison predictably replied with a veiled threat: he 
would "extinguish the council fire" if the Miami would not agree to 
the substance of his terms. 247 
Threats, of course, are antithetical to the voluntary exchange that 
supposedly legitimized American purchases of Indian lands. They 
undermine the essence of lawful negotiation: the right of both sides 
to simply leave the room, refuse to cut a deal, and retain whatever 
property rights they possessed ex ante. "The pressure [on Indians to 
cede lands] was such that it made a farce of the oft-repeated assertion 
that the Indians were equally free to sell or refuse to sell. "248 One of 
the reasons given for a proposed military expedition against the Pi-
ankashaw and other Wabash tribes was 
"their refusing to treat with the United States when invited thereto." 
The Indians were fighting to resist pressure on their lands, and treaties 
with the American government almost invariably resulted in the confir-
mation of cessions or demands for new ones; yet when the Indians re-
fused to negotiate, this was used as a reason for a military expedition. 
Though Knox had asserted that the Indians held the right of soil and 
could choose whether or not to sell their lands, this conce~t of free 
choice broke down under the pressure of the frontier advance. 49 
244 REMINI, supra note 207, at 393-95 (internal quotations omitted). 
245 PRUCHA, supra note 205, at 154. 
246 Smith, supra note 37, at 226 (quotingJOURNAL OF TilE PROCEEDINGS 13, 18 (J.L. 
Heinemann ed., 1910) (1809)) (emphasis added). 
247 ld. at 227 (citing JOURNAL OF TilE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 246, at 19). 
248 HORSMAN, supra note 90, at 126. See supra Part I.A for declarations of the Indi-
ans' right to refuse to sell their lands. 
249 HORSMAN, supra note 90, at 86 (quoting Letter from Secretary of War Knox to 
Governor St. Clair (Sept. 12, 1790), reprinted in AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, supra note 81, 
1 INDIAN AFFAIRS 100 (1832) (footnote omitted)). 
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In similarly candid moments, other American officials admitted 
that the Indians had no free choice. James Gadsden wrote of the 1823 
treaty with the Seminoles that 
[i]t is not necessary to disguise the fact ... that the treaty effected was in 
a degree a treaty of imposition-The Indians would never have voluntar-
ily assented to the terms had they not believed that we had both the 
power & disposition to compel obedience.250 
United States officials often couched their threats in polite, cir-
cumspect language. Harrison, for instance, adverted to "extinguish-
ing the council fire" instead of a more direct threat to declare war.251 
When the Creeks initially refused to permit the United States to build 
a road through their lands, Secretary of War Eustis stated his wish that 
the tribe would not "compel the Government to the use of means 
which it is desirous to avoid."252 Furthermore, threats were not polite 
topics of public conversation: while charges of rape, theft, and fraud 
swirled among political rivals in the territorial press without evoking 
legal response, Harrison successfully sued William Mcintosh for pub-
licly questioning the fairness of the future President's dealings with 
the Indians.253 This episode, and the elliptical threats cited, show that 
American officials were uncomfortable with bargaining techniques 
that violated their own rules of voluntary exchange. 
c. Why the Indians Could Not Use Tricks and Threats 
The Indians had long realized that their disunity enabled the 
Europeans to obtain their lands cheaply via the aforementioned tech-
niques. A founder of Plymouth Colony described with fear the pre-
science of one of the neighboring tribes: 
[T]he Pequots, especially in the winter before [the Pequot war of 1637], 
sought to make peace with the Narragansetts, and used very pernicious 
arguments to move them thereunto: as that the English were strangers 
250 Letter from James Gadsen to the Secretary of War (Sept. 29, 1823), reprinted in 
22 TERRITORIAL PAPERS, supra note 31, at752 (1956). 
251 See supra text accompanying note 247 (discussing Harrison's veiled threat in re-
sponse to an Indian tribe's attempt to gain a fair price for their land). 
252 HORSMAN, supra note 90, at 163 (internal quotation omitted). 
253 See DAWSON, supra note 225, at 175 ("Against this [Mcintosh] suit was brought 
by the Governor, in the supreme court of the territory, for having asserted that he had 
cheated the Indians, in the last treaty which had been made with them at Fort 
Wayne."). 
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and began to overspread their country, and would deprive them thereof 
in time, if they were suffered to grow and increase.254 
The Pequots' attempts failed to unite the tribes against the colo-
nial advance, as did a string of other minor and major efforts, includ-
ing Pontiac's Rebellion in 1763 and Tecumseh and the Prophet's 
movement from about 1808 to 1812. 
Why did these movements fail? Why could the Indians not unify 
in the face of a growing threat to their lands and their livelihoods? 
Why could they not employ any of the negotiating ploys that worked 
so well for the Americans? At the most general level, Indian society's 
lack of the Europeans' well-developed division of labor explains why 
the Indians could not mimic the negotiating ploys of their European 
counterparts. While Americans have perennially held legislators, ex-
ecutives, and bureaucrats in low esteem, it was the lack of just such a 
governing class that hindered Indian unity. The Indians simply could 
not afford to feed and clothe more than a few individuals who would 
hone their skills at mediating differences and administering a large, 
complex alliance.255 
An advanced division oflabor also helps to explain the Americans' 
advantage at the negotiating table. There is no evidence that the In-
dians were inherently worse bargainers than Americans. The Indians 
were not unable, for example, to master the art of bluffing-they sim-
ply had far fewer opportunities to practice their skills. While leading 
chiefs might negotiate two or three major treaties with the United 
States during their lifetime, men like William Henry Harrison, An-
drew Jackson, Lewis Cass, and others were career treaty makers who 
presided over two or three treaties a year for a decade or more.256 
The Americans' superior division of labor further explains why 
specific bargaining ploys worked for them but not for the Indians. 
With far more professional bureaucrats available to study the tribes, 
make and preserve records, and advise their superiors, the United 
254 WILUAM BRADFORD, OF PLYMOUlli PLANTATION: 1620-1647, at 294 (Samuel 
Eliot Morison ed., 1952). 
255 See jARED DIAMOND, GUNS, GERMS, AND STEEL: THE FATES OF HUMAN SOCIETIES 
78-80 (1997) (attributing the Spaniards' conquest of the Incan Empire in part to 
Spain's "centralized political organization" and the Incan's inability to disseminate in-
formation around the Empire regarding the Europeans' hostile intentions). 
255 Harrison negotiated 13 treaties from 1803 to 1815. See 7 Stats. 76, 77, 79, 82, 84, 
87, 92, 101, 115, 116, 117, 119, 132. Jackson negotiated six from 1814 to 1820. See 7 
Stats. 122, 149, 152, 160, 194, 213. Cass treated with tribes no fewer than 22 times from 
1814 to 1832. See7 Stats. 119, 167, 170, 180, 181, 185, 187, 189, 192, 205, 206, 207, 221, 
275,292,297,302,305,306,316,319,368. 
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States undoubtedly enjoyed a tremendous informational advantage 
over the Indians. This made bluffing much more difficult, because 
the United States had a better gauge on Indian troop levels and loca-
tion, stores of ammunition, alliances or feuds, and similar data crucial 
to negotiations. It was like a poker game where one side gets to peer 
into the hand of the other. Successful bluffing, in poker as in politics, 
requires hiding information. 
"Divide and conquer" could not work for the Indians because the 
United States had an effective governing structure filled with officials 
who prevented factional feuds from erupting into permanent and se-
rious divisions. While tribes on occasion detected disloyal leaders and 
punished them quite harshly,257 in general the Indians lacked effective 
means to deal with this agency problem. The Indians' informational 
disadvantage played a role here as well; American negotiators kept 
bribes to Indian chiefs, for the most part, secret. 258 In contrast, 
American officials would have likely detected bribes taken by their col-
leagues and punished them for treason. 
d. The Americans' Use of Both Acceptable Tricks and Unacceptable Threats 
Great disparity between the economies of two societies does not 
necessarily imply that trade between the two is unfair or involuntary. 
Indeed, in appraising the land acquisition process described thus far, 
Felix Cohen found that it fit the model of voluntary exchange: 
Granted that the Federal Government bought the country from the In-
dians, the question may still be raised whether the Indians received any-
thing like a fair price for what they sold. The only fair answer to that 
question is that except in a very few cases where military duress was pres-
ent the price paid for the land was one that satisfied the Indians.259 
No less an authority than the Supreme Court, however, has de-
clared that Cohen's view is facile error. "Every American schoolboy 
knows that the savage tribes of this continent were deprived of their 
257 For example, when in 1824 the Creeks' anointed leaders refused to cede their 
Georgia lands, United States negotiators bribed a Creek faction led by William Mcin-
tosh (no known relation to the plaintiff in ]ollnson v. M'Intosll) to cede the lands in-
stead. The tribe executed Mcintosh for treason, but the signed treaty gave the United 
States leverage and the rightful leaders soon thereafter agreed to sell. See PRUCHA, su-
pra note 205, at 148-51 (detailing how the United States Senate managed to remove 
the Creek Indians from their home territory in Georgia). 
258 See REMim, supra note 207, at 330 (noting that Andrew Jackson considered 
keeping bribes secret to be necessary, "or the influence of the chiefs would be de-
stror.;d"). 
Cohen, supra note 5, at 38. 
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ancestral ranges by force and that, even when the Indians ceded mil-
lions of acres by treaty ... it was not a sale but the conquerors' will 
that deprived them of their land. "260 
While a preponderance of the evidence presented in this Part 
weighs against Cohen's benign view of the voluntary nature of land 
sales, this Part contains limited support for Cohen's view as well. This 
Article proposes that this strange mix is best explained as a facet of 
the nation's effort to acquire Indian lands at the least possible ex-
pense. Voluntary transactions are cheaper than involuntary ones 
since credible threats are expensive, so the United States first tried 
bluffing and all the other negotiating tricks consistent with voluntary 
exchange. When these tactics failed, the United States moved on to 
threats-threats that it hoped would convince the Indians to cede 
land without actually fighting. 
Contemporary leaders voiced precisely this view of the treaty-
making process. Georgia's governor declared in 1830, in the midst of 
expelling the Cherokees from the state, that "treaties were expedients 
by which ignorant, intractable, and savage people were induced with-
out bloodshed to yield up what civilized peoples had a right to possess 
by virtue of that command of the Creator delivered to man upon his 
formation-be fruitful, multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue 
it. "261 Congress expressed almost exacdy the same perspective, pro-
claiming that paying Indians for land was "but the substitute which 
humanity and expediency have imposed, in place of the sword, in arriv-
ing at the actual enjoyment of property claimed by the right of discov-
ery, and sanctioned by the natural superiority allowed to the claims of 
civilized communities over those of savage tribes . ..262 After canvassing 
the treaty-making process during the nation's first three decades, his-
torian Reginald Horsman concurred with these assessments, noting, 
"[f] or white negotiators, treaty language was merely a means of ob-
taining land with the least conflict and expense, and a means of de-
flecting Indian resistance until the next, inevitable cessions were nec-
essary. "263 
The use of these bargaining tricks shows that the United States did 
not face a stark choice between "raid" or "trade" in obtaining Indian 
260 Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 289-90 (1955). 
261 1 FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER: THE UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN INDIANS 196 (1984) (citation omitted) (emphasis 
added). 
262 !d. (emphasis added). 
263 HORSMAN, supra note 90, at x. 
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lands-this is a false dichotomy.264 Rather, the United States pursued 
a middle course. It engaged in trade of a sort with the Indians-trade 
laced with bluffs, fraud, overawing, and threats that enabled the 
United States to obtain land cheaply. The next Part explains why 
these tactics lead to more efficient expropriation than raiding (open 
warfare). 
C. Explaining the Rarity of Fighting: 
The Deadweight Loss of Fighting 
Treaty making is supposed to be simply a form of bargaining; 
coupled with the above testimonials to its role in least-cost acquisition 
of Indian lands, the process seems tailor-made for economic analysis. 
Yet something seems wrong with this picture: how can economics ap-
ply to the use of intimidation, threats, coercion, and warfare? Eco-
nomics traditionally models voluntary exchange, with a sovereign to 
guard against and provide remedies for theft, fraud, breaches of con-
tract, careless injuries, and the like.265 There was no such higher force 
in European-Indian relations, and, thus, for example, the Americans 
could get away with negotiating ploys that unquestionably would have 
been intolerable between two merchants in Philadelphia. 
Economics can help us understand human relations even when 
not all dealings fit the classic model of voluntariness. This Article 
draws on what Jack Hirshleifer has labeled "muscular economics," or "the 
dark side of the force-to wit, crime, war, and politics, ,266 to explain In-
dian-white relations. While conventional economics analyzes coopera-
tive activity (in the words ofVilfredo Pareto, "the production or trans-
formation of economic goods,267), muscular economics deals with the 
264 These tenns are taken from the title of Anderson & McChesney, supra note 16, 
at39. 
265 
"[T]he mainline Marshallian [neoclassical economic] tradition has •.. almost 
entirely overlooked what I will call the dark side of the forc~to wit, crime, war, and poli-
tics." Jack Hirshleifer, The Dark Side of the Force, 32 ECON. INQUIRY 1, 2 (1994). 
People can satisfy their desires in two main ways: by production (for self:.use, or 
for mutually beneficial trade with other parties), or else by conflict (i.e., by ac-
tual or threatened theft, robbery, confiscation, or litigation). Despite its evi-
dent importance, only recently has a systematic economics of struggle and 
conflict begun to emerge. 
Jack Hirshleifer, The Technology of Conflict as an Economic Activity, 81 AM. ECON. REv. 
130, 130 (1991). For a wide range of articles in this vein, see 'IHEPOimCALECONOMY 
OF CONFIJcr AND APPROPRIATION (Michelle R. Garfinkel & Stergios Skaperdas eds., 
1996). 
266 Hirshleifer, supra note 265, at 2. 
267 Id. 
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other way to obtain (if not create) wealth: expropriation of that which 
others possess, via "crime, ·war, and politics.'>268 Muscular economics 
can help us understand a host of important questions about the ex-
propriation of Indian lands. This subsection explains a phenomenon 
of particular relevance to the thesis of this Article: why fighting was 
the exception, rather than the rule, in American-Indian relations, and 
why, despite a significant military advantage, the United States pur-
sued a host of non-military strategies to obtain Indian lands cheaply. 
The remainder of Part II explores these non-military methods of ex-
propriation. 
While it is accepted wisdom that there was a "time-honored ... 
practice of waging war on the Indians in order to force a land ces-
sion,"269 the historical record shows that fighting was the exception 
rather than the rule in Indian-white relations. New England colonists 
waged only two wars during their first century, the era when they ob-
tained most Indian lands in the region. Virginians, too, fought only a 
few small-scale wars in the process of expropriating Indian lands east 
of the mountains. The United States cleared the old Northwest (to-
day, the Midwest) by fighting three battles: two crushing defeats, fol-
lowed by Anthony Wayne's modest victory at Fallen Timbers in 1794. 
While there was a "time-honored practice" of threatening the Indians,270 
rarely did these threats lead to conflict. "The claims of the historical 
school maintaining that Indian-white relations in this country were 
from start to finish determined by violence thus appear erroneous."271 
This is consistent with the predictions of muscular economics. As 
long as potential opponents are well informed of each other's 
strengths, reach similar conclusions about the outcome of conflict, 
and can negotiate relatively easily, fighting should never occur. There 
are two steps to the argument underlying this assertion. First, under 
the assumption of full information and shared expectations, both 
sides know in advance the likely result of combat (which side likely 
will win, and how decisive a victory it likely will achieve). Second, con-
flict wastes all sorts of resources: human lives, labor that could have 
been used more productively, existing capital and productive capacity, 
and destroyed property. These are what economists call deadweight 
losses: they inure to the benefit of neither side, and are simply 
268 !d. 
269 WILLIAMS, supra note 12, at274. 
270 See supra Part II.B.2.b (exploring the use of threats in American-Indian rela-
tions). 
271 Anderson & McChesney, supra note 16, at 57. 
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wasted.272 The large deadweight losses that result from warfare pres-
ent combatants, in effect, with a species of gains from trade (i.e., the 
gains from peace). If they can strike a deal and avoid war, there will 
be a bigger pot of wealth and both sides can have more. 
Warfare, then, is in some sense a market failure that occurs when 
one of the assumptions made in the previous paragraph does not 
hold. For instance, if one side underestimates the abilities of its op-
ponent, it may refuse a compromise that is rational. Thus, "conflict is 
in large part an educational process. Struggle tends to occur when one 
or both of the parties is over optimistic. "273 Such over-optimism may 
arise from a host of sources, many of which were present in American-
Indian relations, including lack of information about the other side's 
strength and changing weapons technology.274 Whatever the cause of 
the over-optimism, the historical record shows that one or two colo-
nial or American victories were sufficient to convince Indians in a 
given region that the costs of·war exceeded the benefits.275 The Euro-
pean tactic of overawing the Indians with demonstrations of their 
technology, population, and military might was an attempt to educate 
the Indians about the futility of resistance without incurring the high 
272 For a definition and illustration of deadweight loss, see WALTER NICHOLSON, 
MICROECONOMICTHEORY: BAsiCl'RINCIPLESANDEXTENSIONS 429-30 {3d ed. 1985). 
273 Jack Hirshleifer, Tlze Economic Approach to Conflict, in ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM: 
THE ECONOMIC METHOD APPLIED OUTSIDE THE FIELD OF ECONOMICS 335, 340 (Gerard 
Radnitzky & Peter Bemholz eds., 1987). 
274 See Anderson & McChesney, supra note 16, at 48-50, 53 (noting the effects of 
"information assymetry"). 
275 See infra notes 281-84 and accompanying text (discussing how successful wars 
against Indians in New England ended the tribes' resistance to colonizers). Another 
"market failure" that may have led to conflict between Europeans and Indians was the 
difficulty of negotiation. For example, certain tribes had no clear leaders, or had lead-
ers who could not hold their warriors to the bargains they entered, making effective 
negotiation problematic. See Anderson & McChesney, supra note 16, at 62-63 {detail-
ing the difficulty Europeans had negotiating land treaties with the nomadic and politi-
cally unstructured Western Indian tribes). 
Beyond such market failures, basic characteristics of societies also determine 
whether they can reach peaceful accommodation or will square off in battle. For in-
stance, cooperation is more likely when production between the two sides is comple-
mentary and they can produce more wealth by combining their talents than they could 
if they remained isolated. See Hirshleifer, supra note 265, at 4 (citing Solomon William 
Polachek, Conflict and Trade, 24J. CONFUcrREsoL. 55 (1980)) (noting that "nations 
that trade more fight less")). This may explain, for example, why the French had more 
peaceful relations with the Indians than the British. The primary economic activity of 
the French was fur trading, and the Indians, as by far the more skilled trappers, were a 
key part of this industry. The British, on the other hand, engaged in fairly large-scale 
agriculture, a use inconsistent with the Indians' heavy reliance on hunting and gather-
ing in uncleared forests. 
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deadweight costs of warfare.276 
This in no way implies that the relative strengths of the parties do 
not matter-strength determines likely losses from battle in terms of 
all the costs of warfare discussed above (life, productive labor, etc.}, 
and gains from expropriating the land or other contested assets. 
When the two sides then sit down at the negotiating table, neither will 
accept less than they could achieve by fighting. Thus, the predicted 
outcome of conflict sets a floor as to what each side will accept in 
compromise; these floors set the rough terms of trade within which bar-
gains will fa11.277 Given that conflict entails inevitable waste, there is 
room for both sides to compromise and walk away with more than 
these floors. This room for compromise is simply the gains from trade 
discussed above. 
John Umbeck presented powerful support for this model of mus-
cular economics in a study of the rules developed by miners to assign 
claims during the California gold rush.278 Despite the presence of 
thousands of armed miners in remote areas, bereft of any official 
authority, violence with its attendant deadweight losses was extraordi-
narily rare.279 Moreover, given the fact that guns equalized everyone's 
ability to use force, Umbeck expected to find, and did find, that the 
miners' legal rules allocated roughly equal-valued tracts to all com-
2so 
ers. 
Such equality prevailed during the early era of European contact 
with the Indians. In the first decades of the New England settlements, 
"the Indians were not weak, dependent groups of people that needed 
protection but powerful equals whom the early settlers had to deal 
with as independent nations."281 Under these conditions, the colonists 
276 See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing the bargaining game between Americans and 
Indians and the tactics Americans used to prevent fighting). 
277 See Anderson & McChesney, supra note 16, at 46 (using phrase "terms of trade" 
in this context of two opposing sides considering warfare to resolve a dispute). 
278 See John Umbeck, Mig!tt Makes Rights: A Theory of the Farmation and Initial Distri· 
bution of Property Rights, 19 ECON. INQUIRY 38 (1981) (explaining how threat of force 
influenced the allocation of property rights among miners in the California gold 
rush). See generally JOHN R. UMBECK, A THEORY OF PROPER'IY RIGHTS: WITH 
APPliCATION TO THE CALIFORNIA GOlD RUSH 50 (1981) (describing the origin and 
development of private property rights and using the California gold rush as a para-
digi!!atic illustration). 
279 See Umbeck, supra note 278, at 49-50 ("Most of the miners carried guns, yet the 
reports of violence during the early period are remarkably scarce."). 
280 See id. at 54-56 ("[T]he land within [certain] districts appears to have been 
rou~hly homogeneous with respect to [many] characteristics .... "). 
81 KAWASHIMA, supra note 33, at 3. 
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could not intimidate the tribes, (for example, into selling land below a 
voluntarily determined price). This parity disappeared after a few 
successful wars against the tribes.282 
A similar story played out in the Great Lakes tribes' successive re-
lationships with the French, British, and Americans. In a rich, de-
tailed panorama, Richard White demonstrates how rough military par-
ity forced the tribes and the early waves of colonizers to seek a "middle 
ground" and accommodate each other. "The middle ground de-
pended on the inability of both sides to gain their ends through force. 
The middle ground grew according to the need of people to find a 
means, other than force, to gain the cooperation or consent of for-
eigners."283 This delicate balance could not survive America's growing 
might. "The real crisis and the final dissolution of this world came 
when Indians ceased to have the power to force whites onto the mid-
dle ground. Then the desire of whites to dictate the terms of accom-
modation could be given its head."284 
Despite the colonists' growing military advantages, it is important 
to emphasize that the Indians remained formidable adversaries capa-
ble of inflicting serious harm, economically as well as in terms of life 
and limb.285 While growing European might continually moved the 
muscular economic terms of trade in America's favor, the cost of 
fighting the Indians never became anything near trivial. Colonial and 
American leaders were well aware of the high expense of Indian vvars 
and avoided them assiduously.286 American threats to fight rather 
than negotiate were thus generally not credible. 
The Indians' strength during the first century of contact was 
manifest; they repeatedly turned back Spanish incursions in Florida 
despite the conquistadors' "supposed advantages of steel swords, 
crossbows, muskets, armor, horses, war dogs, and a crusading warrior 
mentality."287 Even after colonists built towns, learned to feed them-
282 See STEELE, supra note 204, at 80-llO (documenting that King Philip's War effec-
tiverss ended New England tribes' resistance to colonizers). 
WffiTE, supra note 62, at 52. 
284 /d. at xv. 
283 There is perhaps no better example of the continuing seriousness of the Indian 
threat, despite American might, than the massacre of Custer and his men at Little Big 
Hom in 1876. The Sioux decimated an elite, battle-hardened calvary unit. 
286 While the polity's concern for the lives of (non-voting, non-wealthy, non-
influential) frontier settlers may seem doubtful, it is important to remember that the 
greatest source of national wealth for the United States was its extensive western lands. 
To realize the lands' value, the nation needed to attract settlers; the more dangerous 
the frontier, the more difficult (i.e., expensive) it would be to lure them. 
287 STEELE, supra note 204, at 19. Florida "had proved to be nothing but a drain on 
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selves, and established organized governments with militias, Indian 
wars threatened their very existence. Over half of Plymouth Colony's 
towns were destroyed or damaged in King Philip's War in 1676, and 
one in twelve of Plymouth's adult males died in the fighting.288 
White incursions continued, yet the Indians were not yet cowed by 
European might. During Pontiac's Uprising, a disorganized, sponta-
neous set of attacks in 1763, the Great Lakes Indians killed no less 
than 2000 whites, in addition to taking most forts in the region and 
besieging the large installation at Fort Pitt. 289 "Small triumphs came at 
the risk of ambush and catastrophic defeat. ... [and the] cost ofwag-
ing the Indian wars [was high]."290 In short, Indian wars were expen-
sive, risky, and unrewarding even in victory. 
American leaders were well aware of the sizeable costs of Indian 
wars. Chief justice Marshall, in a rough cost-benefit analysis, declared 
the tribes "too powerful and brave not to be dreaded as formidable 
enemies, requir[ing] that means should be adopted for the preserva-
tion of peace. ,29I Only months after the nation won its independence, 
Washington advised Congress that: 
[P]olicy and economy point very strongly to the expediency of being 
upon good terms with the Indians, and the propriety of purchasing their 
Lands in preference to attempting to drive them by force of arms out of 
their Country. • • . [T]here is nothing to be obtained by an Indian War 
but the Soil they live on and this can be had by purchase at less expense, 
and without. .. bloodshed •••. 292 
the resources of Spain." John J. TePaske, Spanish Indian Policy & tlze Struggle for Empire 
in theS()Utheast, 151~1776, at 25, 27, in CONTEST FOR EMPIRE 1500-1775 Uohn B. Elliot 
ed., 1975). The Spanish had more success with peaceful settlements centered around 
relifsous missions. See id. at 30. 
88 See STEELE, supra note 204, at 107.08 (describing King Philip's War). Other 
costs were equally high: "eight thousand head of Cattle great and small, killed, and 
many thousand bushels of wheat, pease, and other grain burnt." jENNINGS, supra note 
10, at324. 
289 See SOSIN, supra note 225, at 6-7 (describing Indian attacks prompted by 
Pontiac's Uprising and claiming that "[m]ore than 2000 [frontier settlers] were 
killed"}; STEELE, supra note 204, at 241 ("An estimated two thousand American traders 
and settlers were killed or taken captive [by supporters of Pontiac]."). 
290 WHITE, supra note 62, at 290. 
291 Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.} 543, 596-97 (1823). 
292 Letter from George Washington, President of the United States, to James 
Duane, Chairman of the Committee of Congress to Confer with the Commander in 
Chief (Sept. 7, 1783), in27 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 133, 140 Uohn C. 
Fitzpatrick ed., 1938) [hereinafter WRITINGS OF WASHINGTON]. 
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Washington repeated this caution about the expense of Indian 
wars in subsequent State of the Union addresses.293 Other leaders 
agreed. In 1790, Secretary ofWar Knox counseled Congress that "[a] 
comparative view of the expenses of a hostile or conciliatory system 
towards the Indians will evince the infinite economy of the latter over 
the former."294 He urged Congress against asserting any right of con-
quest over the Indians because of the Indians' alliance ·with the de-
feated British. "To establish claims by the principle of conquest would 
mean continuous warfare."295 Realists in Congress concurred and 
"recommended some compensation for Indian claims rather than risk 
another Indian war and the tremendous expense it would bring. "296 
Pelatiah Webster summed up the common wisdom: "[N]obody ever 
yet gained any thing by an Indian '\var. Their spoils are of no value; but 
their revenge and depredations are terrible. It is much cheaper to purchase their 
lands, than to dispossess them by force •••. "297 
Consciously paying for Indian lands to avoid costly warfare un-
dermines benevolent interpretations of American policy, yet scholars 
continue to defend the morality of the nation's land purchases. For 
example, Cohen argues that while "it was only natural that the first 
settlers ... who were for many decades outnumbered by the Indi-
ans ... should have adopted the prudent procedure of buying lands," 
the nation's continued willingness to buy, instead of grab, Indian 
lands evidenced high moral character. 
What is significant ... is that at the end of the 18th Century when our 
population east of the Mississippi was at least 20 times as great as the In-
dian population in the same region and when our army of Revolutionary 
veterans might have been used to break down Indian claims to land 
ownership and reduce the Indians to serfdom or landlessness, we took 
293 See George Washington, Fourth Annual Message (Nov. 6, 1792), in GEORGE 
WASHINGTON: A COllECTION 480-81 (W.B. Allen ed., 1988) ("An earnest desire ... to 
arrest the progress of expense ... has led to strenuous efforts ... ,"); Sixth Annual 
Message (Nov. 19, 1794), in WASHINGTON, supra, at 492, 497 (commenting on the "ex-
traordinary expense and waste" of the militia); Seventh Annual Message (Dec. 8, 
1795), in WASHINGTON, supra, at 499, 500 (commenting on the "further expense" of 
continuing conflict with the Indians). 
294 Report of ·Secretary of War Knox to Congress (Jan. 4, 1790), reprinted in 
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, supra note 81, !INDIAN .AFFAIRS 59-61 (1832). 
295 PRUCHA, supra note 261, at 49. 
295 Id. at 43. 
297 PELATIAH WEBSTER, POI.lTICAL EssAYS ON TilE NATURE AND OPERATION OF 
MONEY, PUBUCFINANCES, AND OTiiERSUB]ECfS 495 (1791). 
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seriously our national proclamation that all men are created equal and 
undertook to respect [Indian] property rights ... .'298 
The historical record, however, indicates that it would have been quite 
expensive to physically oust the Indians.299 
The economic' analysis of this Part complements history in un-
dermining the view that the United States pursued a conscious war of 
annihilation against the Indians. M'lntosh itself, granting the Indians 
limited rights and refusing to root titles in unjust wars, is inconsistent 
with genocidal policy. Simply put, exterminating the Indians with di-
rect violence would have been quite costly, and yet would have yielded 
few if any benefits beyond those obtained from the policy of expropri-
ating Indian lands as cheaply as possible. 
The historical data support this Article's thesis that least-cost con-
quest explains most colonial and American laws and policies for deal-
ing with the Indians. When Marshall declined to authorize offensive 
wars of conquest in M'lntosh, he simply made the law congruent with 
the practicalities of dealing with the tribes. Simply put, outright con-
quest and annihilation were not efficient ways of expropriating Indian 
lands. Like any prudent cost minimizer, the United States considered 
the whole range of methods to obtain Indian lands cheaply. 
Hirshleifer makes this point colorfully. He labels productive (coop-
erative, mutually voluntary exchange} activity "the way of Coase,"300 and 
expropriative activity (coerced, involuntary exchange) "the way of Ma-
chiavelli, ,so1 and posits that "decision-makers will strike an optimal 
balance between the way of Coase and the way of Machiavelli-be-
tween the production combined with mutually advantageous ex-
change, and the dark-side way of confiscation, exploitation, and con-
flict. ,so2 American officials did not face a binary choice between "raid 
or trade"-Machiavelli or Coase-but rather a continuum of strategies 
incorporating techniques from both approaches to maximizing bene-
fits and minimizing costs. 
298 Cohen, supra note 5, at 40-41. 
299 See HORSMAN, supra note 90, at 86-89 (describing expeditions led by generals 
Harmar (1790) and St. Clair (1791) that suffered crushing defeats at the hands of the 
northern tribes). 
300 In honor of Ronald Coase, most famous for arguing that, as long as it is rela-
tively easy to bargain, parties will choose least-cost methods to deal with inconsistent 
activities. SeegenerallyRH. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3J.L. &ECON. 1 (1960). 
301 In honor of Niccolo Machiavelli, prominent student of political intrigue. See 
generally NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE (Angelo M. Codevilla trans. & ed., 1997) 
(outlining pragmatic and ruthless avenues to power). 
302 Hirshleifer, supra note 265, at 3. 
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Conflict (Machiavelli) took the United States only so far. The In-
dians' ability to inflict significant losses in warfare meant that despite 
the inevitability of European victory, threats to take Indian land by 
force were not entirely credible. The United States, though starting 
from a position of strength, was still locked in a bargaining game with 
the Indians to divide the surplus that arose from a peaceful (Coasean) 
transfer of lands. Even with the favorable terms of trade based on su-
perior might, the Indians remained formidable foes. There was, then, 
lots of room between the minima each side would accept, based on 
avoiding the deadweight loss of actually fighting. To illustrate this 
concept, and the remainder of this Part, consider the following simpli-
fied version of the negotiating game between the United States and 
the Indians: 
• if the two sides can avoid conflict, the gains from trade are ten; 
• each side has nvo negotiating stances: tough or conciliatory; 
• if both sides negotiate in a tough manner, conflict results; the 
United States wins but pays a high price, while the Indians lose 
in addition to paying a high price; 
• if even one side is conciliatory, the parties reach a compromise; 
• a party acting tough in negotiations, while the opposition is 
conciliatory, obtains a larger share of the gains from trade. 
The following table encapsulates the choices facing the parties 
under these assumptions: 
Indians 
Tough Conciliatory 
Tough 2,0 9, 1 
Conciliatory 3,7 5, 5 
(payoffs: U.S., Indians) 
Figure 2 
Note that fighting occurs only when both sides take a tough nego-
tiating stance, and if fighting occurs the deadweight losses consume 
eighty percent of the gains from trade. In the other three cases, the 
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parties will realize all the gains from trade; the only question is how 
the parties will divide the spoils. The lower left and upper right en-
tries (one side tough, the other conciliatory) reflect the assumption 
that even when conciliatory, neither side will take less in negotiations 
than it will receive in the event of fighting. These two outcomes, the 
minimal amount acceptable to each side, set the terms of trade between 
the parties in this model of muscular economics. The lower right 
payoffs (both sides conciliatory) must fall somewhere between the 
lower left and the upper right. 
As a first cut at solving this game, there are two strategy combina-
tions that are stable: the lower left and the upper right. 303 If one side 
could somehow convince the other that they intended to stick to a 
tough bargaining stance, the other side's rational response is concilia-
tion (to avoid a costly war). The problem is forming a credible com-
mitment to such a strategy; each side knows that threats to engage in 
warfare are irrational as long as a proffered compromise leaves the 
threatening party with more than it receives after combat (two for the 
United States; zero for the Indians). Thus (3,7) and (9,1) are plausi-
ble outcomes of this game, as is any pair in-between, for example 
(4,6), (5,5), (6,4), and so on. 
This wide range of possible outcomes is the defining characteristic 
of the negotiating games discussed above and explains why, despite an 
ovenvhelming military advantage, it was still worthwhile for the United 
States to engage in all sorts of negotiating ploys to maximize its share 
of the "gains from trade" while avoiding the waste of conflict. Bluff-
ing, "divide and conquer," and other ploys enabled the United States 
to negotiate an outcome much closer to (9,1) than to (3,7). In addi-
tion to its bargaining advantages, the United States also had the ability 
to effectively change the numbers in this game by spreading disease 
among the Indians and thinning the game on which they relied. The 
following Part explores these potent additions to the techniques used 
by the United States to obtain Indian lands cheaply. 
808 For both of these strategy combinations, neither party has incentives to change 
its "move." Game theorists call such stable strategy combinations "Nash equilibria." See 
ROBERT GmBONS, GAME THEORY FOR APPLIED ECONOMISTS 8-9 (1992) (describing 
Nash equilibria and explaining that each party's "predicted strategy must be that 
[party's] best response to the predicted strategies of the other [parties]" -thus, imper-
fect information about the other party discourages each party from choosing its pre-
dicted move). 
HeinOnline -- 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1141 1999-2000
2000] EXPROPRIATION OF AMERICAN INDIAN LANDS 1141 
D. Altering the Terms of Trade: Natural Allies 
Tiie Europeans' most powerful methods of altering the basic 
terms of trade did not involve human action-warlike or otherwise-
but rather other life forms small and large brought across the ocean. 
Microbes decimated Indian populations, reducing if not eliminating 
their ability to defend their lands. European crops and domestic 
animals displaced the forests and game animals that constituted an 
important part of the Indians' food supply, rendering lands in the 
neighborhood of settlement of little value to the tribes. This Part de-
tails the workings of disease and game-thinning; Part II.E shows how 
legal rules maximized the effect of these natural allies by encouraging 
and channeling settlement, and minimized potentially costly side-
effects the settlers might cause for their neighbors and the nation. 
This Part will also try to determine whether legal rules that enhanced 
these natural allies are best classified as Coasean, as Machiavellian, or, 
like some of the negotiating ploys discussed above in Part II.B.2, as fal-
ling in a gray area between the two. 
1. Depopulation by Disease 
The pre-contact Indian population of North America was any-
where from one to eighteen million.804 Nowhere near even one hun-
dred thousand Indians died as the direct result of European vio-
lence.305 Even accepting lowest estimates and assuming that the 
Indian population plateaued, the obvious question is, what killed all 
the Indians? 
Beyond peradventure, the answer is microbes. "The most potent 
804 
"Current United States history textbooks illustrate just how far from settled [the 
issue of Indian population] is: their estimates of aboriginal population in 1492 vary 
from one to twelve million." John D. Daniels, The Indian Population of North America in 
1492, 49 WM. & MARY Q. 298, 298 (1992); see also id. at 315 (citing Henry F. Dobyns's 
estimate of aboriginal Indian populations circa 1492). Daniels cites estimates of up to 
eighteen million, apparently not mentioned in the textbooks. Daniels's article, a care-
ful canvas of the literature, catalogs no less than 11 methods of estimating the early 
Indian populations, from pure guesstimates, to count multiples (for example, taking 
European reports on the number of warriors and multiplying by three to derive Indian 
population), to determining carrying capacity (that is, assume population expanded to 
use all food sources present and exploitable with the Indians' technology). See id. at 
304-09 (describing the 11 methods within three broad groupings). Given the paucity 
of data, more precise estimates appear impossible. 
305 See Russell, supra note 7, at 46-47 (estimating a total of 5172 Indian deaths due 
to European violence-1172 from "massacres," 3000 from fights with the U.S. Army, 
and 1000 from killings by civilians). 
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weapon in the invasion of North America was not the gun, the horse, 
the Bible, or European 'civilization.' It was pestilence, feared by all 
and understood by none, that carried off untold tens of thousands ... 
"
306 
"Of all the many organisms Europeans carried to America [in-
cluding themselves], none of them were more devastating to the Indi-
ans than the Old World diseases ... .''307 Smallpox and other eruptive 
fevers were weapons "more effective, of greater range, of surer aim 
than any rifle or poison gas ever devised. "308 
In Europe, large numbers of domesticated animals relatively simi-
lar to humans (such as cows and pigs) created an environment in 
which a host of microbes jumped the species barrier, mutated, and 
became endemic.309 While such diseases may have been initially devas-
tating, centuries of natural selection during which only those who sur-
vived, evidencing some resistance, produced offspring continuously 
reduced the mortality rate among Europeans. Diseases such as small-
pox and measles reached an endemic equilibrium in Europe: large 
populations created a continuous flow of children hosts for these mi-
crobes. Most of these children survived and were likely to produce 
their own children who could also weather the diseases.310 
American Indians did not domesticate any animals except for 
dogs, and hence did not accumulate any such microbes. Their rela-
tively sparse populations did not contain a large enough supply of 
fresh, nonresistant children to maintain endemic diseases. The impli-
cations of this asymmetry were enormous. The Indians were immu-
nologically defenseless against European endemic diseases.311 Unlike 
the Europeans, Indians at the time of contact had not benefited from 
generations of natural selection-based resistance to the diseases; 
therefore, the microbes routinely decimated Indian villages in 
weeks.312 
506 STEELE, supra note 204, at 22. 
807 WILUAM CRONON, CHANGES IN THE LAND: INDIANS, COLONISTS, AND THE 
ECOLOGYOFNEWENGLAND 85 (1983). 
808 COLONEL P.M. AsHBURN, THE RANKs OF DEATH: A MEDICAL HISTORY OF THE 
CONQUEST OF AMERICA 81 (Frank D. Ashburn ed., 1947). 
809 DIAMOND, supra note 255, at 195-214 (describing the link between livestock and 
disease). 
310 See generaUy id. at 201 ("[H]uman populations repeatedly exposed to a particu-
lar pathogen have come to consist of a higher proportion of individuals with those 
genes for resistance-just because unfortunate individuals without the genes were Jess 
likely to survive to pass their genes on to babies."). 
'
11 See id. at 202-11 (discussing the spread of diseases and the effect of European 
diseases on Indians). 
312 For the same reason that they Jacked defenses against European microbes (lack 
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European colonists carried deadly microbes wherever they went. 
Virginia colonists noticed epidemics as early as 1585, and by 1608, a 
Jamestown settler reported a "strange mortalitie" affecting "a great 
part of the [Indians]" in the Chesapeake Bay area.313 Smallpox may 
have reached New England before the first permanent settlements;314 
at any rate, within ten years of the Pilgrims' arrival in 1617, devastating 
epidemics struck. "Mortality rates in initial onslaughts were rarely less 
than eighty or ninety percent, and it was not unheard of for an entire 
village to be wiped out. ... A long process of depopulation set in, ac-
companied by massive social and economic disorganization. ,sis 
of large domestic animals, sparse population), Indians did not have the "offense" of 
their own set of endemic microbes to infect Europeans. The only microbe that may 
have originated in the New World and become epidemic among Europeans was syphi-
lis. See ARNO KARLEN, MAN & MICROBES: DISEASE AND PLAGUES IN HISTORY AND 
MODERN TIMES 121-28 (1995) (describing the possibility that syphilis arose in the New 
World). 
This is not to say that the Europeans faced no microbial barriers to settlement. 
Malaria, for instance, was common along the Mississippi River in southern Illinois, ad-
joining the Illinois Company's southern tract, and this impeded settlement until 
swamps were drained. See! Cl.ARENCEWALWORTIIALVORD, THEM!SSISSIPPIVALLEYIN 
BRITISH POUTICS: A STuDY OF THE TRADE, LAND SPECULATION, AND EXPERIMENTS IN 
IMPERIAUSM CULMINATING IN THE AMERICAN REvOLUTION 416 (1959) (noting that the 
prevalence of malaria had made Illinois an unhealthful place to live); ALBERT T. 
VOLWll..ER, GEORGE CROGHAN AND THE WESTWARD MOVEMENT, 1741-1782, at 198 
(1926) (describing malaria as the "curse oflllinois"). William Murray, a field agent of 
the United Companies, contracted the disease. See Marks, supra note 50, at 196 (not-
ing that William Murray, a trader and land speculator in Illinois, was stricken with ma-
laria fever). Infection and mortality rates for malaria, however, were minuscule com-
pared to those for smallpox and other endemic European diseases. 
SIS JENNINGS, supra note 10, at 23. 
s
14 According to one original settler, Massachusetts colonists found large tracts of 
land deserted, reportedly due to a "great mortality, which fell in all these parts about 
three years before the coming of the English, wherein thousands of [Indians] died." 
BRADFORD, supra note 254, at 87. 
There is a heated debate among current scholars, however, about exactly when 
European diseases reached the New England tribes. See Dean R. Snow & Kim M. Lan-
phear, European Contact and Indian Depopulation in the Northeast: The Timing of the First 
Epidemics, 35 ETHNOHIST. 15, 17-24 (1988) (arguing that epidemics did not strike the 
Northeast until the seventeenth century); see also Dean R. Snow & William A. Starna, 
Sixteenth-Century Depopulation: A VteW from the Mohawk Valley, 91 AM. ANTiiROPOLOGIST 
142 (1989) (reaffirming that epidemics did not strike until after 1600). 
SIS CRONON, supra note 307, at 86. Cronan estimates that the Indian population of 
New England fell from 70,000 in 1600 to less than 12,000 by 1675. "In some areas, the 
decline was even more dramatic: New Hampshire and Vermont were virtually depopu-
lated as the western Abenaki declined from perhaps 10,000 to fewer than 500." Id. at 
89. For a detailed history of the spread of smallpox and other epidemic diseases 
among Indians, see jOHN Dunv, EPIDEMICS IN COLONIAL AMERICA 244 (1953) (discuss-
ing the impact of smallpox on the Indians during the colonial period); ANN F. 
RAMENOFSKY, VECTORS OF DEATII 171 (1987) (describing a study concluding that dis-
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Mter these initial devastating epidemics, the surviving Indians 
were immune. Their children, however, were not always so lucky. 
While being the product of one generation of natural selection for 
immunity to the disease raised their odds of survival slightly, they re-
mained much more vulnerable than their European counterparts.316 
Thus, in the early 1630s, about a generation after the epidemics of 
1617, another outbreak decimated the Massachusetts Indians.817 
Whether infecting tribes for the first time or striking later generations, 
microbes marched west in lock step with settlers. Smallpox ravaged 
the Pequot of Connecticut in 1633318 soon after the British established 
a trading post nearby; it hit the easternmost tribe of the Five Na-
tions-the Mohawk-a few years later,819 and reached the westernmost 
members of that confederation-the Seneca-by the 1660s.320 During 
the 1690s, epidemics similarly marched west on the southern fron-
tier.821 As mentioned earlier in Part I.B, these epidemics reached the 
Illinois region around 1680 and decimated the tribes from whom the 
Illinois and Wabash Companies purchased their lands. Future gen-
erations of the Illinois and Wabash tribes remained susceptible to epi-
demics; in 1793, negotiations with the Wabash tribes had to be can-
celed "because many of the principal Wabash chiefs had died of 
ease was "the most important single factor in the demographic catastrophe of Native 
Americans"); and E. WAGNER STEARN & ALLEN E. STEARN, THE EFFEcr OF SMALLPOX 
ON THE DESTINY OF THE AMERINDIAN 13 (1945) (describing the disastrous impact the 
arrival of smallpox had on the Indian population). 
816 SeeHENRYF. DOBYNS, THEIRNUMBERBECOMETH!NNED 14 (1983). 
817 The colonists interpreted the epidemics' much greater impact on the Indians as 
divine intervention. "About [1631] the Indians began to be quarrelsome about [colo-
nists' encroachments], but God ended the Controversy by sending the Small-pox 
amongst the Indians . ••• Whole Towns of them were swept away, in some of them not 
so much as one Soul escaping the Destruction." INCREASE MATHER, EARLY HISTORY OF 
NEW ENGLAND 110 (1864 ed. private printing) (1677); see also BRADFORD, supra note 
254, at 271 ("The chief sachem himself now died and almost all his friends and kin-
dred. But by the marvelous goodness and providence of God, not one of the English 
was so much as sick or in the least measure tainted with this disease •.•. "). 
818 See STEELE, supra note 204, at 89 ("The Pequot, thought to have numbered 
some thirteen thousand, were reduced to a mere three thousand."). 
819 See id. at 115 ("The Mohawk were suddenly devastated by the massive smallpox 
epidemic that struck all the Five Nations and the New England Algonquians in 
1633. . • • Of a population of some eighty-one hundred, only two thousand Mohawk 
survived this initial epidemic."). 
820 See id. at 117 ("Being farther inland, [the Seneca] had suffered less than the 
Mohawk in the [small pox] epidemics of the 1630s, though they would be harder hit in 
the 1660s."). 
821 See id. at 153 ("[C]ontact with the English brought epidemic disease; the Creek 
[a southern Indian confederacy] population fell by 40 percent to nine thousand dur-
ing the 1690s."). 
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smallpox. ,s22 
While Europeans practiced the ancient art of inoculation and de-
veloped a smallpox vaccine in 1796,323 they possessed limited knowl-
edge of infectious diseases. It is improbable that they attempted to 
employ biological warfare and almost certain that such efforts would 
have failed. In a widely-cited letter, British General Amherst asked a 
subordinate whether it " [ c] ould ... be contrived to send the Small Pox 
among those disaffected tribes of Indians," and proposed spreading 
smallpox via blankets planted with pustules from soldiers with the dis-
ease.324 No historical evidence indicates that the British attempted 
this,325 and while possible, it is very difficult for smallpox residing in 
blankets to spread. 
Although the Europeans could not control their microbial allies, 
the Indians, suffering again from radically imperfect information, may 
have thought otherwise. Squanto, a New England Indian who coop-
erated with the settlers, convinced his fellow Indians that the colonists 
"kept the plague buried in the ground, and could send it amongst 
whom they would, which did much terrify the Indians. ,s26 The Wa-
bash tribes in 1800 worried "that the United States intended to de-
stroy them by means of the small pox, which was to be communicated 
to them by the goods which they received from [the Europeans] . ..s27 
Thus even though disease was a serendipitous ally, Indian overestima-
tion of European power to employ disease as a weapon may have tilted 
the already favorable terms of trade even further in the colonists' fa-
vor. 
A different kind of disease played a similar role in weakening 
tribal resistance to bargain-basement offers for their lands: alcohol-
ism. Just as they had no genetic defenses against smallpox, so too In-
dians had never been exposed to fermented beverages and were 
522 PRUCHA, supra note 205, at 91. 
523 Inoculation, practiced around the world for centuries, involves inserting infec-
tious material underneath the skin; for some diseases this results in a weak case of the 
illness, thereby conferring immunity. See DUFW, supra note 315, at 24. Edward Jenner 
derived the first vaccination, for smallpox, in 1796. See id. at 26-42. 
s
24 2 FRANCIS PARKMAN, CONSPIRACY OF PONTIAC AND THE INDIAN WAR AFrER THE 
CONQ.UESTOFCANADA44 (1929). 
525 See Bernhard Knollenberg, General Amherst and Germ Waifare, 41 Miss. V~ 
HIST. REv. 489, 494 (1954) (rejecting earlier historical analyses and concluding that 
while Amherst and others may have had the intent to spread smallpox, "execution of 
the intent is not supported even by circumstantial evidence"). 
526 BRADFORD, supra note 254, at 99. 
527 DAWSON, supra note 225, at 14-15 (quoting Letter from Major-General William 
Henry Harrison, to Secretary ofWar Henry Dearborn (Feb. 19, 1802)). 
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equally defenseless to alcohol addiction. 
Alcohol held a special place in the history of tribal disintegration .... 
Without the startling finality of smallpox, it set in train the process of 
lingering devastation that not only wore on the physical health of the na-
tives but attacked the very coherence of their social order. In epidemic 
force it ravaged tribe after tribe until the drunken, reprobate Indian be-
came a fixture in American folklore.328 
While the colonies and later the nation passed numerous laws to 
regulate or ban the liquor trade, these proved no more effective than 
the laws that attempted to regulate the sale of weapons to the tribes. 
The Europeans never devoted significant resources to stemming the 
flow of liquor to the Indians, and they continually worried about the 
adverse economic consequences of barring trade of a good in such 
high demand.329 
2. Game-Thinning 
Even with the advantages of Indian alcoholism, vulnerability to 
disease, and inferior military technology, the Spanish, as noted by de 
Tocqueville, were "unable to exterminate the Indian race by those 
unparalleled atrocities which brand them with indelible shame, nor 
did they ~ucceed even in wholly depriving it of its rights.'"30 The 
Americans, despite resorting less often to atrocities, did manage to 
deprive the Indians of their rights, virtually exterminating them. The 
difference between the two colonial methods was simple: the Ameri-
cans engaged in widespread agricultural settlement; the Spanish gen-
erally did not. As a result, "[s]ettlers, who ultimately would prove to 
be the most effective conquerors of North America, were by far the 
weakest of the ... elements" in Spain's invasion of the NewWorld.331 
Chief justice Marshall adverted to the most important harmful ef-
fect of such settlement in the M'lntosh opinion itself: "As the white 
population advanced, that of the Indians necessarily receded. The 
country in the immediate neighborhood of agriculturists became unfit 
for them. The game fled into thicker and more unbroken forests, and 
the Indians followed. "332 Although many eastern tribes engaged in 
s
28 BERNARD W. SHEEHAN, SEEDS OF EXTINCflON: JEFFERSONIAN PHU.ANTiiR.OPY 
AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN 232 (1973). 
s
29 See PRUCHA, supra note 6, at 102-38 (describing the often ineffective attempts to 
control the trade of whiskey to the Indians). 
sso DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
331 STEELE, supra note 204, at 29-30. 
332 Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 590-91 (1823). 
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small-scale agriculture, raising corn, beans, and squash, they still de-
pended on the hunt for a significant portion of their diet (as well as 
for clothing, tools, and other essentials). Chancellor Kent, writing 
only a decade after the opinion, presciently forecast the result of the 
settlers' systematic clearing of Indian game habitats: "[T]he Indians 
of this continent appear to be destined, at no very distant period of 
time, to disappear with those vast forests which once covered the 
country, and the existence of which seems essential to their own.,m 
Agriculture and husbandry reduced wild animal populations in 
three ways. First and foremost, clearing land for planting reduced 
forested habitat acre for acre. Second, Europeans themselves hunted 
game at a prodigious rate, often only for skins.334 Third, European 
domestic livestock, the product of natural selection in crowded envi-
ronments, successfully competed against the wild animals of the New 
World.835 Cronon summed up these effects on the once abundant 
deer population of New England: "Deer were threatened by changes 
in their habitat, augmented numbers of hunters, and competition 
from domestic livestock. ,336 
The effect on game in New England was rapid and severe. "Mas-
sachusetts enforced its first closed season on [deer] hunting in 1694, 
and in 1718 all hunting of them was forbidden for a closed term of 
three years. By the 1740s, a series of 'deer reeves'-early game war-
SS3 KENT's COMMENTARIES, supra note 46, at *400. 
sst In 1801, William Henry Harrison noted that Kentuckians crossed the Ohio 
every fall to hunt deer, bear, and buffalo in the Indiana Territory (still Indian land at 
the time). "One white hunter will destroy more game than five of the common Indi-
ans-the latter generally contenting himself with a sufficiency for present subsis-
tance-while the other eager after game hunt for the skin of the animal alone." Letter 
from William Henry Harrison, Governor of the Indiana Territory, to Henry Dearborn, 
Secretary of War (July 15, 1801), in MEssAGES & LETI'ERS OF Wll.LIAM HENRY 
HARRisON, supra note 82, at 27. "The Shawnee complained in 1802 that 'at present 
they kill more than we do[.) They would be angry if we were to kill a cow or a hog of 
theirs, the little game that remains is very dear to us.'" SHEEHAN, supra note 328, at 
222. 
Contributing to the destruction of game stocks, Indians began to kill greater num-
bers of deer and other large herbivores and take only their valuable hides. "They no 
longer killed primarily for sustenance. • • • [T]his new prodigality left the forest strewn 
with skinned carcasses fed upon by packs of wolves." !d. 
335 
"Old World livestock, which had evolved in what seemingly had been a rougher 
league than that of the New World, often outfought, outran, or at least outreproduced 
American predators." ALFRED W. CROSBY, GERMS, SEEDS & ANIMALS: STUDIES IN 
ECOLOGICAL HisTORY 10 (1994). "[T]he advancing European frontier from New Eng-
land to the Gulf of Mexico was preceded into Indian territory by an avant-garde of 
semiwild herds of hogs and cattle .••• " /d. at 33. 
336 CRONON, supra note 307, at 101. 
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dens-were regulating the deer hunt, but to little avail.,s37 By 1672, 
wild turkey and other game birds were virtually extinct. 338 Local tribes 
felt the squeeze less than forty years after the Pilgrims arrived. 
[O]ur fathers had plenty of deer and skins, our plains were full of deer, 
as also our woods, and of turkies, and our coves full of fish and fowl. But 
these English having gotten our land, they with scythes cut down the 
grass, and with axes fell the trees; their cows and horses eat the grass, 
and their hogs spoil our clam banks, and we shall all be starved.339 
In a little over a century and a half, the process was complete. 
The Mohegan Indians, in a 1789 petition for charity from the Con-
necticut legislature, lamented that "in Times past, our Fore-Fathers 
lived in Peace, Love, and great harmony, and had everything in Great 
plenty. . . . But alas, it is not so now, all our Fishing, Hunting and 
F I. . . 1 ,340 ow mg 1~ entire y gone. 
New England in 1800 was far different from the land the earliest Euro-
pean visitors had described .... Large areas particularly of southern New 
England were now devoid of animals which had once been common: 
beaver, deer, bear, turkey, wolf, and others had vanished. In their place 
were hordes of European grazing animals .•.. ,341 
Destruction of game stocks had little adverse impact on the settlers 
who relied on domestic, not wild, animals for food and byproducts. 
The same story played itself out on other frontiers. In 1796, 
George Washington reminded the "beloved" Cherokee "that the game 
with which your woods once abounded, are growing scarce. ,342 In 
1820, Andrew Jackson cited the total absence of game in counseling 
the Choctaws to remove to lands west of the Mississippi.343 In the 1809 
ss? Id. A leader of Plymouth Plantation, discussing events preceding the First 
Thanksgiving, noted how in the colonists' first autumn they "began to come in store of 
fowl, as winter approached, of which this place did abound when they came first (but 
afterward decreased by degrees)." BRADFORD, supra note 254, at 90. 
sss CRONON, supra note 307, at 100 (quoting John Josselyn as stating, "tis very rare 
to meet with a wild turkie in the woods"). 
ssg STEELE, supra note 204, at 94 (quoting Miantonomi, Chief of the Narragansett, 
Speech at Montauk (1642)). 
840 CRONON, supra note 307, at 107 (citing Harry Quaduaquid & Robert Ashpo, 
Statement to the Most Honourable Assembly of the State of Connecticut (May 14, 
1789)). 
841 Id. at 159. 
842 President George Washington, Talk to the Cherokee Nation (Aug. 29, 1796}, 
reprinted in GEORGE WASHINGTON: A COllECTION 645 (William B. Allen ed., 1988). 
845 See REMINI, supra note 207, at 394 (contrasting land "abounding in game of all 
kinds" west of the Mississippi with the land east of the Mississippi where "game is de-
stroyed"). 
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negotiations with the Piankashaws for lands overlapping the United 
Companies' claims as the frontier moved westward from Ohio, 
Harrison reminded the Indians that "[t]here was but little game left 
on the proposed tracts.'.s« The adverse effect of the decimation of 
Great Plains buffalo on western tribes is well-documented.345 
From the nation's foundation, American leaders relied on the ef-
fect of European agriculture and husbandry on Indian game animals 
to shape policy. In an extremely influential letter, General Schuyler 
advised Congress to avoid expensive wars and to instead wait for na-
ture to take its course. 
[A]s our settlements approach their country, they must, from the scarcity 
of game, which that approach will induce to, retire farther back, and 
dispose of their lands, unless they dwindle comparatively to nothing, as 
all savages have done, who gain their sustenance by the chase, when 
compelled to live in the vicinity of civilized people, and thus leave us the 
country without the expence of a purchase, trifling as that will probably 
b 346 e. 
Washington whole-heartedly concurred, emphasizing the econ-
omy ofletting settlers instead of soldiers dislodge the Indians. 
[T]he Indians as has been observed in Genl Schuylers Letter will ever re-
treat as our Settlements advance upon them and they will be as ready to 
sell, as we are to buy; That it is the cheapest as well as the least distressing 
way of dealing with them, none who are acquainted with the Nature of 
Indian warfare, and has ever been at the trouble of estimating the ex-
pence of one, and comparinJ! it with the cost of purchasing their Lands, 
will hesitate to acknowledge. 7 
This view became orthodoxy among policymakers. In 1789, the 
Secretary of War, who was responsible for Indian affairs, "reasoned 
that as the settlers advanced toward the line between the whites and 
redmen's hunting grounds, the game upon which the natives relied so 
344 Smith, supra note 37, at 225. 
S45 See generally PATRICIA NELSON LIMERICK, THE LEGACY OF CONQUEST: THE 
UNBROKENPASTOFTIIEAMERICANWEST 182 (1987) ("[T]he Plains Indian way of life 
rested on the abundance of buffalo; the hide trade was the most direct way to make 
them a 'dying race.'"). 
846 Letter from General Schuyler to Congress (July 29, 1783}, in 3 PAPERS OF 1HE 
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, microformed on Nat'l Archives Film M-247, Fiche 
173, at 593, 603:153 (National Archives Microfilm Pub I.). 
347 Letter from George Washington to James Duane (Sept. 7, 1783}, in WRITINGS 
OF WASHINGTON, supra note 292, at 136 (emphasis added). In the same letter, Wash-
ington similarly argued that "the gradual extension of our Settlements will as certainly 
cause the Savage as the Wolf to retire; both being beasts of prey tho' they differ in 
shape." Id. at 140. 
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heavily retreated. The result was to be that new purchases could then 
be made for small considerations. ,34s 
Even the disastrous defeats of Generals Harmar and St. Clair in 
the early 1790s did not shake the Administration's belief that, come 
what may, settlers would inevitably push the Indians off their lands. 
When they promised to respect the Illinois and Wabash tribes' rights 
in their land, 
[n]either Knox nor Washington had any real reason to think they were 
risking much by giving a guarantee of Indian land, for both of them had 
already expressed the view that a boundary line would never prove per-
manent as white settlement pressed up to the boundary. The Indians 
would either be exterminated, retire, or would easily yield land which 
349 
was no longer useful to them. 
They hoped for, and received, a military victory by General Wayne 
at Fallen Timbers in 1794, but they apparently did not view this as 
necessary to continued expropriation of Indian lands. 
Game-thinning rendered lands less valuable to the tribes and thus 
made them simultaneously less willing to fight for the land and more 
willing to sell it cheaply. The Indians "most chearfully" acceded to a re-
quested cession to indemnify victims of wartime depredations since 
the land in question "was now of no use to them, for Hunting 
Ground. ,350 By contrast, the Shawnees fought so ferociously for Ken-
tucky, as noted in M'lntosh, because "they often hunted [there] and 
they did not intend to have their supply of game disturbed. ,sst 
Based on this economic consideration, the pace of the westward 
expansion of settlements set the pace for land purchases, for it was 
unnecessary and expensive to buy the still-valuable virgin forests the 
Indians valued highly. 
The purchase will be as easy made at any future period as at this time. 
Indians having no ideas of wealth, and their numbers always lessening in 
the neighbourhood of our Settlements, their claims for compensation 
will likewise be diminished; and besides that, fewer will remain to be 
348 Bayard, supra note 220, at 49. 
549 HORSMAN, supra note 90, at 95. 
sso ABERNETHY, supra note 67, at 31, (quoting letter from George Croghan, Deputy 
Agent to Col. Williamjohnson, to Benjamin Franklin (Dec. 12, 1765)). 
ssl Jd. at 98. In M'Intosh., Marshall reflected on Kentucky as "a country, every acre 
of which was then claimed and possessed by Indians, who maintained their title with as 
much persevering courage as was ever manifested by any people." Johnson v. 
M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 543, 586 (1823). 
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gratified, the game will be greatly reduced, and lands destitute of game 
will, by hunters, be lightly esteemed.352 
Similarly, the Indian agent at Fort Wayne in 1809 advised against 
pressure tactics to gain further cessions. He assured his superiors 
"that Indian lands would be easily obtainable at the proper time when 
they were no longer needed as hunting grounds. In the past, this 
condition had coincided with the needs of the espanding [sic] white 
settlements. ,sss 
3. Understanding the Economic Impact of Game-Thinning 
While the effect of disease on the terms of trade between Ameri-
cans and the tribes is clear,354 the effect of game-thinning requires fur-
ther explication via an analogy. Consider two neighbors, a farmer and 
an industrialist who wishes to acquire the farmer's land. The farmer's 
land is uniquely valuable to the industrialist as part of a planned ex-
pansion. These parties are in a bilateral monopoly, like the ships Dis-
tress and Rescuer in the earlier hypothetical or the United States and 
the Indian tribes.355 Assume that the industrialist is willing to pay up 
to $200,000 for the farm, while the farmer will settle for nothing less 
than $100,000. The parties will then fight over the division of gains, 
since any price between these two extremes leaves both better off. 
Now add a twist: the industrialist's everyday acts decrease the 
value of the land to the farmer (for example, smoke partially blocks 
the sun, stunts crop growth, and adversely affects animal health). The 
farmer will then be willing to sell out for less, say $50,000. This does 
not guarantee that the industrialist will get the property for $50,000 or 
even for less than $100,000-ifthe farmer knows that the industrialist 
is willing to pay $200,000 and is an adept bargainer, she may get a 
price near the top of the range and garner most of the gains from 
trade. All else equal, however, the industrialist is likely to get the land 
for less if she can reduce its value to the farmer. The range of mutu-
ally beneficially outcomes has expanded by fifty percent, and every 
point in the expansion favors the industrialist. 
552 HORSMAN, supra note 90, at 100, (quoting Letter from Col. Timothy Pickering 
to Rufus King, Congressman from Massachusetts (June 1, 1785}, in 1 THE LIFE AND 
CORRESPONDENCE OF RUFUS KING 105 (Charles R. King ed., 1894)). 
sss Bayard, supra note 220, at 277. 
354 Reductions in the Indian populations eroded their ability to inflict military 
losses and thus strengthened the United States's bargaining position. 
555 See supra Part II.B.2 (illustrating bilateral monopolies using an example from 
marine salvage). 
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The common law of nuisance provides a remedy for such negative 
externalities, allowing the farmer either to bar the industrialist's 
smoke-spewing or at least to collect damages.356 The distinction be-
tween injunctive relief and damages is usually important in nuisance 
cases: injunctive relief forces a polluter with a higher-value activity to 
bargain with others and perhaps share some of the surplus, while lim-
iting plaintiffs to damages in effect allows a polluter to condemn a 
neighbor's use and enjoyment at the market value of the neighbor's 
use.
357 When the polluter wants title to the neighbors' land, however, 
even damages prevent the polluter from improving her bargaining 
position by the effects her activity has on her neighbor. Properly cal-
culated, damages will make the farmer whole again, and thus she will 
drop her suit against the industrialist and sell her the property only 
for $100,000 or more. 
A similar analysis applies if one replaces the farmer ·with the Indi-
ans, the industrialist with the United States, and smoke with the game-
thinning that resulted from approaching settlement. By devaluing the 
Indians' hunting grounds, the United States significantly increased 
the range of favorable outcomes in its bargaining game with the Indi-
ans, and hence the odds of buying Indian lands cheaply. The Indians, 
of course, had no nuisance-like remedy for the negative external e£:. 
feet that neighboring settlements had on the land they retained. 
Game-thinning reduced the value of land to the tribes and thus tilted 
the odds yet further in favor of the United States in the process of 
bargaining for Indian land. While settlement and the game-thinning 
that necessarily followed are not classical expropriating acts like some 
of the bargaining techniques discussed above in Part II.B.2, they fall in 
a gray area between expropriation and voluntary exchange. The 
United States obtained land more cheaply based in part on negative 
external effects that the nation would not have tolerated among its 
own citizens. 
856 It is assumed here that the harm to the farmer arises as a necessary side effect of 
productive activity by the industrialist. If the industrialist engaged in acts otherwise 
legal, solely for the purpose of harming her neighbor, the common law would provide 
the farmer powerful remedies against such unproductive (indeed, counterproductive) 
activity. See generally POSNER, supra note 163, § 6.15 ("Intentional Torts") (characteriz-
ing intentional torts that resemble common law crimes as coerced or forced transfers 
of wealth leading to economic waste and arguing that legal policy should be and has 
been more willing to award punitive damages in such cases). 
357 The classic discussion contrasting damages (liability rules) and injunctions 
(property rules) is Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability 
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1089 (1972). 
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E. Altering the Terms of Trade: Legal Rules to Attract 
Settlers and Deal with Externalities 
1. Attracting and Rewarding Settlers 
a. The Economics of Attracting and Rewarding Settlers 
1153 
To the extent the federal government discouraged, or at least did 
not actively encourage, settlement on the frontier, it would be difficult 
to charge the nation with engaging in quasi-expropriative acts against 
the Indians. The United States, however, vvas not passive. The gov-
ernment enacted laws that encouraged settlement on the distant, 
dangerous frontier. The need for settlers was obvious. Via the discov-
ery doctrine, the M'Intosh rule, and the ability to extinguish Indian 
claims cheaply, the United States had claims to virtually limitless acres. 
Yet frontier land, unlike a prime address in Manhattan today or gold 
since recorded history, had no established market; it was valuable only 
to the extent that the nation could attract buyers. 
At first blush, it seems unclear why America needed legal incen-
tives to spur land purchases. There was a large pool of potential buy-
ers, both domestic and foreign,358 and combined with the millions of 
acres available, it would seem conditions were ripe for an active mar-
ket to emerge, with price adjusting to equilibrate the costs and bene-
fits of moving to the frontier. There were, however, two prominent 
market failures that would have led to inefficiently low amounts of 
frontier settlement in the absence of some sort of governmental inter-
vention. 
First, settlers were better off coordinating their migrations (for 
stronger defense, more concentrated spreading of disease, and thin-
ning game), but had difficulty doing so on a large scale privately. In 
addition to helping coordinate activity, the government helped deal 
with what is known as a network externality.359 Just as one of the main 
558 See generaUy SOSIN, supra note 225, at 23 ("Early marriage was the rule; and the 
birthrate among women of child-bearing age was exceptionally high in colonial Amer-
ica. In many colonies the population doubled every generation."). In addition, the 
desire to attract land purchasers played a role in the colonies' and the nation's open-
door immigration policies. See E. Wn.LARD MILLER & RUBYM. MILLER, UNITED STATES 
IMMIGRATION: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 3-4 (1996) (tracing the development of U.S. 
imm~tion policy from 1607 until the early 1800s). 
~ The term "network externality" seems to have been coined in Michael L. Katz & 
Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75AM. ECON. REv. 424, 
424 (1985) ("[T]he utility that a given user derives from [a] good depends upon the 
number of other users who are in the same 'network' as is he or she. The scope of the 
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attributes that makes a computer operating system like Windows 95360 
valuable is the simple fact that many others use it (making skills trans-
ferable, software cheaper based on volume, etc.), so too, settlement 
on the frontier became safer and more economically attractive as the 
number of other settlers increased. The government not only needed 
to coordinate behavior, it needed to overcome a natural inertia: no-
body wanted to be among the first on the frontier, bearing the greater 
risks. The government was also in a unique position to supply settlers 
with information about the safety and suitability for agriculture of 
various regions. 
Second, settlers produced a host of positive external effects. As 
suggested in the previous paragraph and in Part II.D, the first settlers 
in a region spread disease and thinned game, reducing the value of 
neighboring lands to the Indians. This helped the nation purchase 
land cheaply and raised the value of nearby lands significantly. A 
Congressman expressed the western attitude by arguing that even 
squatters performed a service by improving the lands and increasing 
the value of neighboring tracts.361 The government's policy of reserv-
ing one section, "section 16," in the rectangular survey of each tract of 
land stemmed from a belief that the land would become more valu-
able after the first wave of settlers established themselves.362 
In addition to enhancing the value of land in their immediate 
neighborhood, new settlers made land on the previous frontier less 
dangerous and hence more valuable. Squatters argued this point ex-
plicitly, noting that "[t]hey had served as buffers in the recent war 
against the Indians, and their sacrifices had assured the safety of the 
towns and larger plantations [further east]. "363 
These and perhaps other external effects seem to explain the 
'"opinion that the Improving and cultivating the Land in Pennsylvania 
is a General Interest and Credit to the Province in Part as well as to the la-
network that gives rise to the consumption externalities will vary across markets."). For 
recent applications of the concept to legal problems, see Michael Klausner, Corpora-
tions, Corporate Law, andNetwarks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REv. 757, 763 (1995). 
360 Windows 95 is a trademark of the Microsoft Corporation. 
301 See Letter from Congressman John McLean to James Monroe, Secretary of State 
Uan. 19, 1816}, reprinted in 8 TERRITORIAL PAPERS (1956), supra note 31, at 373-74 
(1939) (arguing that a squatter "selects a valuable spot and renders it, (and the adjoin-
ing lands}, more valuable by improvement"). 
302 The New England tradition of "the reservation of section 16 in every township 
'for the maintenance of public schools within said township'" became part of Federal 
lan~olicy. PAUL W. GATES, HisTORY OF PUBUC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 65 (1968). 
ROHRBOUGH, supra note 96, at 110 (emphasis added). 
HeinOnline -- 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1155 1999-2000
2000] EXPROPRIATION OF AMERICAN INDIAN LANDS 1155 
boring man that gets his living upon the Improvements. '"364 The 
problem with these benefits is that they did not inure to those creat-
ing them. Inability to award positive external effects to the source of 
the benefit leads to socially suboptimal outcomes: individuals will not 
engage in the efficient level of an activity for which some of the bene-
fits end up in others' pockets.365 
If sellers can somehow capture the positive external effects created 
by buyers, then competition will drive the price they charge down in 
order to internalize the benefits. In land sales, the recipients of the 
settlers' "services" were a broad class of other Americans, from those 
on the previous frontier who found themselves on safer and hence 
more valuable land, to all citizens whose direct or indirect tax burden 
would fall as western lands became more valuable and productive. 
The United States, then, could encourage the efficient level of settle-
ment by discounting frontier lands below the market-clearing level. 
By offering land at a discount to settlers, the government encouraged 
more purchases by settlers. The taxpaying population, beneficiaries 
of the settlers' activities, would pay for this subsidy. 
There was a long tradition of land subsidy measures in colonial 
times. American policy after the Revolution evolved from trying to 
charge relatively high prices (to pay off Revolutionary War debt) to 
offering land at lower prices, to including favorable financing terms, 
to permitting preemption (squatters' rights), and finally to outright 
giveaways (the Homestead Acts). 
Before reaching these "discounting" policies, however, a number 
of legal rules that solved the coordination problem and enhanced the 
United States's natural advantages (disease and game-thinning) will 
364 AMELIA CLEWLEY FORD, COLONIAL PRECEDENTS OF OUR NATIONAL LAND 
SYsTEM As IT EXISTED IN 1800, at 133 (Univ. of Wis. Bull. No. 352, 1910) (quoting a 
Pennsylvania surveyor writing in 1738) (emphasis added). Squatters in Maine invoked 
similar logic, arguing that "the opening of Wilderness and turning the Desert Into 
Wheatfields, while it Supports Individuals, is of great advantage to the pub lick." I d. at 
134-35. 
us For an interesting example, see IAN AYREs & STEVEN D. LEviTT, MEASURING 
POSITIVE EXTERNAliTIES FROM UNOBSERVABLE VICTIM PRECAUTION: AN EMPIRICAL 
ANALYSIS OF LOJACK (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 5928, 
1997), available at <http://papers.nber.org/papers/W5928> (visited Mar. 30, 2000) 
(demonstrating that prevalence of hidden auto anti-theft devices in a given region de-
ters car theft in general, so that purchasers of such devices confer positive external et: 
feet on non-purchasers). Lojack, and services rendered by settlers, are examples of 
"mixed" goods, for which there is both private and public demand. See RICHARD A 
MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PuBUC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 49-55 
(5th ed. 1989) (discussing costs and benefits of goods that serve both individuals and 
groups). 
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be considered. Encouraging compact settlements served dual pur-
poses: it solved the coordination problem by channeling settlers to 
those tracts the government surveyed and sold, and it concentrated, 
via relatively quick mass migrations, the effects of disease and game-
thinning. Colonies and the United States had a long tradition of en-
hancing defenses by settling soldiers on the frontier. Requiring im-
provements, especially clearing of land, facilitated game-thinning. 
Large-scale land speculation, like that undertaken by the United 
Companies, undermined many of these advantages and hence laws 
generally disallowed it 
b. Legal Rules to Attract and Reward Settlers 
This Part explains how some of the most important statutes of the 
early Republic, from the rectangular survey system to land sale financ-
ing, preemption acts, and homesteading, all played a role in efficiently 
expropriating Indian lands. 
i. Compactness and the Rectangular Survey System 
Attempts to keep settlement compact, especially in New England, 
date back almost to the beginning of colonization. 
[T] o every person was given only one acre of land, to them and theirs, as 
near the town as might be; and they had no more till the seven years 
were expired. The reason was that 'they might be kept close together, 
both for more safety and defense, and the better improvement of the 
366 general employments. 
This continued to be official policy for the next century, until the In-
dians had been all but eliminated from the region. 
The necessity of "preserving a regular face to the frontiers" and of safe-
guarding sites for future towns caused the Massachusetts general court to 
begin to insist on contiguity. In addition, the needs of defence brought 
about the new plan of granting several townships simultaneously, to be 
located on the frontier. In 1713 the [Massachusetts legislature] resolved 
that it was for "Her Majesties Service [that] there be some Townships 
regularly Planted and Setled in the most Defensible manner, in [various 
tl . ] nS67 ou ymg areas . 
Similar considerations motivated the British when they took over 
western policy from the colonies. In drawing a line between the races 
S66 BRADFORD, supra note 254, at 145. 
567 FoRD, supra note 364, at 30 (internal citations omitted). 
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in the Proclamation of 1763, Sir William Johnson wanted to encour-
age "thick settlement of the Frontiers" and to "oblige the Proprietors 
of large grants to get them Inhabited.',s68 London rejected an earlier 
scheme to set up a colony in Illinois because it "had determined on 
the gradual expansion of the settlements westward," and Illinois was 
then far from the frontier.369 
Although the nation did not ultimately adopt the highly organized 
approach of settling the frontier only in complete townships, the land 
sales regime generally followed the contiguous approach, selecting 
blocks ofland for settlement and requiring surveys before sales. 
The United States was concerned [all along the frontier] about the or-
derly advance of white settlement. It wanted to open lands adjacent to 
the established settlements and to discourage wide scattering of the 
whites to areas far distant, and the extinguishment of Indian titles by 
treaty proceeded pretty much in this fashion.370 
The lynchpin of this orderly advance was the rectangular survey 
system.371 By refusing to sell land, and later refusing to recognize pre-
emption (squatter) rights, before an area had been surveyed, the 
United States government exercised significant control over when set-
tlers went to the frontier and where they went. Controlled, contigu-
ous, concentrated land rushes into predesignated areas conferred a 
number of advantages in expropriating Indian lands at least cost. 
They enhanced the spread of endemic diseases and thinned game 
rapidly. Compact settlement made defending the frontier cheaper. 
Finally, the rectangular survey system, by channeling settlers at a given 
time to a few, select regions on the extensive frontier, solved their co-
ordination problem and provided them, at low cost, with valuable in-
formation. 
To illustrate this last point, consider a family contemplating mi-
gration to one of two frontier locations; call the two possibilities Illi-
nois and Alabama. For all the reasons discussed above, they would 
like to go where everyone else is going. Yet the costs of communicat-
ing among thousands of families and coordinating their decisions 
S6S PRUCHA, supra note 6, at 14. 
369 ALVORD, supra note 312, at 322 (emphasis added). 
s70 PRUCHA, supra note 205, at 146 (emphasis added). 
sn Bouquet, a British general, laid much of the foundation for the rectangular sur-
vey system in his design for a land system to help control the frontier. See FORD, supra 
note 364, at 37-38, 53 ("[His plan] shows a British officer studying settlement under 
frontier conditions, and reaching the same conclusion in theory as pioneers a decade 
or so later, worked out in practice under the same conditions."). 
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would be prohibitive. In the absence of effective communication, 
each family faced the dilemma illustrated by Figure 3. 
Every Other Family 
lllinois Alabama 
Illinois 10, 10 2,2 
Alabama 2, 2 10, 10 
Payoffs: (Each Family, Every Other Family) 
Figure 3 
The payoffs in Figure 3 are somewhat arbitrary; they merely reflect 
that the settlers are better off together than apart. Unable to com-
municate in advance, the families are effectively playing a guessing 
game and have only a fifty percent chance of ending up in the same 
area.
372 If the total number of settlers wishing to migrate is sufficient 
to defend effectively, spread disease, and thin game in only one re-
gion, having half the group migrate to Illinois and the other half to 
Alabama is not an efficient way to extinguish Indian claims. The gov-
ernment can solve this problem by opening up settlement first in one 
region, say Illinois, and then, after Illinois is sufficiently populated, 
surveying and opening up Alabama. 
Assume in addition that Illinois is safer than Alabama. This would 
change the payoffs in the upper left comer to, say, (15, 15). One of 
the cheapest ways for the government to communicate this to mi-
grants is simply to open up Illinois lands first. It need not attempt ac-
tually to notify potential settlers about the disadvantages of other re-
gions; it can simply refuse to sell land until the region is the most 
advantageous place for settlement. These appear to have been the 
motivations for the facets of the rectangular survey system and the 
"orderly" advance of the frontier described above. 
The United States rejected the competing system of "indiscrimi-
sn This scenario is often called a "coordination game," indicating that the only 
thing the parties need to do in order to maximize their payoffs is to coordinate their 
choices; there is no inherent conflict created by the payoffs. See ERIC RASMUSEN, 
GAMES & INFORMATION 26-27 (2d ed. 1994), for a description of coordination games. 
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nate location" prevalent in the South, where purchasers received the 
right to select a given number of acres anywhere in a colony, as long 
as there was no preexisting claim. The problem with indiscriminate 
location was that "good lands, especially the river bottoms, were taken 
up rapidly. Newcomers pushed farther and farther into the wilderness 
in search of good lands without bothering about the nearer but sec-
ond-rate stretches. Thus, new regions quickly became dotted with 
widely scattered and often unconnected settlements. ":m This created 
four disadvantages relative to compact settlement in extinguishing In-
dian claims at low cost. First, scattered settlement thinned game and 
spread disease less effectively in a given region than compact settle-
ment. Second, it left unsolved the coordination problem among set-
tlers who would benefit from migrating to the same area as other set-
tlers but would have a difficult time coordinating the joint migration 
themselves. Third, dispersed settlers were less able to defend them-
selves and hence more reliant on the military services of the govern-
ment.374 Finally, scattered settlement left the government with less 
valuable reserved lands, making it more difficult to subsidize the ini-
tial settlers and recoup the positive externalities by selling neighbor-
. 1 ds 1 h' h . 375 mg an ater at a tg er pnce. 
The government's belief that land prices would rise rapidly in the 
aftermath of settlement explains in part the reservation of section 16 
of each township from sale, a practice dating back to colonial times.376 
373 Rudolf Freund, Military Bounty Lands and the Origins of the Public Domain, 20 
AGRICULTURALHIST. 8, 12 {1946). 
874 A contemporary commentator cataloged the military advantages of compact 
settlement over indiscriminate surveys: 
This method will push our settlements out in close columns, much less assail-
able by the enemy, and more easily defended, than extensive, thin popula-
tions; there will be people here for defense near tlze frontiers; they will have the 
inducements of a near interest to animate them to the service; their course of 
life and acquaintance with the country will render them much 11WTe fit for the 
service, than people drawn from the interior parts of the country; and the 
necessary force may be collected and put into action much quicker, and with 
much less expense, than if the same was drawn from distant parts. 
WEBSTER, supra note 297, at 493. 
As a matter of economics, it might seem that a government selling under the indis-
criminate survey system could have accepted a lower price in return for requiring its 
widely-scattered settlers to defend themselves. As discussed infra Part II.E.2, however, 
any government that wanted to sell frontier lands needed to foster a reputation for 
protecting its settlers. 
875 Such lures were efficient given the positive external effects of settlement. 
376 The Penns, proprietors of Pennsylvania, "reserved [land] in order to secure the 
unearned increment [from development]." VOLWll.ER, supra note 312, at 238. Maine 
landowners reserved every third lot, also hoping to sell later when positive externalities 
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Charging a higher price later for these reserved sections enabled the 
government to charge lower prices to the first settlers. Offering a dis-
count to early settlers may have been necessary to counteract higher 
costs incurred by those first settling a frontier. Consider the following 
scenario: 
Potential Early 
Settlers 
Potential Later Potential Later 
Settlers Settlers 
stay put/"'move to frontier stay pu~ove to frontier 
(o.t' ).-10) (-1o,( \-5,25) 
Payoffs: (early settlers, later settlers) 
Figure4 
If nobody moves, there are no losses but also no gains, illustrated 
by the (0, 0) payoff on the left Those who move first to the frontier 
face greater risks, more distant markets, and a host of other costs. 
Early settlers will not recoup these costs if nobody follows them, as 
shown by the (0, -10) and (-10, 0) payoffs in the middle two entries. 
Finally, early settlers recoup only part of their losses if others follow, 
while the later settlers reap a windfall by taking advantage of the pio-
neering done by their predecessors, demonstrated by the (-5, 25) en-
try on the right 
Facing these choices and making individualized seJ.f,.interested de-
cisions, the parties would both stay put The potential early settlers do 
better if they stay put regardless of what potential later settlers might 
decide. Once the early settlers decide to stay home, the potential later 
settlers have no incentive to incur the costs of being the first ones on 
the frontier. The problem is that the outcome reached, (0, 0), is 
clearly suboptimal: the parties maximize their joint wealth by both 
moving to the frontier. 
made the unsold parcels more valuable. See FORD, supra note 364, at 101 (discussing 
this practice as used in Augusta, Maine). As discussed supra note 70, the expectations 
must have been that land prices would rise faster than the risk-adjusted rate ofinterest. 
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One obvious way to solve this dilemma, side-payments from later 
to earlier settlers, seems to involve prohibitive transactions costs. The 
government, however, as seller of all acreage to both groups, can 
simulate such side-payments by charging higher prices to late arrivals. 
This was precisely the effect of many federal land law rules: the reser-
vation of section 16, providing financing only to the first wave of set-
tlers, and the Homestead Acts. 
Reserving some land from sale also inspired confidence in poten-
tial settlers. Even if leaders were not confident that prices would rise 
rapidly enough to justify keeping some land off the market, retaining 
title to a portion of the frontier made the rest of the nation in effect 
co-adventurers with actual pioneers. Like an entrepreneur who re-
tains a stake in an enterprise even after going public, this fostered 
confidence in potential settlers that the entity sponsoring the enter-
prise of expropriating Indian lands was confident of its success. In the 
same vein, by taking a fixed section of effectively random quality in-
stead of the best lands, the United States looked less like a skittish se-
cured creditor and more like a confident equity investor. 
ii. Special Programs for Special Abilities: Military Bounties 
Not all settlers were equally suited to frontier life. Early American 
colonists, following practice dating back at least as far as the Greeks,377 
used "military bounties to promote compact settlement on the fron-
tier by men able to defend it, and in this way to secure protection 
without the expense of a standing army."378 This process began in Vir-
ginia no later than 1679, when the government granted large tracts to 
two militia officers on condition that they settle 250 men, at least fifty 
armed and ready for war; similarly, a 1701 statute offered land to 
groups that could maintain one armed soldier for each 500 acres 
granted.379 These special programs for veterans were not, in the main, 
577 See Jerry A. O'Callaghan, Tlze War Veterans and tlze Public Land, in THE PUBUC 
LANDS, supra note 100, at 109, 109 (citing Herodotus as mentioning the Greek practice 
of settling veteran soldiers on new frontiers). 
578 FORD, supra note 364, at 103-04. 
579 See 2 STATUTES AT LARGE OF VIRGINIA, supra note 46, at 448-54 (granting tracts 
of land to Laurence Smith and William Bird, and stating that other lands on the fron-
tier may be granted in the same manner); 3 id. at 204-06 (encouraging settlers by 
granting land to groups fulfilling certain requirements, including size). According to 
Ford, there were no takers at the time. See FORD, supra note 364, at 104 (discussing the 
statutes and concluding that "[n]othing came of this project"). Such statutes sound 
positively feudal, akin to requirements that lords of the manor maintain so many 
armed knights and the like. The threats posed by Indians in America, just as by war-
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compensation for services rendered; "settlement rather than reward 
was the object of [these] military bounties. ,sso 
Governments wanted to subdue the frontier, and there were natu-
ral gains from trade there: land in return for expertise in fighting In-
dians. Building on this longstanding practice, President Washington 
argued 
that [western lands] could not "be so advantageously settled by any other 
class of men as by the disbanded officers and soldiers of the army," for 
this plan of colonization "would connect our government with the fron-
tiers, extend our settlements progressively, and plant a brave, a hardy 
and respectable race of people as our advanced post, who would be al-
ways ready and willing .JJn case of hostility) to combat the savages and 
check their incursions." 1 
He further argued that the presence of military men "would be 
the most likely means to enable us to purchase upon equitable terms of 
the Aborigines their right of preoccupancy; and to induce them to re-
linquish our Territories";382 by "equitable" Washington undoubtedly 
meant "cheap." He believed, then, that the presence of veterans on 
the frontier would help tilt the terms of trade for Indian lands in the 
nation's favor. 
While the federal and state governments did award land bounties 
to Revolutionary War veterans and set aside a number of large western 
tracts to satisfy these claims,383 few veterans actually settled on the 
frontier. "The soldiers, in general, returned to their own homes and 
accustomed habits and few of them took any interest in lands in the 
wilderness except to assign their warrant, for a nominal consideration, 
to some restless settler or visionary speculator. ,384 Apparently the sol-
diers found the government's terms insufficiently attractive; if the na-
tion wished to benefit from the positive external effect of using them 
as a buffer on the frontier, it needed to pay them more, for example, 
in the form of larger land grants, and further couple the interest with 
a settlement requirement. 
Based on this experience, the government cooled on the idea of 
ring princes, Vikings, and other marauders in medieval times, required both societies 
to structure themselves around, and devote considerable resources to, defense. 
88
° FORD, supra note 364, at 104. 
381 TREAT, supra note 88, at 21-22 (quoting George Washington, from WRITINGS OF 
WASHINGTON, supra note 292, at 17). 
882 WRITINGS OF WASHINGTON, supra note 292, at 17-18. 
38S See, e.g., GATES, supra note 64, at 249-84 (discussing American military bounty 
land policies regarding Revolutionary War veterans). 
ss<~ TREAT, supra note 88, at 245. 
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granting free land to veterans. Congress balked when veterans of Wil-
liam Henry Harrison's Tippecanoe campaign asked for land grants in 
the territories that Harrison had purchased.385 The veterans noted 
that "it would be ofimmen[s]e advantage to the security of the fron-
tiers as well as to the future settlement of this extensive region .... 
[T]his plan offortifying and securing the country from the hostility of 
the savages ... is not only the cheapest to Government but the most 
beneficial to your Soldiers and citizens. ,386 Another petition for land 
claimed that veterans could save the government $160,000 a year in 
military outlays.387 Congress received over a dozen such petitions; all 
appear to have been defeated.388 Legislators, learning from past fail-
ures, undoubtedly worried that most grantees would simply sell their 
rights to other less martial settlers. Since the nation would not benefit 
from the positive externalities of a more skilled frontier population, 
there was no reason to grant land at a discount. 
iii. Requiring Improvements 
If and when the government granted lands on what it viewed as 
favorable terms, it naturally wanted something in return. Far more 
common than requests for military service were requirements that 
purchasers clear land and make other improvements. Virginia im-
posed such requirements on early settlers;389 its "ancient cultivation" 
statutes even rewarded squatters with title, despite their lack of legal 
right, as long as they cleared sufficient acreage.390 Massachusetts re-
quired settlers to clear at least five acres of land and build a house to 
perfect title.391 The British government followed similar policies, void-
885 See John Arnold et al., Petition to Congress by john A mold and Others, reprinted in 8 
TERRITORIAL PAPERS, supra note 31, at 219, 219-20 (1939) (asking Congress, as veter-
ans, for a land grant). 
388 8 TERRITORIAL PAPERS, supra note 31, at 220 (1939). 
387 /d. at 318 ("[W]ithin Nine Months after a proclamation .•• the Ranging Busi-
ness might cease and thereby Save the Expence of upwards of one hundred and Sixty 
thousand dollars per Year in this Territory .... "). 
388 See, e.g., 9 JOURNAL OF TilE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF TilE UNITED STATES 
304, 317, 397, 669-70,743 (D.C., Gales &Seaton 1826). For descriptions of some of 
these bills, see SAMUEL R BROWN, VIEWS OF TilE CAMPAIGNS OF TilE NORTII-WESTERN 
ARMY 122-26 (Burlington, Vt., Mills 1814). 
389 SeeW. STITIROBINSON, MOTIIEREARTII: LAND GRANTS IN VIRGINIA, 1607-1699, 
at 31-32 (1957) (describing Virginia's land improvement requirements). 
500 See 3 STATUTES AT LARGE OF VIRGINIA, supra note 46, at 206-07 (exempting set-
tlers from specific duties upon fulfillment of certain conditions, including that they 
protect and build on the land). 
591 See FORD, supra note 364, at 103 (describing how Massachusetts homestead law 
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ing patents if settlers did not occupy, improve, and cultivate land 
within a reasonable time.392 These colonial laws were precursors to the 
two primary subsidized land distribution systems later employed by 
the United States: preemption and homesteading.393 The technical 
differences among these programs are dwarfed by a single similarity: 
they rewarded only those who improved land, especially those who 
cleared forests for agriculture. These laws created incentives for set-
tlers to destroy animal habitats and thus to thin the game relied on by 
the Indians. This in tum reduced the value of the lands to the Indi-
ans, who would then be less likely to fight, and would more likely part 
with their title of occupancy for a lower price.3!l4 Clearing land, then, 
had positive external effects, and the government tailored land policy 
to maximize this benefit to all colonists. 
iv. Disfavoring Large-Scale Speculation 
In a few early instances, the government sold land at a discount to 
large entities that aimed to profit from marketing smaller parcels to 
individual settlers. For instance, the Ohio Company bought an enor-
mous tract of land in eastern Ohio for ten cents an acre at a time 
when the government was trying to sell to settlers at two dollars an 
acre.
395 Yet as time went on the government rarely resorted to such 
middlemen.396 As part of settling the frontier at least cost, it is surpris-
ing that the government did not make greater use of private enter-
prises like the Ohio Company or the earlier United Companies. 
While the government needed to prevent competition in acquiring 
Indian title, it is natural to presume that once it obtained title, private 
enterprise would have had a cost advantage in undertaking the myriad 
required settlers to take "actual possession and within three years, build[] a house of a 
certain size, usually eighteen or twenty feet square, and clear[] five to eight acres fit for 
mowing and tilling"). 
592 SeeVOLWILER, supra note 312, at 243 ("They declared a grant null and void un-
less a certain proportion of the land was cultivated and settled within a reasonable pe-
riod of time."). 
595 See infra notes 419-39 and accompanying text (discussing these two distribution 
systems at length). 
594 See supra Part II.D.2-.3 (discussing the game-thinning effects of settlement and 
the resulting decrease in the value of the land to the Indians). 
595 See ROHRBOUGH, supra note 96, at 11 (describing Congress's sale of one million 
acres to the Ohio Company as an indication of its willingness to "rid itself of the ex-
pense and difficulty of administering a large section of the public domain," and of the 
need for immediate revenue). 
596 See id. at 12, 23 (noting the drop in sales to middlemen and the rise in sales to 
individuals at the end of the 18th century and beginning of the 19th). 
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steps necessary to distribute the land to settlers. Nothing about land 
distribution leads one to believe it was a public good that private mar-
kets could not provide. 
The positive external effects created by settlers, however, made 
land purchases in part a public good, or what the literature dubs a 
"mixed good": part private (benefits that accrued to settlers), and 
part public (positive external effects on their neighbors, those on the 
previous frontier, and others).397 The nation needed to subsidize the 
price of land in order to encourage settlement and optimize positive 
external effects. Accordingly, it offered settlers discounted land when 
it sold directly to them.398 When it sold large tracts to speculating en-
terprises like the Ohio Company, the nation adopted the same strat-
egy.s99 
There are, however, two intertwined problems with trying to dis-
tribute privately a mixed good that creates positive external effects. At 
first cut, larger entities appear more attractive: the bigger the tract of 
land sold, the greater the positive external effects the seller can cap-
ture. A very large land distributor could, for instance, sell its first 
tracts cheaply, and successively raise prices for late arrivals facing less 
risk. This is precisely what the United Companies intended to do; 
they planned to offer free land to the first 500 families, apparently be-
lieving that they could more than recoup this giveaway by selling re-
maining land at higher prices.400 As large landholders, they could af-
ford to subsidize early settlers since they captured a large share, if not 
all, of their positive external effects in the form of rising value for 
their unsold acres. This was common practice among large private 
landowners trying to attract settlers, from Maine to New York to 
Ohio.401 As long as the government offered the proper discount, large 
597 See MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 365, at 49 (explaining that there is not 
such "a sharp distinction ... between private goods ... and others, ... the benefits of 
which are wholly external"). 
598 See supra Part II.E.l.b (describing financing, preemption, and the Homestead 
Acts). 
899 See infra Part II.E.l.b.v (discussing such discounted offers). 
400 See Minutes of the United Companies, supra note 66, at 24. 
401 
"[E]ntrepreneurs ... attracted settlers and subsidized them, thus helping to 
build up the back country .... [G]reat landed proprietors ... often supplied [buyers] 
with credit and other necessities for beginning a new community. . . . [Some] con-
structed roads, mills, and other improvements," and offered food, instruction in agri-
culture, churches, schools, and physicians. SOSIN, supra note 225, at 40, 42. These 
land marketers "furthered the expansion and population of the back country by pro-
viding the economic wherewithal and services for prospective settlers who lacked 
means to establish themselves on the frontier." !d. at 43. 
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land distributors could pass on some of the discount to attract the op-
timal number of settlers, since they could capture the positive external 
effects of the earlier settlers by charging more to latecomers. 
In the limit, this calls for selecting only one very large land dis-
tributor. Such a monopolist, however, will not make decisions that 
maximize social wealth, but rather will maximize its own profits. This 
always creates deadweight loss, but the social loss is even greater in the 
f . . al ffi 402 presence o pos1ttve extern e ects. 
In addition to ignoring the positive external effects of settlers' ac-
tivities, monopolists reduce output below an efficient level to maxi-
mize their private profits. Thus, despite the sale of land to an entity 
with lower distribution costs, the monopolistic nature of that entity 
leads to an even greater divergence from the socially optimal level of 
settlement. 
One way to deal with monopolies is regulation. When the gov-
ernment sold large tracts of land to speculators, it tried to mandate 
minimum requirements on the number of actual settlers. This is like 
requiring a monopolist to produce a given quantity, or, equivalently, 
to charge a given price. Thus, the British government conditioned 
the title of the Ohio Company ofVirginia (unrelated to the later Ohio 
Company) on the settlement of 200 families; the United States im-
posed similar requirements on the Ohio Company.403 Monitoring 
compliance with such restrictions and punishing violations, however, 
was expensive. 
The more natural solution to monopoly is competition: the gov-
ernment could have sold discounted land to a large number of specu-
lators. The discount would have solved the positive externality prob-
lem. Further, rivalry among the speculators would seem to solve the 
monopoly problem since competition to attract settlers would cause 
the groups to increase output, and simultaneously lower their price, 
until they earned only enough to cover their costs of distribution. It 
would seem, then, that the government could have the best of every-
thing: acquire the land cheaply itself, turn around and sell it at prices 
calibrated to capture the positive externalities of settlement, and the 
buying entities could distribute the land to settlers at lower cost than 
the state. 
These distribution companies, however, faced the network exter-
402 See supra Figure 4 (mapping out the choices faced by early and later settlers). 
40
s SeeSOSIN, supra note 225, at 33 ("In 1752 [the Ohio Company] received an ad-
ditional 300,000 acres conditional on settling 200 families."). 
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nality problem:404 each would prefer owners of neighboring tracts to 
market their lands first, allowing the later seller to reap the positive 
external effects created by the earlier settlement. Pelatiah Webster 
voiced precisely this concern in arguing for small tracts in compact 
settlements instead of large sales to speculating companies. He wor-
ried about 
large quantities of land lying unimproved in the hands of non-residents or absen-
tees, who neither dwell on the land, nor cause it to be cultivated at all, 
but their land lies in its wild state, a refuge for bears, wolves, and other beasts 
of prey, ready to devour the produce of the neighbouring farmers, bears 
no part of the burden of first cuUivation, and keeps the settlers at an incon-
venient distance from each other, and obstructs the growth and riches of 
the townships in which it lies; whilst the owner, by the rise of the land, 
makes a fortune out of the labor and toils of the neighboring cultivators. 
This is a most cruel way of enriching one man by the labor of another, and so 
very hurtful to the cultivation of the country, that it ought to be re-
. db th d . . 405 strame y e most eCISlVe measures. 
Those making a "fortune" out of the "rise of the land [prices]" 
due to the "labor and toils" of their neighbors are free riders captur-
ing the positive external effects created by earlier settlers. This exter-
nality problem and the network externality problem create more than 
an issue ofjustice. As Webster emphasizes, these problems adversely 
affected efficiency. They create inertia, as each Company or settler 
waits for others to go first; to the extent actors foresee this problem 
they may simply choose not to participate in the market. 
Any attempt to pursue both governmental and private land sales 
faced the same problem. The government, focusing on social welfare, 
would subsidize prices sufficiently to lure settlers to its portions of the 
frontier, while private distributors would wait until buyers from the 
government generated positive external effects that raised the value of 
the neighboring lands they owned. The private sellers could free-ride, 
cutting into the government's ability to subsidize settlement. This ex-
plains why speculators often withheld land from the market. It also 
undermined some of the positive external effects of compact settle-
ment. 
The effects on settlement of the extensive purchase of land by specula-
tors were very great. Desirable tracts in the neighborhood of settlements 
were held at prices too high for most of the immigrants to pay, and con-
sequently they were forced to go farther afield to take up less desirable land. 
404 See supra Part II.E.l.a (exploring the network externality problem). 
405 WEBSTER, supra note 297, at 494. 
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The result of this and of the uniform price of government land, regard-
less of quality, was a widespread scattering of the settlers over a vast extent of ter-
ritory instead of an arderly progression along a definite frontier.405 
The United Companies explicitly recognized that many govern-
mental acts had enhanced the value of their claims, and stated their 
willingness to cede a large portion of the land to the United States to 
reflect the nation's contribution to its value.407 Thus, it was up to the 
government to subsidize, in one way or another, land purchases by 
early settlers who generated positive external effects. 
Before examining the means by which the colonial and national 
governments provided such subsidies, it is interesting to consider one 
means the government did not employ: small-scale speculation. In-
stead of selling small tracts ofland at a deeply discounted price to the 
first wave of settlers, the government could have sold larger tracts at a 
small discount. The settlers then could have resold the extra acreage 
at a higher price, after their activities had rendered the area safer and 
more economically viable. Many pioneers engaged in such small-scale 
speculation themselves, buying up the claims of neighbors who either 
decided not to move west or decided not to stay.408 
v. Discounts to Attract the Masses 
Thus, those who wished to speculate had to buy neighboring lands 
themselves; the government did not give out excess land as a means of 
406 BUCK, supra note 97, at 58 (emphasis added). There is a longstanding historical 
debate on the role of speculators in settling the frontier. Traditional scholarship con-
demned them as parasites. However, more economically sophisticated analyses have 
defended their role in efficiently distributing land. For a summary of this literature, 
see Robert P. Swierenga, Land Speculation and Its Impact on American Economic Growth 
and Welfare: A Historiographical Review, 8 W. HIST. Q. 283 ( 1977). 
407 While formally maintaining a right to the entirety of the lands described in tlvo 
deeds, the Companies were "ready to admit, that the measures adopted by the Gov-
ernment for the defence and settlement of the neighboring country have greatly en-
hanced the value of this property," and hence were willing to yield a portion of their 
lands. 1810 MEMORIAL, supra note 81, at 116. 
408 See Stephen Aron, Pioneers & Profiteers: Land Speculation and the Homestead Ethic 
in Frontier Kentucky, 23 W. HIST. Q. 179, 182 (1992) ("[B]ackcountry men ... were 
[equally] susceptible to unrestrained acquisitiveness when it came to possessing 
land."). Aron points out that such speculation was inconsistent with pioneer rhetoric 
that denounced large-scale speculators for engrossing the best lands and charging ex-
cessive prices to hard-working settlers. The essence of the "homestead ethic" was that 
nobody should be able to buy more land than they could farm themselves. !d. at 182, 
193. While the settlers' land speculation may have contradicted the rhetoric of their 
ethic, it was entirely consistent with efficient expropriation of Indian land, providing 
one way for pioneers to capture the positive external effects they generated. 
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encouraging settlement. The United States, however, following a long 
line of colonial precedents, did subsidize frontier settlement in a 
whole host of other ways. "At times provincial governments encour-
aged joint ventures by offering townships with free land, tax exemp-
tions, subsidies, agricultural implements, and supplies.tt409 Grants of 
land to encourage immigration were common, and appear to have 
been motivated by the positive external effects of settlement. 410 The 
result ~vas cheap land. "[D] ue to the desire of the royal and various 
colonial governments to establish a bulwark of settlers in the back 
country, by the middle of the eighteenth century even those with very 
limited means could legally obtain tracts . .,4n The granting govern-
ment usually apportioned subsidies based on the number of able-
bodied men who would settle on the frontier. For instance, colonial 
Virginia's "headright" system awarded fifty acres for each immigrant. 412 
New settlers, beyond the positive external benefits they conferred on 
existing settlers, were cheaper frontier defenders than soldiers. 
"[B]uffers" had formed a protective shield on innumerable occasions 
since the establishment of the English colonies. Various colonial gov-
ernments in periods of crisis had offered free land to men who would 
settle in exposed places. The prosperous citizens of the General Court 
in Massachusetts and the House of Burgesses in Virginia thought such 
bounty cheaper than the cost of mercenary troops and perhaps even 
more effective.415 
Selling land at market prices in the presence of positive external 
benefits would have been suboptimal.414 Therefore, "[r]egardless of 
409 SOSIN, supra note 225, at 40. Even with these subsidies, some so extensive that 
they amounted to a negative price for land (paying settlers to occupy it), colonial gov-
ernments found it difficult to lure settlers to the remote and dangerous frontier. They 
turned their attention to disfavored groups with lower opportunity costs. For instance, 
Georgia transported Jewish and other religious refugees across the ocean and sup-
ported them during their first years in order to create a buffer zone on the frontier. 
See PHlNizY SPALDING, OGLETHORPE IN AMERICA 4, 20 (1977) (describing the early 
colonization of Georgia and the settlers' unusual acceptance of Jews into the commu-
nity). Georgia even banned importation of slaves at times, in an attempt to create a 
labor market with wages sufficiently high to attract European settlers to the frontier. 
See id. at 48-51, 60·61, 72 (explaining attempts "to keep Georgia a refuge for free, 
white, Protestant Yeoman farmers"). 
410 See FORD, supra note 364, at 133 (quoting surveyor's observation that squatters 
improve land, stimulate the market, and increase state revenue). 
411 SOSIN, supra note 225, at 25. 
412 ROBINSON, supra note 389, at 32-33 (describing Virginia's "principal basis for 
title to land in the seventeenth century"). 
41S ROHRBOUGH, supra note 96, at 61-62. 
414 See supra Part II.E.l.a (arguing that "if sellers can somehow capture the positive 
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the need for revenue from land sales, most states offered fairly gener-
ous terms to bona fide settlers or to squatters."415 The situation was 
different for the federal government immediately after the Revolu-
tion. It alone bore responsibility for repaying the huge debt incurred 
to fight the war, and hence felt great pressure to raise revenue to meet 
its obligations. Thus, in the early years of the Republic, the federal 
government offered few subsidies to purchasers of frontier lands. 
This state of affairs, with the attendant sacrifice of all the positive 
external effects of greater frontier settlement, did not last long. In 
1791, a land commissioner in Indiana recommended gifting land to 
French family heads even if they had no legal claim, arguing that they 
would prove useful in defending the region against Indians.416 Con-
gress agreed and liberalized the standard for granting land to French 
inhabitants.417 
In the same year, Congress began to sell land on credit; it followed 
with more generous terms in 1800.418 Private credit was apparently 
hard to come by, at least at the rates the government offered, and 
hence this was just another form of subsidy. 
Under the Act of 1800 the land system became a real factor in the west-
ward movement, and it was the five-year credit period which rendered 
the act effective. Without the credit little land could be sold for two dol-
lars an acre, but with it a man could pay fifty cents an acre and the bal-
·th· fi 419 ance WI m 1ve years. 
Congress also began to reconsider its treatment of squatters who 
made improvements on land without color of title, even those who 
trespassed on tribal lands before the United States, per M'Intosh, had 
extinguished Indian title. Squatters argued early and often that, at a 
minimum, they should have preemption-a right of first refusal to 
purchase, at a price determined by statute, the parcel of land that they 
had improved. As the war debt became less pressing, Congress began 
to listen. 
external effects created by buyers, then competition will drive the price they charge 
down in order to internalize the benefits"). 415 SOSIN, supra note 225, at 152. 416 See Repart Regarding Land Claimants in the Narthwestem Territory (Dec. 23, 1790), 
reprinted in AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, supra note 81, 1 PUBUC LANDS 9-10 (1832) (pro-
vidin9 an account of the many methods of! and disposal used by the various colonies). 41 SeeActofMar. 3, 1791, ch. 27,1 Stat. 221 (1791). 418 See Act of May 10, 1800, ch. 55, 2 Stat. 73 (1800) (establishing four land offices, 
enjoining the surveyor general to transmit "general plats of the lands hereby directed 
to be sold" to those offices, and establishing the system by which the lands in question 
were to be divided). 419 TREAT, supra note 88, at 378-79. 
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The growth of the sentiment in favor of preemption, therefore, was par-
allel to the changing conception of the ultimate object of land legisla-
tion. So long as revenue was the end to be sought, preemption was un-
deniably bad. But if the furtherance of settlement was to be the desire of 
Congress, then preemption was but a step toward the ultimate goal-the 
granting of homesteads to settlers. So during the half century of land 
legislation the squatter developed from a trespasser ... to a public bene-
factor, a man whose bravery and whose sacrifices had opened great areas 
to peaceful settlement and who merited well of the nation.420 
What made a settler a "public benefactor" were the positive exter-
nal effects his settlement had on neighbors and the rest of the nation. 
Selling frontier land at market prices inefficiently bypassed this public 
benefit. "Gradually [Congress] began to adopt the point of view of 
the pioneers, until by 1820 it had become the custom to grant pre-
emption for a limited period in every region where, for special rea-
sons, the land sales were delayed."421 One of the earliest and most im-
portant preemption acts was passed in 1813 for squatters in Illinois; it 
served as "a prototype for later special preemption laws. "422 The War 
of 1812 delayed government surveys and sales, yet the region was oth-
envise ripe for a deluge of settlers. To attract them despite adminis-
trative delays, and perhaps to help weaken the Indian resistance re-
sponsible for the delays, the government unleashed squatters to help 
reduce the value of the land to the tribes. 
Preemption seems inconsistent with compact settlement since set-
tlers have incentives to seek out valuable tracts, such as riverfront 
tracts, regardless of the location of other settlers. Douglas Allen, how-
ever, has noted that the preemption acts effectively prevented a return 
to the southern system of indiscriminate surveys. "The most notable 
feature [of the preemption acts] was that squatters only had preemp-
tive rights on surveyed land."423 By limiting preemption to surveyed 
land, the government could solve the settlers' coordination problem 
and channel them to areas where they could best serve the process of 
efficiently expropriating Indian lands. 
420 /d. at 386. 
421 /d. at 383. 
422 ROHRBOUGH, supra note 96, at 201. Many of the Illinois squatters who bene-
fited from this act undoubtedly resided on lands claimed by the United Companies. 
423 Allen, supra note 17, at 19 (emphasis added). Allen notes that the government 
did recognize squatters on unsurveyed lands at times. He argues that this was done 
when hostile Indians made surveys impossible, as in Illinois around the time of the War 
of 1812. See id. at 20-21 ("With no reliable survey, homesteading in very hostile areas 
could not be carried out, and preemption may have been a viable alternative to mili-
tary action."). 
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When the United States went one step further and gave away land 
to improving occupiers, it similarly limited such gifts to the most dis-
tant frontier regions where Indians presented a real threat. In 1788, 
for instance, the Confederation donated 400 acres to every head of a 
household in Illinois and Indiana-a region over which hostile tribes 
exercised significant control.424 In 1802, Congress gave away land in 
Mississippi, Alabama, Louisiana, and Arkansas, which were states on a 
contested border.425 Giveaways in Missouri and Michigan also oc-
curred before the government had cleared these areas of hostile 
tribes.426 In addition, the government channeled settlers to Florida as 
part of its efforts to pacify the Seminole and other Florida tribes that 
zealously resisted American incursions. 
The Armed Occupation Act of 1842 is the most obvious case of home-
steading to induce settlement in the face of Indian problems. Spain had 
tried several times to place settlements in Florida, but failed for the most 
part because of the hostile Indians. The act of 1842 gave 160 acres to 
any man capable of bearing arms who was willing to move south of 
Gainesville and improve the land for five years. The policy was a success. 
Of the 200,000 acres allotted, 1,048 permits for 167,680 acres were taken 
. h. 427 
up Wit m two years. 
These limited programs were precursors to the most massive land 
"giveaway" in history: the Homestead Act of 1862 and successor legis-
lation.428 The Homestead Acts vested title to anywhere from eighty to 
640 acres to those who actually occupied and improved the land. The 
government did not offer choice tracts to homesteaders. Instead, it 
opened up only less desirable lands that were further from settlement. 
Moreover, the government usually limited homesteading to a few ar-
eas. "By instigating homesteading, the U.S. government restricted the 
choices of settlers by providing an incentive to rush one area. "429 
In the absence of positive external effects, homesteading (givea-
ways requiring occupation and improvement) creates a wasteful race 
424 See Act of Mar. 3, 1791, ch. 27, 1 Stat. 221 (giving 400 acres to persons "who in 
the year one thousand seven hundred and eighty-three, were heads of families at Vin-
cennes or in the Illinois country, on the Mississippi"). 
425 See Act of Mar. 3, 1803, ch. 27, 2 Stat. 229 (disposing of land in the Mississippi 
Territory). 
426 See Act of Mar. 3, 1807, ch. 34, 2 Stat. 437 (regulating grants of land in Michi-
gan); Act of Mar. 27, 1804, ch. 61, 2 Stat. 303 (regulating grants ofland in Missouri). 
427 Allen, supra note 17, at 12-13. 
428 See Homestead Act of 1862, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392 (vesting title to certain land in 
those people who established that "they ha[d] resided upon or cultivated the same for 
[a] term of five years"). 
429 Allen, supra note 17, at 5. 
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for land: in order to establish tide, setders make investments in im-
provements before the market dictates that such expenditures are 
warranted.430 Allen has persuasively argued, however, that enforcing 
property rights against the Indians was the positive external effect that 
justified preemption, homesteading, and other subsidies. 
U.S. public land policies of the nineteenth century were appropriate in 
light of the costs of enforcing property rights. Due to the Indian's simul-
taneous claim on public lands and the costs imposed by this dispute over 
property rights, the land policies were efforts to "hire" settlers to reduce 
the costs of enforcement. The state may have a comparative advantage 
in enforcing property rights through violence; however, when disputes 
occur, the state will use a least-cost strategy to secure ownership. In this 
light, homesteading is a substitute for direct military force and acts to 
. . th f . I 431 mttigate e costs o vto ence. 
Preemption and homesteading established a large population on 
a given piece of the frontier. Setders presented the Indians with a 
large local militia that made the odds of a victorious attack so low that, 
realizing their weakness, the tribes sold out cheaply.432 
However opposed the common law tradition might be to squat-
ters, these setders played an important role in expropriating Indian 
lands at minimal cost. 433 Even during colonial times, the usefulness of 
squatters in helping to eliminate Indian land claims was too powerful 
to ignore. Massachusetts, while eliminating Indian tribes from the 
western part of the state, found ousting squatters difficult, inter alia, 
"because of the usefulness of the squatters in this area as a buffer. "434 
The British government defended actual setders against holders of 
later-issued warrants for lands in New Hampshire grants because "[i]t 
450 See Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill, The Race for Property Rights, 33J.L. & ECON. 
177, 191 (1990) (noting that "speculators ... would hold [land] out of produc-
tion ... with no apparent settlement activity, while squatters and homesteaders would 
engage in premature development of the land," and that "[i]t was the speculators who 
took socially efficient action by not doing anything on the land"). 
451 Allen, supra note 17, at 2. Allen seems to hint at the equally important effect of 
spreading disease and thinning game: "[t]he sudden arrival of tens of thousands of 
peogle into a given territory destroyed much of the Indian way of life." Id. at 5-6. 
2 For an incredibly detailed account of the incessant pressure that early settlers 
placed on the tribes along the Ohio River from 1768 until the national army dispersed 
remaining resistance in the Battle of Fallen Timbers in 1794, see ALLAN W. ECKERT, 
THATDARKAND BLOODY RivER, CHRONICLES OF TilE Omo RivER VALLEY (1995). 
455 Note that in relatively crowded England, squatting served no socially useful 
purpose. The common law of trespass is presumably efficient under a well-developed 
property regime, since it forces all interested parties to negotiate with owners to use 
land, resulting in allocation to the highest value user. 
434 KAWASHIMA, supra note 33, at 68. 
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was felt that the difficulties of early settlement on lands exposed to the 
incursions of the savages and French made it imperative in justice and 
equity that the original proprietors should be quieted in their posses-
sions."435 
After the Revolutionary War, state and federal governments often 
showed the same predisposition in favor of squatters. Tennessee's 
original Bill of Rights, for instance, created a right of preemption 
based on the dangers weathered, and services rendered, by the earliest 
settlers.436 Local federal officials warned their superiors in Washing-
ton that the perceived injustice of ousting squatters was so strong that 
soldiers simply would not obey orders to that effect. 
At this time it is my opinion, justified by the statements of many, that five 
militia men of this Territory would not march against the intruders on 
public lands • . • • Much feeling has been excited on this subject, as those 
who may be found on public lands are the persons who have borne the 
storm of the Indian War, being on the frontier.437 
As discussed in the following section, the government made infre-
quent and largely ineffective attempts to remove squatters, especially 
those on Indian lands.438 Roback contrasts this failure to enforce the 
law with the zealous enforcement of the M'Intosh rule against private 
purchases from the Indians: "The government indirectly subsidized 
white intrusions onto Indian lands by enforcing the prohibition on 
land sales more effectively than they enforced the prohibition on 
. ,439 
squattmg. 
Not only did the government refuse to remove squatters from In-
dian land, but it also invariably protected them wherever they hap-
455 FORD, supra note 364, at 128. 
436 REMINI, supra note 207, at 78 ("The Bill of Rights ... stated that the people who 
had pioneered this country .•. were entitled to the right of preemption and occu-
pancy, [and that] because these settlers had lived in the region without benefit ofland 
and exposed to pillage, starvation, and massacre, it was felt that preemption was richly 
deserved."). 
437 ROHRBOUGH, supra note 96, at 61-62 (quoting Letter from St. Louis Land Regis-
ter McNair to General Land Office Commissioner Tiffin) (footnote omitted). While 
this and the preceding quotes speak of doing justice ex post by granting title to squat-
ters, the more important effect oflegal rules is the incentives they create for future be-
havior. 
458 See infra Part II.E.2 (discussing negative externalities of lawless settlers, specula-
tors, and traders). 
439 Roback, supra note 190, at 20. She goes on to note that this may have been true 
in part because the cost of preventing squatting was quite high, while the cost of en-
forcing the M'Intosh rule was low. See supra notes 190-92 and accompanying text (not-
ing how "the rule of M'Intosh solved a collective action problem and permitted the na-
tion to avoid expensive bidding wars for Indian lands"). 
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pened to settle. There is a nagging question here: why protect squat-
ters on Indian lands? As discussed at length in the next section, such 
squatters provoked innumerable acts of retribution from Indians pro-
tecting their land, and these sometimes lethal retaliations often fell on 
legal settlers, travelers, and others not guilty of any provocation.440 
The point here is that the seemingly obvious ·way to deal with squatters 
on Indian lands would have been to leave them at the mercy of the 
Indians. 
The United States may have rejected such a hard line due to con-
cerns about its reputation. In order to attract settlers to drive the en-
gine of efficient expropriation, be they squatters or legal buyers, the 
nation needed to establish a strong reputation as a protector of those 
on the frontier. Although officials in a world of perfect information 
could have treated illegal squatters differently than legal buyers, in an 
environment of slow communication over great distances, from an 
ever-evolving frontier, it may have been impossible to pursue such a 
nuanced policy. If the United States wished to attract occupants to its 
millions of western acres, it first and foremost needed to reassure po-
tential settlers that the government would always, and to the utmost of 
its ability, protect them from Indian violence-even when they pro-
voked it. 
2. Negative Externalities of Lawless Settlers, Speculators, and Traders 
Unfortunately, egregious conduct by frontiersmen was frequent. 
The most problematic practice was squatting on Indian lands, coupled 
with acts of violence against tribe members. "The greatest menace to 
the stability of the frontier was often the aggressive, undisciplined set-
tler himself. He regarded the Indian as an animal to be exterminated 
•••• "
441 This was a longstanding problem; in the 1670s, the governor 
of colonial Virginia worried that frontiersmen "might well provoke an 
Amerindian war in order to secure land and slaves, thus drawing the 
whole colony into the human and fiscal consequences. »442 
By provoking hostilities that bled over and affected neighbors and 
those further from the frontier, frontiersmen whose activities created 
positive external benefits also created negative external costs. When 
440 See infra Part II.E.2 {describing frequent conflicts between squatters and na-
tives). 
441 SOSIN, supra note 225, at 82. 
442 STEELE, supra note 204, at 53; see al5o ABERNETHY, supra note 67, at 107 ("Tide-
water Virginians in general had little interest in Indian wars. They knew the cost to 
them would much outweigh any immediate benefits."). 
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settlers provoked Indians, the negative external effects of Indian re-
taliation were far-reaching, endangering Europeans for miles in every 
direction. Since frontier squatting often enabled settlers to obtain 
valuable land, it may have been rational from an individual settler's 
point of view. However, Indian retaliation hurt others. Therefore, in 
the social calculus, squatting on Indian lands and instigating blood-
shed often did more harm than good.443 
Costs imposed on society by lawless squatters infuriated both gov-
ernment officials and citizens removed from the frontier. According 
to one British general, "[a]ll the settlers on the frontier were not 
worth what a campaign against the Indians would cost. ..«4 Thomas 
Jefferson declared: 
[T]he U.S. [will] find an Indian war too serious a thing, to risk incurring 
one merely to gratify a few intruders with settlements which are to cost 
the other inhabitants of the U.S. a thousand times their value in taxes for 
carrying on the war they produce. I am satisfied it will ever be preferred 
to send[ing] armed forces and mak[ing] war against the intruders as be-
. . &I . 44.5 mg more JUSt ess expensive. 
There was a "general Eastern conviction that the frontier was a 
terrible place inhabited by terrible people whose main business in life 
was stirring up Indian wars for which Easterners had to pay. "446 One 
official argued that "he who preserves Peace with Indians thereby 
serves the Indians[,] but it is equally true that by that act he in a much 
greater degree serves his Fellow Citizens. "447 
The federal government enacted a series of Trade and Inter-
course Acts to rein in frontiersmen engaging in provocative behav-
ior.448 In addition to codifying and nationalizing the rule against pri-
443 See Anderson & McChesney, supra note 16, at 50 (describing adherence to trea-
ties as a version of the prisoners' dilemma and noting that "[e)ven if the total benefits 
from a treaty exceed its total costs for both sides, any particular individual may find it 
in his interest to violate the treaty terms"). 
~ WHITE, supra note 62, at 362 (footnote omitted). 
Ho PRUCHA, supra note 6, at 139 (quoting Letter from Thomas jefferson to David 
Cam.Jsbell (Mar. 27, 1792) ). 
6 ABERNETHY, supra note 67, at 73. As discussed in Part II.E.l.b, Easterners could 
not refuse to help in fights provoked by squatting and violence if they hoped to main-
tain the protective reputation necessary to attract settlers to the nation's extensive 
frontier lands. 
447 Letter from Governor William Blount to Alexander Kelley and Littlepage Sims 
(Dec. 1, 1795), reprinted in4 'TERRITORIAL PAPERS, supra note 31, at 408,410 (1936). 
Hs Congress enacted the first Trade and Intercourse Act in 1790, see Trade and In-
tercourse Act of 1790, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137, and amended the law frequently through the 
mid-1800s. See gen~ally PRUCHA, supra note 205, at 100-04 (describing the U.S. gov-
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vate purchases of Indian lands, these acts regulated a number of sensi-
tive areas of conflict, including crime between Indians and Americans, 
trade (particularly in liquor and fur), and removal of squatters from 
Indian lands. 449 
Astute frontiersmen realized the government's concern and 
promised to avoid creating negative external effects that would im-
pose costs on the rest of the nation. In petitioning the federal gov-
ernment for land grants, for instance, plaintiffWilliam Mcintosh and 
others emphasized that they were intent on "preserving and securing 
the Friendly Intercourse and Harmony which at present happily sub-
sists between them and those Indian Tribes" and carefully limited 
their requests to "places within the limits of the Indian cessions. "450 
The government took measures aimed at restraining the more se-
vere negative external effects created by lawless squatters. In the 
words of Merriwether Lewis, "[t]he first principle of governing the 
Indians is to govern the whites. "451 Many colonial treaties paid dam-
ages to survivors of Indians wrongfully killed. These provisions were 
"designed to forestall escalating violence between individuals, which 
might result in war."452 Preventing a violent backlash due to squatting 
was one of the primary motivations for the Proclamation of 1763 and 
similar laws precursing the M'Intosh decision.453 
Chief justice Marshall adverted to such policies in M'Intosh, noting 
efforts made so that the tribes' "friendship should be secured by quiet-
ing their alarms for their property. This was to be effected by restrain-
ing the encroachments of the whites.~ Pelatiah Webster, otherwise 
sympathetic to law-abiding frontiersmen, had little patience with those 
squatting on Indian lands and provoking conflict: "For it is 
un[r]easonable that the public tranquillity [sic] [s]hould be endan-
ernment's Indian policy as expressed in the Trade and Intercourse Acts). 
'"
9 See, e.g., Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790, supra note 448 (requiring all citi-
zens who trade with Indians to carry a federal license and codifying treatment of citi-
zens who commit crimes on Indian lands). 
450 Petition to Congress by Inhabitants of Knox, St. Clair, and Rantklph Counties [Indiana 
Territory] (Oct. 22, 1803), reprinted in 7 TERRITORIAL PAPERS, supra note 31, at 125, 127 
(1939). 
-tSJ PRUCHA, supra note 261, at 75 (quoting 7 ORIGINAL JOURNALS OF 1HE LEWIS 
AND CLARK EXPEDmON, 1804-1806, at 378, 387-88 (Reuben Gold Thwaites ed., Anti-
quarian Press Ltd. 1959) (1904-05). 
-t5
2 LARRY C. SKOGEN, Il\'DIAN DEPREDATION CLAIMS, 1796-1920, at 19 (1996). 
m The desire to ensure good relations with the Indians motivated a 1779 Virginia 
ban on settlement north of the Ohio River. See GATES, supra note 64, at 39 (explaining 
the Virginia Legislature's dual concerns of protecting the rights of squatters and main-
taining good relations with the Indians). 
-tS4 Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 597 (1823). 
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gered for the [s]ake of the convenience of a few people, who, without 
the lea[s)t pretence of right, have fixed them[s]elves down on lands not 
their own. "455 
The government made sporadic efforts to remove squatters forci-
bly from Indian land in order to minimize retaliatory attacks.456 Wil-
liam Murray, the driving force behind the lllinois and Wabash land 
Companies, may have participated in such an effort while serving in 
the King's army at Pittsburgh in 1766.457 Removal, however, was ex-
pensive and ineffective. Neither the colonies nor the United States 
was willing to maintain enough troops to monitor a frontier hundreds 
of miles long.458 In the absence of a permanent police force, settlers 
returned a few days after the troops left. If their crops were destroyed 
and their homes demolished, they simply replanted and rebuilt. 459 
Potentially effective alternatives existed. Andrew Jackson, for in-
stance, proposed that troops seize the squatters' cattle, horses, and 
other valuable animals. Because animals were the predominant form 
of personal wealth, such a policy might well have deterred squatters. 
The War Department, however, would not adopt such a harsh pol-
icy.460 As discussed in the previous Part, the government seemed to 
455 WEBSTER, supra note 297, at 495. 
456 In 1745, Pennsylvania ejected setders, destroyed their improvements, and even 
bought land for some "in order to quiet the Indians," but "[i]n defiance of this, men 
persisted in occupying the ground as boldly as they had always done." FORD, supra 
note 364, at 115. Pennsylvania and Virginia took similar measures in the 1760s. See 
VOLWILER, supra note 312, at 218-19 (detailing Pennsylvania's repeated attempts to 
oust squatters from FortPitt);Jack M. Sosin, Britain and the Ohio Valley 1760-1775: The 
Search jQT Alternatives in a Revolutionary Era, in CONTEST FOR EMPIRE, supra note 287, at 
61, 63-64 (discussing failed efforts by the governors of Pennsylvania and Virginia to 
remove squatters). General Harmar removed Ohio Valley squatters in 1785; some re-
turned even after the army destroyed their improvements three times. The general 
told George Washington the effort was hopeless. Despite this abysmal record, the 
United States repeatedly tried to remove squatters from Cherokee lands in 1809. See 
PRUCHA, supra note 6, at 159-60 (describing removal of squatters in response to 
Chickasaws' threat to bum their houses and squatters' subsequent resetdement, neces-
sitating further action). 
457 See Marks, supra note 50, at 191 (describing orders Murray received to remove 
homesteaders at Red Stone Creek). 
458 See PRUCHA, supra note 6, at 165 ("A serious weakness in the protection of the 
Indian Country was the peacetime shortage of troops to enforce the removal of in-
truders."). 
459 See id. at 164 (noting that destruction of setders' improvements and removal of 
catde failed to prevent squatters from returning several days later). 
460 See Letter from George Graham, Acting Secretary of War, to Major General An-
drew Jackson (Aug. 14, 1817), reprinted in 18 TERRITORIAL PAPERS, supra note 31, at 
135-36 (1952) (asserting that the federal government had no jurisdiction to seize stock 
belonging to the squatters). 
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have been concerned with preserving its reputation as a reliable 
guardian. Mter all, the nation could not hope to attract wave after 
wave of land purchasers without a reputation for protecting all fron-
tier settlers. This also explains why, despite the great cost of Indian 
wars, colonists in less exposed regions had little choice but to finish 
the conflagrations begun by their frontier cousins. 
Instead of punishing rogue settlers, the government borrowed a 
colonial practice of paying damages to aggrieved Indians in order to 
limit the external effects of lawless settlers. This approach made eco-
nomic sense and maintained the government's reputation for protect-
ing its citizens. As Prucha noted: 
[The United States] frequently resorted to compensating the families of 
murdered Indians by payment of a fixed sum of money or goods. • • • A 
sum of one to two hundred dollars for each Indian murdered by whites 
was suggested by the secretary of war in 1803, and this amount was regu-
larly given . 
. . . By providing machinery for recovery of losses by peaceful means, 
it eliminated any justification for private retaliation and was largely suc-
ful . . th. ti • . 461 cess m removmg JS nction ...• 
Paying damages was an ex post remedy, made necessary by the na-
tion's difficulty controlling trespasses on Indian land and the inevita-
ble violence that followed. 
Even though the United States had tried to bring some order into the 
western advance by organizing repeated cessions and creating boundary 
lines which for the time being were supposed to be inviolate, the gov-
ernment was never able to stem the illegal advance. Settlers crossed the 
boundary line to obtain choice lands, and the government never mus-
d uffi . .1. J: h . . 462 tere s tctent mt ttary .orce to prevent t e mtrustons. 
Roback notes: 
[H]ow little sovereignty the 'Sovereign' actually had over his subjects. 
The English colonists were themselves sovereign individuals . . . . The 
English Americans made choices subject to the constraints placed on 
them by their own rulers and by the Indians. In many cases, the laws 
were so costly to enforce that they amounted to only a minimal con-
straint on the behavior of individual settlers.463 
461 PRUCHA, supra note 261, at 106-07. The government also compensated whites 
for thefts by Indians, to discourage 'self-help' private retaliation that might have en-
gendered retaliatory Indian violence. 
462 HORSMAN, supra note 90, at 160. 
463 Roback, supra note 190, at 13-14. 
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Mocking George Washington's laments about the difficulty of 
controlling frontiersmen, Limerick archly noted that "[r]ather than 
the government controlling the people, the people-or at least those 
on the far fringes of settlement-had the power to control the gov-
ernment, which is what, after all, democracy is supposed to mean.'o464 
Democracy, however, is a bit more complicated. As discussed 
above, the nation was dealing with a collective action problem: while 
it was in an individual settler's interest to trespass on Indian lands and 
perhaps commit acts of violence, every American would benefit if offi-
cials could restrain settlers.465 This would allow the nation to rely on 
the more orderly and less expensive tools of disease, game-thinning, 
and negotiating advantages to combat Indians, rather than the expen-
sive tool ofviolence. 
In addition, American democracy was capable of solving, at least 
in part, this collective action problem. It is easy to overstate the pow-
erlessness of the United States to control activity on the frontier. 
Moreover, the positive externalities created by squatters diluted the 
government's desire to control them. 
The federal government was sincerely interested in preventing settle-
ment on Indian lands only up to a point . . . . The basic policy of the 
United States intended that white settlement should advance and the 
Indians withdraw. Its interest was primarily that this process should be as 
free of disorder and injustice as possible .... It supported Indian claims 
as far as it could out of justice and humanity to the Indians and above aU 
as Jar as it was necessary to keep a semblance of peace and to maintain Indian 
good will so that continuing cessions of land could be evoked from the 
tribes.466 
Summing up the effects of the Trade & Intercourse Acts, Prucha 
finds that "if the goal was an orderly advance, it was nevertheless ad-
vance of the frontier."467 The United States, by using both the carrot 
(for example, granting title only to those on lands purchased by the 
nation) and the stick (for example, occasionally removing settlers 
from Indian land, at least temporarily) was able to mitigate some of 
the squatters' negative external effects that most threatened the pub-
lic interest. 
The relative effectiveness of American regulation of frontiersmen 
164 LIMERICK, supra note 345, at 192. 
165 See supra text accompanying note 443. (describing the prisoner's dilemma fron-
tier settlers faced). 
466 PRUCHA, supra note 6, at 186-87 (emphasis added). 
167 Id. at 3. 
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contrasts sharply with the tribes' complete inability to police their 
members, especially young ·warriors bent on punishing the trespasses 
and murders committed by settlers.468 Roback argues that the tribes, 
long unsuccessful in regulating citizens in a forest environment, did 
not really try to control members by fiat (majority or otherwise), but 
relied instead on unanimous consent. 469 Roback's theory again high-
lights the Indians' significant bureaucratic disadvantage. The reper-
cussions for the tribes of young warriors' aggression were much more 
severe than for the Americans, yet the Indians could not police their 
own members at all. In contrast, although the United States could not 
control the forested, sparsely-populated frontier as well as it could 
control life in Boston or Philadelphia, its extensive bureaucracy could 
limit activities imposing costs on the rest of the nation. 
The history of the M'Intosh rule as applied against private pur-
chases shows that European governments, based on a developed bu-
reaucratic legal system, could effectively regulate at least some socially 
undesirable behavior effectively. Land speculators, like squatters, of-
ten fomented Indian hostilities. "An avaricious disposition in some of 
our people to acquire large tracts of land and often by unfair means, 
appears to be the principle source of difficulties with the lndians.',470 
South Carolina's colonial legislature cited Indian policy as the motiva-
tion for passing legislation banning private purchases: 
[T]he practice of purchasing lands from the Indians may prove of very 
dangerous consequence to the peace and safety of this Province, such 
purchases being generally obtained from Indians by unfair representa-
tions, fraud and circumvention, or by making them gifts or presents of 
little value, by which practices, great resentments and animosities have 
been created amongst the Indians towards the inhabitants of this Prov-
• 471 
mce. 
When Great Britain took over all Indian affairs in the Proclama-
tion of 1763, it echoed these concerns about speculators' purchases 
from the tribes: "[G]reat frauds and abuses have been committed in 
the purchasing lands of the Indians, to the great prejudice of our in-
463 See SKOGEN, supra note 452, at 20 ("One of the seemingly omnipresent features 
of Indian-white councils has been the repeated admission by Indian leaders that they 
could not control their young men."). 
469 See Roback, supra note 190, at 14-16 (examining political organization of the 
Iro~uois at both the village and tribal levels). 
70 HORSMAN, supra note 90, at 40 (quoting 33 JOURNALS OF TilE CONTINENTAL 
CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 454, 457 (Roscoe R. Hilled., 1936) ). 
471 3 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF So urn CAROUNA, supra note 46, at 525, 525. 
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terest, and to the great dissatisfaction of the said Indians. "472 When 
William Murray purchased the Illinois Company's lands in 1773, Brit-
ish officials "feared that settlements which were rumored to be made 
in the spring by emigrants from the East would irritate the Indians" 
and disrupt the peace. 473 These concerns led to a proclamation in 
1774 reaffirming the policy against private purchases of Indian 
lands.474 Other large prerevolutionary land speculation schemes 
raised the same concerns.475 The New York Constitution of 1777 justi-
fied its ban on private purchases on the "great importance of this 
state, that peace and amity with the Indians within the same, be at all 
times supported and maintained; and that the frauds too often prac-
tised towards the Indians, in contracts made for their lands, had, in 
divers[e] instances, been productive of dangerous discontents and 
animosities. "476 
The same divergence between individual and societal costs that 
drove squatter activity also drove speculators to buy land despite prob-
able adverse consequences to others. 
Land speculators were unconcerned that their actions aroused the tribes 
and could lead to another bloody Indian war ••.• Since the lands be-
tween the mountains and the Ohio were said to be so extremely fertile, 
"people will run all risques [sic] whether from Governments or from In-
dians" to settle there "without the least plea ofRight."477 
As Roback observes, "a fraudulent transaction with the Indians 
could have substantial spillover effects on other colonists if the Indi-
472 GATES, supra note 64, at 34 (citation omitted). 
475 Marks, supra note 50, at 202 (summarizing a letter from General Haldimand to 
Dartmouth, Secretary of State (Nov. 3, 1773) ); see also JACK M. SOSIN, WHITEHALL & 
1HE WILDERNESS: THE MIDDLE WEST IN BRmSH COLONIAL POLICY, 1760-1775, at 233 
(1961). 
474 On March 10, 1774, General Haldimand issued a proclamation prohibiting the 
private purchase of land from the Indians. SeeSOSIN, supra note 473, at 233 (describ-
ing the aftermath of Murray's land purchases). 
475 In explaining the delay in approving the Vandalia scheme (founded on an In-
dian deed to a large tract of land in Ohio, West Virginia, and Indiana) officials de-
clared that "[t]he government was also much concerned over the unlicensed emigra-
tions into the interior parts of America. It was feared that this movement westward 
would likely lead to an Indian war, which would prove detrimental to the older colo-
nies and expensive to the crown." LEWIS, supra note 65, at 126 (citing extracts from 
PA. CHRONICLE,june 7, 1773). 
476 N.Y. CONST. ofl777, art. 37 ("[N]o purchases or contracts for the sale of lands, 
made with, or of the said Indians, shall be binding on them, or deemed valid, unless 
made under the authority and with the consent of the legislature."). 
477 SOSIN, supra note 473, at 122-23 (quoting Letter from Virginia Lieutenant Gov-
ernor Fauquier to Shelburne, Head of British Board ofTrade (Dec. 18, 1766)). 
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ans chose to make reprisals more or less at random.'o478 Speculators 
were much less likely than even squatters to suffer at the hands of In-
dians who felt cheated or betrayed by their leaders. How likely '\vas it 
that a merchant member of the United Illinois and Wabash Compa-
nies, sitting in a Philadelphia counting house, would suffer at the 
hands of angry young warriors? 
The long line of statutes, proclamations, and court decisions bar-
ring private purchases, culminating in M'Intosh, eventually curbed 
such purchases. There were few, if any, attempts by private groups to 
purchase Indian lands after the Revolution. This policy both reduced 
Europeans' actions that provoked Indians to violence, and helped 
maintain a united front in the purchase oflndian lands.479 The Indian 
tribes, on the other hand, lacked the governmental structure to regu-
late their members' activities. Their closest equivalents to speculators 
were perhaps the tribal chiefs who sold them land, claiming to repre-
sent entire tribes. Members found it difficult to regulate chiefs who, 
acting as disloyal agents, took bribes in return for selling tribal lands 
fi al . 480 at re-s e pnces. 
3. Positive Externalities of Trade 
In addition to small-scale squatters and large-scale land specula-
tors, Europeans trading in personal property defrauded the Indians 
and provoked violent reprisals against others. 
Fraud and illegal practices on the part of traders stirred up Indian in-
dignation and anger and thus led to frequent retaliations against the 
white community. In an attempt to prevent abuses, multifarious legisla-
tion regulating the conditions of the trade was enacted .... Because the 
Indian trade had such close bearing on the public welfare, the colonial 
. . d . f 1481 governments ms1ste on stnct measures o contro . 
478 Roback, supra note 190, at 12. 
479 See supra Part II.B (describing the governing of European-Indian relations and 
the creation of a united front among European sovereigns). 
480 See supra Part II.B.2.c. 
481 PRUCHA, supra note 261, at 18-19. Europeans feared negative external effects of 
trading arms and liquor with the Indians. Guns made the Indians much more formi-
dable military foes; drunkenness often resulted in random acts of violence. "At times 
the Massachusetts government, like those in other colonies, prohibited the sale of cer-
tain articles to the natives to ensure colonial security and peace. . . . Conspicuous 
among such commodities were firearms and alcohol." KAWASHIMA, supra note 33, at 
79. The United States enacted similar provisions in the Trade and Intercourse Acts. 
See PRUCHA, supra note 261, at 19 (describing restrictions on sales of arms and rum to 
Indians). 
HeinOnline -- 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1184 1999-2000
1184 UNIVERSITYOFPENNSYLVANIALAWREVIEW [Vol.l48: 1065 
These problems in part motivated the Trade and Intercourse Acts. 
Fair trade, however, had significant positive externalities. Tribes de-
pendent upon European settlers for a host of necessities (such as guns 
for tribes that had lost the art of making and using bows, or metal pots 
and pans for tribes that had lost the art of making pottery) were much 
less likely to resist European pressure for land. This explains, for in-
stance, why Massachusetts subsidized the Indian trade long after it had 
become unprofitable: "The Indians were no longer valuable custom-
ers, and truck trading cost the colony large sums of money, although 
not nearly so much as was expended in Indian wars."482 United States 
officials took a similar view and advocated trade as a way "to conciliate 
the affections of a distressed and unhappy people, and as it might 
prevent the expense of a war with them . . . . It was clear as a sun-
beam, one representative remarked, that the establishment of a trade 
must be the foundation ofamity."483 
President Jefferson defended federally financed trading houses, 
despite the losses they generated, because trade was "the cheapest & 
most effectual instrument we can use for preserving the friendship of 
the Indians."484 A decade later, an official counseled the Senate 
against worrying about financial problems in the Indian trade "facto-
ries" run by the federal government. The justification for the system, 
he said, "must be found in the influence which it gives the Govern-
ment over the Indian tribes within our limits . . . . The most obvious 
effect of that influence is the preservation of peace with them, and 
th 1 ,485 among emse ves. 
F. Putting the Pieces Together: The Algorithm 
of Efficient Expropriation 
By a repeated process of drawing on natural allies and providing 
These laws, however, did not work. Indians obtained arms and liquor from settlers 
willing to risk breaking the law to earn high profits, or from agents of other nations 
competing for the Indians' trade and military assistance. See KA.wASmMA, supra note 
33, at 82 (noting that "[a]s long as the colonists wanted fur from them .•. the Indians 
had no difficulty in securing liquor and firearms, with or without legal permission"); 
Anderson 8c McChesney, supra note 16, at 60 (noting that "Indians usuaJly were able to 
obtain new weapons ... almost as soon as they were available to whites"). The high 
costs of enforcing even a limited trade embargo meant that this collective action prob-
lem was unsolvable. 
482 KAWASmMA, supra note 33, at 90-91 (internal quotations and citation omitted). 
4
ss PRUCHA, supra note 261, at 116 (quotations and citation omitted). 
484 Letter from President jefferson to Secretary of War Dearborn (Aug. 12, 1802), 
reprinted in 7 TERRITORIAL PAPERS, supra note 31, at 68 (1939). 
485 PRUCHA, supra note 261, at 127 (quotations and citation omitted). 
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them with legal rules to encourage socially useful acts (those with 
positive external effects) and to discourage socially harmful acts 
(those with negative external effects), the Europeans managed to ex-
propriate Indian lands very cheaply. 
The process, broken down into components of a repeated "loop," 
looks almost like a computer program: 
Step (1): exploiting its more united front, its military superiority, its 
negotiating advantages, its superior ability to rein in troublemak-
ers, and the trade dependency of the tribes, the United States buys 
Indian borderlands for pennies on the dollar; 
Step (2): the nation then moves settlements into the lands purchased 
from the Indians, and spurs migration with subsidized land trans-
fers; 
Step (3): these settlers kill Indians by spreading diseases and thin 
game by clearing land and hunting-both making land less valu-
able to the Indians; 
Step ( 4): go to Step (1) and repeat the process. 
G. Analogizing Efficient Conquest to Eminent Domain 
This Article posits that, more than anything else, cost minimiza-
tion explains the laws and policies employed by the United States to 
expropriate Indian lands. This expropriation 'vas a gargantuan proj-
ect, so it is not surprising that the United States employed a wide vari-
ety of means to achieve this end. Before concluding, it is interesting 
and enlightening to consider how the United States would have 
achieved the same ends if its citizens owned the coveted acreage. 
Assume that, instead of Indians, a relatively small group of moun-
tain men owned "the west" and wished to maintain their pre-
agricultural way oflife in the face of encroaching civilization. There is 
no question that the United States could, and likely would, have em-
ployed the power of eminent domain to take frontier lands, paying 
the constitutionally required just compensation. In computing this 
just compensation, moreover, the courts would not weigh any senti-
mental (subjective) value that the frontier population attached to 
their way of life.486 They would instead pay the value of the land in its 
480 See 3 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 8.07 (Julius L. Sackman ed., rev. 3d ed. 
1999) (discussing the just compensation to which an owner is entitled in terms of eco-
nomic loss sustained by the owner). But if. Jack L. Knetsch & Thomas E. Borcherding, 
Expropriatim of Private Property and the Basis for Compensation, 29 U. TORONTO LJ. 237 
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highest and best use, excluding the increment in value due to the 
governmentally supervised project of bringing the land under cultiva-
tion and intense settlement.487 The frontiersmen would no doubt find 
such compensation incomplete, yet to award them more would 
amount to forcing society to share the gains from the land's higher-
value use with the frontiersman. Governments have the power of 
eminent domain precisely in order to avoid such windfalls to owners 
of assets of significant public value.488 
Now substitute the Indians for the frontiersmen. In the eyes of 
the European colonizers, the Indians were underutilizing a continent. 
By converting the economy from hunting and gathering to agriculture 
and industry, the United States and its predecessors knew that they 
could create much more wealth-as they defined the term.489 Thus, 
the same thinking that justifies eminent domain may also have made 
Americans comfortable with all the devices employed to obtain Indian 
lands cheaply. They saw no reason to share the gains, due to intro-
ducing agriculture and a more technologically advanced society, with 
the relatively few existing owners unable to put the land to such 
higher-value uses. 
There is no doubt that, from the Americans' perspective, expro-
priating land and selling it to settlers was a very profitable enterprise. 
The United States usually paid less than two cents an acre for land east 
of the Mississippi.490 This fell far below the value of the land to the na-
(1979) (noting the possible inefficiency of failing to pay owners for their subjective 
(above-market) valuation of their property). 
487 When considering just compensation where property is taken by eminent do-
main, 
[t]he general rule forbids consideration of the effect of the proposed project 
upon the value of the property taken. If, however, the present adaptability of 
such property for the projected use is a determinative factor in creating a spe-
cial demand for such property ... , it does have a real and substantial effect 
upon its market value .... 
3 NICHOlS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 486, § 8.07. 
488 See Eric Kades, Avoiding Takings "Accidents": A Tart Perspective on Takings Law, 28 
U. RICH. L. REv. 1235, 1254 (1994) {discussing how the government's power of emi-
nenet domain stops a land owner from holding out for the additional land value cre-
ated by the planned government project). 
489 See supra Part I.A (summarizing colonists' assertions that agricultural societies 
had rights to land superior to those of hunter-gatherer groups). Thomas Flanagan 
interprets the colonists' argument as a form of eminent domain, as long as transferring 
the land from Indians to Europeans was Pareto efficient. See Thomas Flanagan, The 
Agricultural Argument and Original Appropriation: Indian Lands andPoliticalPMlosophy, 22 
CANJ- POL. SCI. 589,596-99 (1989). 
4 See PRUCHA, supra note 205, at 122-25 (citing instances when land was pur-
chased for less than two cents per acre); 7TERRITORIAL PAPERS, supra note 31, at 256-
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tion and its land-hungry settlers. Lewis Cass advised the Secretary of 
War in 1817 not to quibble too much about the details of land ces-
sions from the Indians, since "[u]nder any circumstances, [the con-
sideration we pay] will fall infinitely short of the pecuniary and politi-
cal value of the country obtained.,491 
All the time that "the United States had been refusing to pay the 
Indians more than two cents an acre for even the best land ... the 
government charged its own western settlers two dollars an acre.',492 
While the record is spotty, there is strong evidence that administrative 
and transaction costs consumed only a small portion of this $1.98 
spread. 
Expenses incurred by the national government till the War of 1812 for 
surveying, officials' salaries, and boards of commissioners [in Indiana] 
were about $90,000. This amount was approximately equal to the sales 
during the first five months at the Vincennes land office alone. In fact, 
sales at either of the two Indiana offices for five years beginning in 1812 
were greater than all governmental expenditures made for pr~aring 
and offering lands from 1789 to the middle of the [War of1812].4 
Recasting expropriation as an analog of eminent domain rein-
forces one of the rationales for the M'lntosh decision: preventing 
speculators from reaping part of the gains from expropriation that 
came about in large part because of the combined power of all Ameri-
cans, organized by their government. Just as the M'lntosh decision 
57, 301-03 (1939) (providing letters indicating the same); Letter from Secretary of 
War Dearborn to Charles Jouett (1805), reprinted in AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, supra 
note 81, I INDIAN AFFAIRS 702-03 (1832) (stating that "[t]he price usually given for In-
dian cessions ... has not exceeded one cent per acre"); Smith, supra note 37, at 230 
(recounting how between two and three million acres of land were sold for less than 
two cents per acre). 
491 Letter from Governor Cass to Acting Secretary of War Graham (Apr. 17, 1817), 
reprinted in .AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, supra note 81, 2 INDIAN AFFAIRS 136, 136. 
492 HORSMAN, supra note 90, at 130-31 (discussing the American purchase of 
Creeks lands around 1805). While the United States did not always obtain the statu-
tory reservation price of two dollars an acre, for many choice tracts it obtained consid-
erably more. On average, two dollars an acre is a lower bound on the price the United 
States received for acres sold to settlers. See THOMAS DONALDSON, THE PuBuc 
DOMAIN: ITS HISTORY, WITH STATISTICS 203 tbl., 520-21 fold-out tbl., 522-23 fold-out 
tbl. ( 1884) (providing statistics on Indian land sales that indicate prices of at least two 
dollars per acre); GATES, supra note 64, at 132 tbl., 133 tbl. (providing data regarding 
collections and average prices on sold lands). 
493 Bayard, supra note 220, at 266 (citing 8 TERRITORIAL PAPERS, supra note 31, at 
362 (1939)); see also ADAM SEYBERT, STATISTICAL ANNALS 367-68 (Ben Franklin Press 
1969) (1818) (providing summary statements regarding sales of land from 1812 to 
1817); Expense of Surveying and Selling the Public Lands, and of Ascertaining Titles 
to Private Claims (Feb. 26, 1813), reprinted in AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, supra note 81, 2 
PuBuc LANDs 739. 
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denied speculators the value derived from the efforts of others in a 
society-wide project, in eminent domain law, landowners receive no 
portion of the higher value that will result from the government's 
planned use. 494 
The nation did not invoke eminent domain against the Indians 
because it could not: they did not recognize the power of the United 
States unilaterally to oust them and decide the fair value of their land. 
This subsection argues that all the techniques used to expropriate In-
dian lands, taken together, were an alternative process to effectively 
condemn Indian lands in exchange for compensation deemed fair by 
the United States. The Indians, in the end, were treated no differ-
ently than landowners who refuse to leave their property despite the 
promise or actual payment of just compensation; they were forcibly 
removed if necessary and payment was still made. 
Ultimately, as their ability to resist dissipated, payments to Indians 
for their land came to look almost exactly like just compensation. 
While later judicial decisions permitted the government to take land 
without paying compensation/95 but by statute or executive decision, 
the United States continued to pay for expropriated Indian lands.496 
494 See supra notes 486-88 and accompanying text (providing sources that support 
and explain this principle of eminent domain law). 
495 See Lone Wolfv. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903) (holding that the United Stares 
may unilaterally abrogate treaties with tribes, and thus take away property rights guar-
anteed to the tribes under treaty); Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 965 
(1955) (holding that tribes had no constitutional right to just compensation for ex-
propriation of their title of occupancy). As noted, TeerHit-Ton, along with Lone Wolf, 
seem inconsistent with M'Intosh, which defended Indian title against outright seizure 
except in the case of a just (defensive) war. If, as this Article argues, the basis for the 
holding in M'Intosh is custom, there is no reason that later cases cannot modify the 
rule to account for changed circumstances. Where a weaker nation prior to 1823 sacri-
ficed nothing by conceding that it was legally required to pay for what it could not take 
cheaply, a more developed, powerful nation (especially after the Civil War) could seize 
land more cheaply and found no value in the portion of the M'Intosh rule that forbade 
outright seizure. Moreover, despite the rule enunciated in Lone Wolf, the United States 
continued to pay for Indian land in almost every case (even after wars of conquest). 
See supra notes 3-7 and accompanying text (describing instances where the U.S. gov-
ernment purchased land, even after Lone Wolj). The United States did so for the same 
reason it always had before: fighting involves deadweight loss and negotiated settle-
ments offer gains from trade for both sides. See supra Part II.C (discussing the advan-
tages of negotiated settlement over fighting). 
496 
"Starting with the Rosebud Act in February 1904, individual statutes opened 
reservations to taking at congressionally set prices, rather than prices negotiated with 
the Indian owners." Fred S. McChesney, Guvemment as Dfjiner of Property Rights: Indian 
Lands, Ethnic Externalities, and Bureaucratic Budgets, 19 J. LEGAL SruD. 297, 313 n.57 
(1990) (citing FREDERICK E. HOXIE, A FINAL PROMISE: THE CAMPAIGN TO AssiMILATE 
INDIANS, 1880-1920, at 157 (1984)). While determining just compensation is tradi-
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Expropriation long resembled eminent domain in substance; formal 
similarities followed. 
CONCLUSION 
The breadth and complexity of the legal rules used to simulate 
condemnation seem daunting, yet expropriating an entire continent 
was, in effect, a business enterprise of massive proportions. Adam 
Smith marveled at the division of labor in an 18th-century pin fac-
tory. 497 It is unsurprising that the much larger task of taking over an 
entire continent required an even greater division oflabor. 
The government coordinated this division of labor. With its cus-
tomary rule against private purchases of Indian land, reaffirmed in 
M'Intosh, the state prevented competitive bidding for Indian lands. It 
drew on a special cadre of career Indian negotiators to buy land 
cheaply. The government further passed laws to channel the flow of 
settlers and to regulate their antisocial acts. 
In all of these laws, as in Adam Smith's pin factory, the bottom 
line was the bottom line: acquiring Indian lands at least cost. In this 
complex enterprise, the means of minimizing cost were not simple. 
Threats against a formidable foe, while of some use, were often not 
credible, and so the United States pursued all the negotiating tricks 
discussed in Part II.B.2 of this Article. Moreover, the nation, whether 
intentionally or not, benefited from the biological and dietary differ-
ences between Indians and settlers, which weakened Indian resistance 
by spreading disease and thinning game. 
The historical record provides strong support for the positive the-
sis that the desire for cheap land shaped America's Indian policy. 
That is not to say that it is impossible to make a normative case one 
·way or the other. It is clear, however, that both the benevolent and 
malevolent schools must craft more sophisticated arguments. Charges 
of intentional genocide are simply inconsistent with most legal rules 
governing Indian relations. Conversely, attempts to whitewash every-
thing from the M'Intosh monopsony, to fraud and threats, to seem-
ingly intentional reliance on game-thinning, cannot paint over these 
dark facts. 
tionally a judicial function beyond the legislative power, congressionally determined 
prices for Indian land are much more akin to a taking than to the negotiated pur-
chases typical in the M'Intosh era. 
•
97 See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INfO THE NATIJRE 8c CAUSES OF THE WEAL Til OF 
NATIONS 5 (Edwin Cannan ed., 1937) ("[T]en persons [working in a pin factory], 
therefore, could make among them upwards offorty-eight thousand pins in a day."). 
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Whatever the ultimate normative conclusion, the entire process of 
expropriating America is a stunning example of Hirschleifer's muscu-
lar economics-the "dark side" of efficiency. History is replete with 
the more obvious forms of expropriation: war and plunder. This Ar-
ticle has shown the wide variety of subtler, yet potent, and certainly 
cheaper means by which the United States obtained Indian lands 
"tranquilly, legally, philanthropically, without shedding blood, and 
without violating a single great principle of morality in the eyes of the 
world."498 
498 DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note l, at 355. 
